United States v. Chappell
| Decision Date | 14 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 09–cr–139 (JNE) (1), Case No. 16–cv–3049 (JNE) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Arthur James CHAPPELL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
David P. Steinkamp, United States Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, James E. Lackner, United States Attorney's Office, St. Paul, MN, for Plaintiff.
Gary R. Wolf, Wolf Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.
In May 2009, a grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant, charging him in one count with sex trafficking of a minor. A jury found him guilty. The Court sentenced Defendant to 336 months' imprisonment. He appealed, and the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial. United States v. Chappell , 665 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2012).
After the case was remanded, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Defendant, charging him in 11 counts with sex trafficking of a minor, possession of child pornography, conspiracy to possess child pornography, conspiracy to produce child pornography, enticement to travel to engage in prostitution, transportation with intent to engage in prostitution, conspiracy to entice to travel to engage in prostitution, and conspiracy to transport with intent to engage in prostitution. A jury found him guilty on each count. The Court sentenced Defendant to a total term of imprisonment of 336 months. He appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Chappell , 779 F.3d 872 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 281, 193 L.Ed.2d 205 (2015).
Approximately 11 months after the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012). For the reasons set forth below, the Court vacates his convictions and sentences on counts 8, 9, and 10 of the superseding indictment.
Defendant filed several motions after he filed his § 2255 motion. The Court addresses them before considering the § 2255 motion.
The government sought an extension of time to respond to Defendant's § 2255 motion. Asserting that the government misrepresented that it and Defendant's former attorney were in the process of exchanging information about Defendant's claims, Defendant moved for sanctions. According to an e-mail exchange between the government and Defendant's former attorney, the attorney initially indicated that he did not plan on responding to the § 2255 motion and that he would read the motion again and consider a response. Later, the attorney indicated that he preferred to answer any questions at a hearing, relayed certain memories of the trial, and stated he will provide an affidavit if the government cited authority to support its assertion that an affidavit is required. Having reviewed the exchange between the government and Defendant's former attorney in the days immediately preceding the government's request for an extension of time, the Court denies Defendant's motion for sanctions.
The Court denied Defendant's request for a transcript under 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) and (f) (2012). After seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Defendant sought reconsideration of the denial of his request for a transcript. The Court construed his motion for reconsideration as a renewed motion for the transcript and denied the renewed motion. He filed a motion for reconsideration. He subsequently obtained a copy of the transcript. The Court denies his motion for reconsideration.
The Court granted Defendant's motion to hold his § 2255 motion in abeyance until the completion of his transfer to another institution. After his arrival at the institution, Defendant moved to take his § 2255 motion out of abeyance. The Court grants the motion.
Defendant moved to supplement his § 2255 motion with a copy of a transcript of a hearing that took place on September 18, 2012. He sought to correct misstatements in his § 2255 motion and to cite portions of the record. The Court grants Defendant's motion to supplement.
Defendant moved for the appointment of a magistrate judge to review his § 2255 motion. The Court denies the motion.
Section 2255"provides a remedy for jurisdictional and constitutional errors." Sun Bear v. United States , 644 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). "Beyond that, the permissible scope of a § 2255 collateral attack on a final conviction or sentence is severely limited; ‘an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." ’ " Id. (quoting United States v. Addonizio , 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) ).
Defendant made several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel "may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal." Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that his "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In assessing the reasonableness of counsel's conduct, a court must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id.
"[R]eview is particularly deferential when reviewing a claim that appellate counsel failed to raise an additional issue on direct appeal." Charboneau v. United States , 702 F.3d 1132, 1136 (8th Cir. 2013). "Experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Jones v. Barnes , 463 U.S. 745, 751–52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). "When appellate counsel competently asserts some claims on a defendant's behalf, it is difficult to sustain [an] ineffective assistance claim based on allegations that counsel was deficient for failing to assert some other claims." Link v. Luebbers , 469 F.3d 1197, 1205 (8th Cir. 2006). "[A]bsent contrary evidence, ‘we assume that appellate counsel's failure to raise a claim was an exercise of sound appellate strategy.’ " United States v. Brown , 528 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Roe v. Delo , 160 F.3d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 1998) ); see Gray v. Norman , 739 F.3d 1113, 1118 (8th Cir. 2014) .
Defendant asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to raise certain arguments regarding voir dire in a post-trial motion or on direct appeal: (1) that the Court conducted voir dire in a manner that prevented Defendant from obtaining information about potential jurors that would allow him to intelligently exercise his peremptory strikes; (2) that the Court effectively deprived him of eight peremptory strikes by requiring him to exercise the strikes before he challenged potential jurors for cause; (3) that the Court's denial of his for-cause challenges denied him a fair and impartial jury; and (4) that the Court refused to allow him to confer with stand-by counsel during voir dire.
The Court thoroughly questioned prospective jurors. Some potential jurors expressed concerns about viewing graphic depictions of female genitalia. They nevertheless indicated their ability to serve as jurors. The Court gave Defendant, who represented himself during voir dire, an opportunity to submit additional questions, and the Court posed additional questions to the prospective jurors. The Court asked the government and Defendant whether there was "[a]nything else" before the Court gave the prospective jurors a break and the parties exercised their peremptory strikes. Each party responded "no." Outside the presence of the prospective jurors, the Court addressed an issue about a juror being called out of order. The jury panel returned, and the Court indicated that the parties were exercising their peremptory strikes. The Court then directed the potential jurors to leave the courtroom. After clarifying the number of peremptory strikes that each side could exercise, the Court asked the government and Defendant whether they passed the panel for cause. The government did. Defendant, after consulting with standby counsel, did not. The Court heard his for-cause challenges and denied them.
Defendant has not demonstrated that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on the attorney's failure to assert the issues noted above in a post-trial motion or on direct appeal. Nor has he shown any prejudice from the alleged deficiencies. See United States v. Mann , 685 F.3d 714, 719 (8th Cir. 2012) (); United States v. Thompson , 450 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2006) ...
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