United States v. Clayton
| Decision Date | 23 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19-5142,19-5077 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EARL CLAYTON, III, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Earl Clayton III ("Defendant" or "Clayton III") was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) (b)(1)(B), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court determined that Defendant was a career offender and sentenced him to 360 months of incarceration. The district court also revoked Defendant's supervised release and added twenty-four months to his sentence because he had committed a crime while under supervision. Defendant appeals his convictions and the revocation of his supervised release. Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle on the day of his arrest. Defendant also contends that he is entitled to a new trial because of an erroneous supplemental instruction on deadlocked juries, various evidentiary errors, and prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. We AFFIRM.
Defendant Earl Clayton III was arrested on November 24, 2015 after a Federal Bureau of Investigation High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area task force had been investigating his son Earl Clayton IV ("Clayton IV"), for over a year. The day before, task force officer Detective Kevin McKinney obtained a search warrant for Clayton IV's house based on surveillance of Clayton IV and the fact that there had been numerous controlled purchases of heroin from the home since October 2014, one of which had been made within the previous forty-eight hours.
The morning of November 24, 2015, Detective McKinney did a spot check of the residence prior to the execution of the search warrant. At that time, he saw a white Chevrolet Monte Carlo in the driveway and Defendant at the back door of the home.
Later that morning, Detective McKinney returned to Clayton IV's home with a special weapons and tactics ("S.W.A.T.") team to execute the search warrant. As the S.W.A.T. team was approaching the residence, McKinney observed the Monte Carlo driving toward the house, and it appeared to him that Defendant was driving the vehicle. When the police were next door to Clayton IV's house and Defendant's car was about four or five houses down, Detective McKinney saw the Monte Carlo reverse at a high rate of speed away from the home. Detective McKinney then radioed other officers to stop the vehicle.
Detective McKinney eventually went to the scene of Defendant's stopped vehicle, read Defendant his rights, and took him to Clayton IV's home. A handgun was found in the vehicle. At the home, officers found heroin and electronic scales. At that point, Defendant was arrested.
Defendant and his son, Clayton IV, were initially charged as co-defendants in a drug conspiracy. Defendant moved to suppress certain evidence, including evidence obtained as a result of the November 24, 2015 stop, arguing that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. The district court denied the motion.
On December 4, 2017, Clayton IV reached a plea agreement with the prosecution and would later testify as a government witness at his father's trial. The next day, Defendant was charged in a single-defendant second superseding indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), as well as being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Defendant's trial began on February 5, 2018. The district court elected to try the two counts in one bifurcated trial, with the jury receiving evidence as to Defendant's criminal history only in the second phase of trial concerning the felon in possession charge. However, the district court allowed the government to introduce evidence of the firearm that was found in the vehicle in the first phase of trial, which related to the drug conspiracy charge. Defendant was convicted on the drug conspiracy charge on February 8, 2018. The trial then proceeded to the felon in possession count, and Defendant was convicted on that charge as well.
At a sentencing hearing on January 11, 2019, Defendant was determined to be a career offender under the sentencing guidelines, and was sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment. Defendant timely appealed.
The district court also determined that Defendant had violated the terms of his supervised release by committing a federal, state, or local crime. Accordingly, the district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced Defendant to a prison term of fifty-one months, twenty-four of those months to be served consecutively to his 360-month sentence in the underlying criminal case. Defendant timely appealed the order revoking his supervised release.
The district court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his seizure by police on November 24, 2015 because the police had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle.
"When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, the district court's factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2016). "Whether an officer had reasonable suspicion under the circumstances is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo." United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 2012). We view the evidence in the light mostly likely to support the district court's decision. United States v. Abernathy, 843 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2016).
Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant's car based on prior information they had received about Defendant's involvement in drug trafficking and their observations of his conduct on November 24, 2015.
An officer's decision to initiate a traffic stop and the scope of any subsequent search are reviewed "under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)." Stepp, 680 F.3d at 661. In this case, Defendant challenges only "whether there was a proper basis for the stop." Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir. 2005)). "[T]he reasonable suspicion standard governs the legality of traffic stops when the suspected violation is a criminal offense rather than a civil infraction." United States v. Sanford, 476 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir. 2007).[1] As Detective McKinney's testimony at the suppression hearing made clear, he requested that officers stop Defendant's vehicle because he suspected that Defendant was involved in drug trafficking, not because he had committed a traffic violation.
"Under Court's precedents, the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.'" Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop an individual is determined under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 343 (6th Cir. 2021).
As an initial matter, Defendant appears to suggest that, because Officers Nathan Cary and Todd Jensen, who actually stopped his vehicle, did so solely on the basis of a request from Detective McKinney, the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure was lacking. However, the government correctly points out that this Court "impute[s] collective knowledge among multiple law enforcement agencies, even when the evidence demonstrates that the responding officer was wholly unaware of the specific facts that established reasonable suspicion for the stop." United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the relevant question in this case is whether Detective McKinney, who directed his colleagues to stop the white Monte Carlo, had "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Glover, 140 S.Ct. at 1187 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18).
The district court correctly found that Detective McKinney had such a basis in its order denying Defendant's motion to suppress. As McKinney testified at the suppression hearing he had observed Defendant make a short stop that morning at a home where McKinney knew heroin had been purchased within the past few days. According to Detective McKinney, a short stay indicated a probable narcotics transaction. Later, Detective McKinney saw Defendant's vehicle approach the home again, but then back up at a high rate of speed within sight of S.W.A.T. officers preparing to execute a search warrant. Detective McKinney could see that Defendant was driving the car, and he knew that Defendant was the father of the person police suspected of selling drugs out of the home. Detective McKinney also knew that Defendant had a history of drug trafficking. Moreover, from prior purchases of heroin from Clayton IV, the police had gained knowledge that Defendant was involved in the particular drug trafficking they were investigating. It was on the basis of all these factors that Detective McKinney had Defendant's vehicle stopped. The district court's opinion...
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