Hood v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 04 March 1924 |
| Docket Number | 23914 |
| Parties | CHARLES J. HOOD, Appellant, v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court; Hon. H. A Hamilton, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Abbott Fauntleroy, Cullen & Edwards and Brill & Weismantel for appellant.
(1) The Safety Appliance Act is highly remedial in its character; the purpose of Congress in passing the act was humanitarian; it was enacted for the better protection of railroad employees and travelers by rail; accordingly, it should be construed by the courts so far as its terms will permit so as to carry out fully the intention of Congress, and should not be frittered away by judicial decision. Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1; International Railroad Co. v. United States, 238 F. 317; United States v. Chicago Railroad Co., 149 F. 486; Wabash Railroad Co. v United States, 168 F. 1; Chicago Railroad Co. v. Voelker, 129 F. 522; United States v. Central Ga. Railroad Co., 157 F. 893; United States v. Chicago Co., 173 F. 684; United States v. Northwestern Pac. Railroad, 235 F. 965; Gray v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 197 F. 874. (2) Where a railroad company operates its trains engaged in interstate commerce over the tracks of another company, under a contract between them, such tracks are a part of its lines within the meaning of the Safety Appliance Act, and it is immaterial whether the railroad company actually uses its own engine to haul its cars or permits another company, under a contract between them, to do the hauling. Philadelphia Ry. Co. v. United States, 191 F. 1; United States v. Southern Ry. Co., 285 F. 766; United States v. Northwestern Pac. Railroad, 235 F. 965; Gray v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 197 F. 874; Richey "Federal Employers Liability and Safety Appliance and Hours of Service Acts" (2 Ed.), p. 466, p. 143; United States v. Atlantic Terminal Co., 260 F. 779; United States v. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co., 213 F. 748; Chicago, B. & Q. Co. v. United States, 211 F. 12; Campbell v. Canadian Railroad, 124 Minn. 245; Spaw v. Terminal Ry. Co., 198 Mo.App. 552.
Fordyce, Holliday & White and Kramer, Kramer & Campbell for respondent; Morrison R. Waite and William A. Eggers, of counsel.
(1) When the plaintiff alleges specific acts of negligence on the defendant's part, his evidence and his right of recovery will be limited to the specific acts charged. Chitty v. Iron Moun. & So. Ry. Co., 148 Mo. 64, 75; Evans v. Wabash Railroad Co., 222 Mo. 435, 453; McGrath v. Transit Co., 197 Mo. 97, 105; Roscoe v. Metrop. Street Ry. Co., 202 Mo. 576, 587. (2) In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence challenged by demurrer, the general rule is that plaintiff's evidence, if not impossible or opposed to the physics of the case, or entirely beyond reason, is taken as true, and the plaintiff is further entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference of fact arising on all the proof, but this does not relieve plaintiff of the necessity of producing substantial testimony to prove the issues involved; a mere glimmer or spark, a mere scintilla, will not do. Near v. Railroad Co., 261 Mo. 80, 91. (3) If appellant's own acts were the sole cause of his injury there can be no recovery. Phillips v. Penn. Railroad Co., 283 F. 381; Copeland v. Heinz, 269 F. 361; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Wiles, 240 U.S. 444. (4) Where a duty is imposed for the protection of persons in particular situations or relations, a breach of it, which happens to result in injury to one in an altogether different situation or relation, is not, as to him, actionable. St. L. & S. F. Railroad Co. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243; Lang v. N. Y. C. Railroad Co., 255 U.S. 455; Davis v. Hand, 290 F. 73.
On November 19, 1921, plaintiff sued the Chicago & Alton and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad companies, in the St. Louis Circuit Court, for damages claimed to have been sustained by him as an employee of said defendants, on account of their alleged negligence. On April 1, 1922, plaintiff amended his petition by interlineation, and alleged therein that on February 24, 1921, he was in the employ of said defendants as a car inspector, and that on said date, while he and the defendants were engaged in interstate commerce, he was injured as hereafter stated, and that said injuries resulted, in whole and in part, from the negligence of said defendants and their servants, and from defects and insufficiencies due to the negligence of defendants in respect to their cars, engines and appliances. He alleges that on the date aforesaid he was engaged in connection with the movement and handling of cars, passengers, goods, wares, and merchandise, which were en route to and from various states of the Union; that plaintiff and defendants, at the time of his injury, were engaged in interstate commerce; that the cars, between which plaintiff was working when injured, were not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which could be coupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars, in violation of the laws of the United States, and of the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, Chap. 196, 27 Statutes at Large, p. 531, as amended by Act of March 2, 1903, Chap. 976, 32 Statutes at Large, p. 943. He alleges that while attempting to couple the cars above mentioned, by reason of the failure of defendants to have said cars equipped with proper couplers aforesaid, it was necessary for plaintiff, in order to effect the coupling between said cars, to go between the ends of same; that plaintiff did go between the ends of said cars, and attempted to adjust said coupler, while between the ends of said cars, so that they would couple; that while he was between said cars for the purpose aforesaid, by reason of defendants' failure to comply with the Federal Safety Appliance Act, in the particulars aforesaid, his left hand was caught, crushed and mangled, in such manner as to necessitate the amputation of the thumb through the middle of the hand, including the first, second and third fingers, and first joint of the fourth finger, leaving a scar on said hand which is tender and causes shooting pains. The remainder of the petition relates to plaintiff's injuries, and the damages which he claims to have sustained, which are placed at the sum of $ 25,000.
The second amended answer of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company denied each and every allegation of the petition, except the averment that it is a corporation. It also pleaded that plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury, and further pleaded that appellant's injury was due to his own acts of negligence.
The evidence on the part of plaintiff tended to show that at the time of his injury a diner, two sleepers, a coach, a smoker, an express and mail car were standing on track 28 in the Union Station at St. Louis, Missouri; that all of the above were Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company cars; that the mail car was at the south end of said train, which was known as Baltimore & Ohio Train No. 2; that it was an interstate-commerce train, carrying passengers to Cincinnati, Ohio, Baltimore, Maryland, Washington, D. C., and New York; that tickets were sold by the Baltimore & Ohio agents in St. Louis to all these points; that the above train was scheduled to leave St. Louis at 10 A. M. and the accident in question happened at 9:47 A. M. on February 24, 1921; that at the time of the accident passengers were boarding the cars under the supervision of a Baltimore & Ohio conductor, Baltimore & Ohio brakeman and porters.
The plaintiff offered in evidence an agreement between the Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co. and the Terminal Company; and an agreement between the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Ry. Co., as successor of the Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co., and the Terminal Company, but we are not referred to any testimony connecting respondent with said agreements or either of them. The above agrements relate to the rights of certain railroads named to participate in the use of the Terminal Railroad Company's terminal facilities, etc. Mr. James Henry Stoddard, foreman of the Terminal switching crew, testified that the Baltimore & Ohio train is pulled out by a Terminal engine, with a Terminal engineer and fireman in charge, and that the Terminal engine and crew take said train to East St. Louis; that the Baltimore & Ohio tracks do not run into the Union Station, and that the terminus of the Baltimore & Ohio is at East St. Louis.
Plaintiff's evidence also tends to show that he was employed by the defendant Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company as a car inspector, and that it was a part of his duty, as such, to see that couplings were made so that trains could depart on time; that on the day of the accident, three refrigerator express company cars of the A. R. Express Company were brought by a Terminal switch engine from track 24 to track 28, to be coupled to the Baltimore & Ohio cars on track 28; that several attempts were made to couple the refrigerator cars to the Baltimore & Ohio train; that the lock on the coupler of the Baltimore & Ohio mail car, at the end of said train, failed to work; that plaintiff stepped between the mail car and the refrigerator car to examine the coupler of said mail car, and that, while he was between said cars, the refrigerator car was backed against him, and inflicted the injuries complained of in petition.
Plaintiff's evidence tends to show that the Terminal engine attached to the refrigerator cars was not the engine which hauled the Baltimore & Ohio train No. 2 to East St. Louis, but was detached after the refrigerator cars were coupled to the Baltimore & Ohio cars, and that another Terminal engine and crew hauled the Baltimore & Ohio...
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