United States v. Castillo

Decision Date04 June 2018
Docket NumberAugust Term 2017,No. 16-4129-cr,16-4129-cr
Citation896 F.3d 141
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Juan CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Sagar K. Ravi, Assistant United States Attorney (Margaret Garnett, Sarah K. Eddy, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Joon H. Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of the United States, for Appellant.

Barry D. Leiwant, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., for Defendant-Appellee.

Nikki Kowalski, Deputy Solicitor General for Criminal Matters, for Barbara D. Underwood, Acting Attorney General for the State of New York, as Amicus Curiae.

Before: Cabranes, Raggi, Circuit Judges, and Vilardo, District Judge.*

José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals from an October 6, 2016 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Gregory H. Woods, Judge ) convicting defendant-appellee Juan Castillo, following his plea of guilty, of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentencing him principally to nineteen months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, the government argues that the District Court erred when it found that Castillo’s prior New York conviction for manslaughter in the first degree, in violation of New York Penal Law Section 125.20(1), did not qualify as a "crime of violence" for enhancement purposes under the enumerated offenses in Application Note 1 of the commentary to Section 4B1.2 of the November 1, 2015 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines," "U.S.S.G.," or simply "Guidelines").

This case presents four questions:

(1) Whether the government waived any arguments based on the former "residual clause" of Guidelines Section 4B1.2(a)(2) when, before the District Court, it conceded that the clause was void for vagueness;
(2) What the so-called "generic definition" of "manslaughter" is;
(3) Whether the elements of manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1), are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense of "manslaughter"; and
(4) Whether the District Court erred in calculating the applicable advisory range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines when it found that manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1), does not qualify as a "crime of violence" under Application Note 1 of the commentary to Section 4B1.2 of the November 1, 2015 edition of the Guidelines.

We conclude:

(1) The government did not waive arguments based on the former "residual clause" of Guidelines Section 4B1.2(a)(2);
(2) The generic definition of "manslaughter" includes the unlawful killing of another human being recklessly;
(3) Manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1), is narrower than the generic definition of "manslaughter"; and
(4) The District Court erred when it found that Castillo’s prior conviction for manslaughter in the first degree under New York law, N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1), did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under Application Note 1 of the commentary to Section 4B1.2 of the November 1, 2015 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Accordingly, we set aside the District Court’s sentence of Castillo and REMAND the cause to the District Court for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND
A.

On or about May 11, 2003, defendant-appellee Juan Castillo shot and killed a man in Bronx County, New York. Castillo was indicted for the shooting and charged in six counts, including one count for manslaughter in the first degree, a felony, in violation of New York Penal Law Section 125.20(1).1

On February 2, 2006, Castillo was convicted in New York State Supreme Court, Bronx County, of manslaughter in the first degree ("2006 Manslaughter Conviction"). Before the District Court, the parties here agreed that this conviction was "under subsection 1 of New York Penal Law 125.20."2 Castillo subsequently served his sentence.

B.

On November 11, 2015, Castillo was arrested in the Bronx after he threw a bag containing a loaded .22 caliber revolver out of an apartment window. On March 30, 2016, the government filed an indictment in the Southern District of New York charging Castillo with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).3 The parties did not reach a plea agreement, and Castillo pleaded guilty to the sole count in the indictment on June 6, 2016.

C.

At sentencing, the government and Castillo disputed the applicable advisory range under the Sentencing Guidelines. As relevant here, the parties disagreed on two issues: (1) whether to apply the August 1, 2016 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines ("August 2016 Guidelines"), or the November 1, 2015 edition ("November 2015 Guidelines"); and (2) whether Castillo’s 2006 Manslaughter Conviction was a "crime of violence" resulting in a "career offender" enhancement under either or both editions of the Guidelines.

These issues are interrelated because of constitutional considerations resting on the Ex Post Facto Clause.4 A sentencing court typically applies the Guidelines Manual in place at the time of sentencing , which here is the August 2016 Guidelines.5 There is, however, "an ex post facto violation when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher applicable Guidelines sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense ,"6 which here is the November 2015 Guidelines. Consequently, the sentencing court was required to calculate the advisory range under both editions of the Guidelines—and in so doing consider whether Castillo’s 2006 Manslaughter Conviction was a "crime of violence" under each edition—in order to determine which edition to apply.

1. Castillo’s position at sentencing

Castillo took the position that the District Court should apply the November 2015 Guidelines. He argued that those Guidelines produced a lower advisory range than the August 2016 Guidelines because, under the November 2015 Guidelines, his 2006 Manslaughter Conviction did not constitute a "crime of violence."

Castillo acknowledged that his prior conviction for manslaughter in the first degree under New York law would have qualified as a "crime of violence" under the "residual clause" of Section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines.7 But Castillo contended—and the government conceded—that because the Supreme Court decided in Johnson v. United States8 that the "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") was unconstitutional, the identically worded provision in the Guidelines was likewise unconstitutional.9 That meant Castillo’s 2006 Manslaughter Conviction could constitute a "crime of violence" only if it qualified as such under some other provision in Section 4B1.2. The problem for the government, according to Castillo, was that no other provision covered his prior offense.

Castillo observed that, because the government had conceded that the "residual clause" was void for vagueness, the government could only rely on two other Guidelines provisions to argue that manslaughter in the first degree under New York law was a "crime of violence" under Section 4B1.2 : (1) the "force clause"10 and (2) the enumerated offenses in Application Note 1 of the commentary.11 Neither, Castillo said, applied to his prior offense. He argued that the government could not rely on the "force clause" because manslaughter in the first degree under New York law could be committed by omission, and thus did not necessarily require the use of force. And the government could not rely on Application Note 1’s enumeration of "manslaughter," according to Castillo, because that provision was merely an interpretation of the section’s "residual clause," which the parties agreed was void.

Because there could be no enhancement for a prior "crime of violence," Castillo argued, the applicable November 2015 advisory Guidelines range for his instant offense was 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. Castillo requested a below-Guidelines sentence of one-year and one-day imprisonment, to be followed by supervised release.

2. The government’s position at sentencing

The government responded that Castillo’s 2006 Manslaughter Conviction was a "crime of violence" under both the November 2015 and August 2016 Guidelines. It then calculated an advisory range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment under the August 2016 Guidelines, and recommended that the District Court impose a sentence within the Guidelines range.

In arguing that Castillo’s prior conviction was a "crime of violence" under the November 2015 Guidelines, the government expressly disclaimed reliance on the "residual clause" of Section 4B1.2(a)(2). It instead focused on the "force clause" and the enumerated offenses in Application Note 1.12

Manslaughter in the first degree under New York law qualified as a "crime of violence" under the "force clause," the government contended, because the offense necessarily involves knowingly or intentionally causing bodily harm. The government also argued that the offense was a "crime of violence" under Application Note 1, because Application Note 1 had independent force and enumerated "manslaughter" as a "crime of violence."

3. The District Court’s sentencing

The District Court sentenced Castillo on October 6, 2016. In an oral ruling, the District Court largely adopted Castillo’s arguments, and concluded that his 2006 Manslaughter Conviction was not a "crime of violence" under the November 2015 Guidelines. Applying those earlier Guidelines, the District Court arrived at an advisory range of 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. The District Court sentenced Castillo principally to 19 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.

The District Court entered judgment on October 6, 2016.

D.

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