United States v. Chambers, Crim. No. 80-47.
Citation | 515 F. Supp. 1 |
Decision Date | 27 February 1981 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 80-47. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey CHAMBERS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
James Jensen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Toledo, Ohio, for plaintiff.
John Callahan, C. Thomas McCarter, Paul Frankel, Sheldon Wittenberg, Toledo, Ohio, for defendants.
This cause came to be heard upon the filing by defendant Wilton of a motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the indictment for lack of jurisdiction. This motion has been joined by all other defendants. The Government has opposed the motion.
Count II
Count II of the indictment in the present case charges the defendants with attempted malicious destruction of property by means of an explosive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), 18 U.S.C. § 2. Section 844(i) provides in pertinent part:
"Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both;..."
18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
Defendants contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Count II under § 844(i) because the alleged acts of malicious destruction of property occurred during the course of a legitimate labor dispute. Defendants urge that picketing and related activities are protected by a comprehensive federal statutory scheme, including the National Labor Relations Act which protects the rights of unions and their members who are actively pursuing legitimate labor objectives. Thus, defendants conclude, Count II of the present indictment based on the firebombing of the Plaza Hotel impermissibly intrudes into a federally protected area.
Defendants rely primarily on United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which makes it a federal crime to obstruct interstate commerce by robbery or extortion, does not reach the use of violence to achieve legitimate union objectives, such as higher wages in return for genuine services that the employer seeks. In pertinent part, the Hobbs Act provides:
Upon a careful examination of the legislative history of the Hobbs Act, the Court reasoned that the insertion of the word "wrongful" in the definition of extortion excluded those situations where threats or violence were committed in furtherance of legitimate labor objections. 410 U.S. at 399-400, 93 S.Ct. at 1009-1010. The Court held that the pursuit of legitimate labor objectives was protected by federal labor law and that, absent clear Congressional intent, the federal criminal statute should not be interpreted "to put the Federal Government in the business of policing the orderly conduct of strikes." 410 U.S. at 411, 93 S.Ct. at 1015. The Supreme Court held that the acts committed by the defendants in Enmons were punishable under state law. However, the Court warned that, under the Hobbs Act, union members could not use their protected status to achieve a "wrongful" use of actual or threatened force; for example to exact payments from employers for imposed, unwanted and superfluous services.
Relying on Enmons, the defendants contend that the legislative history of § 844(i) shows no congressional intent to regulate the conduct of the defendants in the present case, which was allegedly committed in furtherance of legitimate labor goals. Defendants contend that § 844(i) was an attempt by Congress to combat the effects of racketeering activity and organized crime. Defendants urge that it was not the intent of Congress to regulate the activities of labor unions through this statute. In support of this argument, defendants cite the Court to the recent district court decision in United States v. Thordarson, 487 F.Supp. 991 (C.D.Cal.1980).
This Court finds that defendants' motion to dismiss is not well taken for several reasons. First, the present case is clearly distinguishable from the Enmons case. In that case, the Court considered the interplay between a particular federal criminal statute, the Hobbs Act, and the federal labor laws. The Court held that the insertion of the word "wrongful" into the definition of the word "extortion" restricted its application in legitimate collective bargaining disputes. The Court noted that a broader definition of "extortion" in the Hobbs Act was not easily restricted; "it would cover all overtly coercive conduct in the course of an economic strike, obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce." 410 U.S. at 410, 93 S.Ct. at 1015. To the same effect, see United States v. DeLaurentis, 491 F.2d 208 (2nd Cir. 1974) ( ).
In the present case, there exists no such overlap between a federal criminal statute and the federal labor laws. Section 844(i) prohibits a specific violent act (the malicious destruction of property by means of an explosive). Congress enacted the statute in response to a particular growing problem. The legislative history of § 844(i) reveals that Congress was gravely concerned about the increased incidence of bombings throughout the nation and the absence of any effective state or local controls. It was said:
H.R.Rep.No.91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4013. Section 844(i) is specific, unambiguous and contains no exceptions, implied or express, for acts committed in...
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MHC v. INTERN. UNION, UNITED MINE WKRS. OF AMERICA
...occurring in a labor context have narrowly interpreted the "Enmons doctrine". See Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1323; United States v. Chambers, 515 F.Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio 1981). In Chambers, an action involving prosecution for malicious destruction of property by means of an explosive during the c......
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Teamsters Local 372 v. Detroit Newspapers
...labor activity beyond the reach of all federal criminal statutes. Id. This Court is in agreement with the Thordarson/[U.S. v.] Chambers [515 F.Supp. 1 (N.D.Ohio 1981)] interpretation of Enmons. To interpret otherwise would effectively immunize from federal criminal prosecution unions and em......
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Stevenson v. State , 106
...States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1074–75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817, 102 S.Ct. 94, 70 L.Ed.2d 86 (1981); United States v. Chambers, 515 F.Supp. 1, 3 (N.D.Ohio 1981). Attempts to commit bank robberies are explicitly proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) and therefore are appropr......
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U.S. v. Dearmore, 81-1480X
...v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1074-75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 94, 70 L.Ed.2d 86 (1981); United States v. Chambers, 515 F.Supp. 1, 3 (N.D.Ohio 1981). Attempts to commit bank robberies are explicitly proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) and therefore are appropriate o......