United States v. Castro

• Decision Date: 14 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 18-10137,18-10137
• Citation: 4 F.4th 345
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Adrian CASTRO, Defendant—Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

4 F.4th 345

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.Adrian CASTRO, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 18-10137

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED July 14, 2021

Jonathan Glen Bradshaw, Leigha Amy Simonton, Assistant United States Attorneys, U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

James Matthew Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Northern District of Texas, Amarillo, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Ho, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:

A judge on our court granted Adrian Castro a certificate of appealability ("COA"). It's undisputed that the COA is invalid under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)–(3) because it fails to specify a constitutional issue. The only question is what we should do about it. We vacate the COA and dismiss the appeal.

I.

Adrian Castro plotted and executed a spree of violent thefts against United States postal workers. The Government indicted Castro and charged him with, inter alia , violating 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) by assaulting mail carriers and putting their lives in danger, and violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(3)(B) by using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. Castro pleaded guilty to the relevant charges, and the district court sentenced him to 552 months in prison. This sentence included four concurrent sentences for 168 months based on the fact that Castro "put[ ] his [victims’] li[ves] in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon." 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a). Castro did not appeal. His conviction became final on July 15, 2004.

Twelve years later, Castro filed his first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That was long after the one-year limitations period provided in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). But Castro argued he should get a new limitations period based on Johnson v. United States , 576 U.S. 591, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (providing a new one-year limitations period where the Supreme Court recognizes a new right and makes it retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review). The magistrate judge determined that Johnson ’s holding as to the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) was inapplicable to Castro's conviction under § 924(c)(3)(B). Thus, Castro did not get the benefit of § 2255(f)(3), and his motion was time-barred. Castro objected to the report and recommendation, albeit with a concession that his argument was foreclosed by binding Fifth Circuit precedent. The district court adopted the report and recommendation, denied Castro relief, and denied a COA.

Castro then asked our court for a COA. One judge of our court granted a COA on a single procedural ground: "whether the district court erred by denying Castro's § 2255 motion as untimely."

II.

Prisoners challenging their custody are not like ordinary litigants. For over a century, Congress has required prisoners—unlike anyone else appealing a judgment—to receive permission before appealing. We first explain that permission requirement. Then we vacate Castro's COA.

A.

In 1908, Congress took away the appeal-as-of-right from state prisoners. See An Act restricting in certain cases the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in habeas proceedings, 35 Stat. 40, 40 (1908). In its place, Congress instituted the certificate of probable cause ("CPC") procedure. The CPC procedure required a state prisoner to obtain certification from "the United States court by which the final decision was rendered or a justice of the Supreme Court" that "probable cause for an appeal" existed. Ibid. This prerequisite to appeal served to preempt frivolous petitions and prevent the expenditure of precious judicial resources on meritless cases. See Davis v. Jacobs , 454 U.S. 911, 917, 102 S.Ct. 417, 70 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[C]ongress[ ] ... impose[d] th[e] [CPC] requirement as a means of terminating frivolous appeals in habeas corpus proceedings.").

In 1948, Congress broadened the types of judicial officers empowered to grant CPCs to include circuit judges in addition to Supreme Court justices. See An Act to revise, codify, and enact into law title 28 of the United States Code entitled "Judicial Code and Judiciary," 62 Stat. 869, 967 (1948). And although the statute did not designate the substantive standard for probable cause, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner seeking certification must offer a "substantial showing of the denial of a federal right." Barefoot v. Estelle , 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (quotation omitted).

A tidal shift occurred in 1996 when Congress enacted AEDPA, which overhauled the statutory framework governing habeas corpus with an eye towards "eliminat[ing] delays in the federal habeas review process." Holland v. Florida , 560 U.S. 631, 648, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) ; see Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Section 2253(c)(2), as amended by AEDPA, retained the certification requirement but changed the name to a "certificate of appealability." And instead of permitting an appeal anytime a prisoner made "a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right," Barefoot , 463 U.S. at 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383 (emphasis added), AEDPA elevated the standard and limited appeals to only those cases in which an applicant makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (emphasis added). As directly relevant here, AEDPA applied the certificate requirement for the first time to federal prisoners like Castro. See United States v. Orozco , 103 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting "a pre-AEDPA § 2255 movant was not required to obtain [a CPC] in order to appeal the final order in a § 2255 proceeding to a court of appeals").

Today, state and federal prisoners face the same hurdle to noticing an appeal: The applicant must obtain a COA by making "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The requirement that a COA identify a constitutional issues serves the same interest as the earlier CPC requirement—namely to "screen[ ] out issues unworthy of judicial time and attention" and to "ensure[ ] that frivolous claims are not assigned to merits panels." Gonzalez v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 145, 132 S.Ct. 641, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012). In short, the COA requirement serves a gatekeeping function. See Jennings v. Stephens , 574 U.S. 271, 291–92, 135 S.Ct. 793, 190 L.Ed.2d 662 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (describing the history and purpose of the COA requirement).

The must-identify-a-constitutional-issue requirement is not diminished where a district court denies relief on procedural grounds. See Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). To obtain a COA in such a circumstance, an applicant must show "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id. at 478, 120 S.Ct. 1595. The rationale for these rules is simple: If a prisoner must eventually prove a constitutional violation to secure release from custody, his appeal should proceed only if he can prove a debatable constitutional issue at the outset. A procedural-only appeal is much ado about nothing. See, e.g. , id. at 483–84, 120 S.Ct. 1595 (holding that a COA applicant "must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"); Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ("[ Section] 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a petitioner has made a ‘substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ ").

Most recently, the Supreme Court confronted a COA issued by our court that is materially identical to the COA our court issued in this case. See Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 138, 132 S.Ct. 641. Here are the two Fifth Circuit COAs side-by-side:

Gonzalez v. Thaler	United States v. Castro
"whether the habeas application was timely filed"	"whether the district court erred by denying Castro's § 2255 motion as untimely"

The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that such a COA is invalid because it says nothing at all about the Constitution. See Gonzalez , 565 U.S. at 141, 132 S.Ct. 641 (eight justices agreeing that a procedural-only COA is invalid); id. at 155, 132 S.Ct. 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a procedural-only COA is invalid and also constitutes a jurisdictional defect). And although an invalid COA does not deprive us of jurisdiction, the Court nevertheless held that the commands in § 2253(c)(2) and (c)(3) are "mandatory." Id. at 154, 132 S.Ct. 641 (majority op.).

B.

Given Gonzalez and the Court's unanimous judgment, both sides unsurprisingly agree that Castro's COA is invalid. The Government asks us to vacate it. The Federal Public Defender ("FPD") says that once a COA is issued, it cannot be vacated—no matter how badly it conflicts with the COA requirements enacted by Congress and affirmed by the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court.

We agree with the Government. The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished us that procedural-only COAs are invalid. We've refused to follow those instructions before, and we've been reversed for the refusal. Today we resolve to follow the statute that Congress wrote and to forswear procedural-only COAs. "Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not accept [the] invitation to have one last drink." Alexander v. Sandoval , 532 U.S. 275, 287, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001).

This approach accords with other habeas doctrines. Take for example Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Like the COA requirement, the nonretroactivity doctrine serves the interests of judicial economy, efficiency, and...