United States v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co.

• Citation: 157 F. 893
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO.
• Decision Date: 27 September 1907
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

157 F. 893

UNITED STATES v. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

September 27, 1907

Penalties 33

(Syllabus by the Court.

The safety appliance act is a remedial statute, and must be so construed as to accomplish the intent of Congress. Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 25 Sup.Ct 158, 49 L.Ed. 363.

The only exceptions to the safety appliance acts were those found in the proviso of section 6 of the act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 532, c. 196), as amended April 1, 1896 (29 Stat. 85, c 87 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3175)), and in section 1 of the act of March 2, 1903 (32 Stat. 943, c. 976 U.S. Comp. St Supp. 1907, p. 885)).

The provisions of section 2 of the original safety appliance act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. 531, c. 196 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)), and section 1 of the act of March 2, 1903 (32 Stat. 943, c. 976 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 885)), require that each end of every car must be equipped with a coupler operative in and of itself.

It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. It need not show the facts constituting a violation beyond a reasonable doubt.

When the evidence shows that one end of a car was not provided with a coupler, but that the other was so provided, and, if the employe was standing on a certain side of the car, he could make the coupling and uncoupling without going between the cars, but could not make this coupling and uncoupling if on the opposite side, this is not a compliance with the law.

O. D. Street, U.S. Atty., and Luther M. Walter, Special Asst. U.S. atty.

London & London, for defendant.

HUNDLEY District Judge (charging jury).

This is an action brought by the United States to recover the sum of $200 claimed to have been incurred as penalties by the defendant for hauling two cars, which it is alleged did not comply with the requirements of the act of Congress known as the 'Federal Safety Appliance Act.' This statute was enacted in 1893, and one of its provisions is that it is unlawful to use any car in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of a man going between the ends of the cars. This condition, 'without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars,' applies to the act of coupling, as well as to the act of uncoupling. This was the holding of the Supreme Court in the case of Johnson v. Southern Pacific Company, 196 U.S. 1, 25 Sup.Ct. 158, 49 L.Ed. 363.

This act of Congress is a remedial statute, and it is the duty of the court to so construe its provisions as to accomplish the intent of Congress--to protect the lives and limbs of men engaged in interstate commerce. This intent is shown as well by the title of the act as by its provisions. The title is:

'An act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads.'

The language of the statute is mandatory. The only exception contained in the act is that it shall not apply to trains composed of four-wheel cars or to trains composed of standard logging cars, where the height of such car from top of rail to center of coupling does not exceed 25 inches, or to locomotives used in hauling such trains, when such cars or locomotives are exclusively used for the transportation of logs. It is not claimed, gentlemen of the jury, that either of the two cars sued upon fall within this exception. In order, therefore, for the plaintiff to recover, it is necessary for it to show: First, that the defendant is a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad. This is admitted. Second. It has been proven in this case and there is no conflict in the evidence, that both of the cars in question were carrying traffic consigned from a point in one state to a point in another state. This makes such traffic interstate traffic. While the evidence does not show that the defendant hauled the car across the state line, still the defendant is engaged in interstate traffic no matter how short the movement, if the traffic hauled is in course of movement from a point in one state to a point in another. The third fact necessary to bring the defendant within the provisions of the statute is the movement of the cars in a defective condition;...