United States v. Cobb
| Decision Date | 10 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL NO. 1:18CR33 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JAMES TIMOTHY COBB, Defendants. |
(Judge Keeley)
This is a child pornography case stemming from a physical altercation between the defendant, James Timothy Cobb ("Cobb"), and his cousin, Paul Dean Wilson, Jr. ("Wilson"). Because that altercation resulted in Wilson's death, Cobb was arrested and later charged in state court with first-degree murder. While in custody, Cobb made several calls to his parents, asking that they wipe his laptop computer clean. Suspecting Cobb's laptop may contain evidence relating to Wilson's murder, the Marion County, West Virginia Sheriff's Department obtained two search warrants, the first on September 16, 2014, for Cobb's laptop ("the first warrant"), and the second on September 23, 2014, for its contents ("the second warrant") (collectively "the warrants"). The second search uncovered over 2,000 images of child pornography.
Pending is Cobb's motion to suppress the evidence from the second search, which he claims was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. For the following reasons, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART the Government's objections (Dkt. No. 41), ADOPTS IN PART AND REJECTS IN PART the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (Dkt. No. 36), and DENIES Cobb's motion (Dkt. No. 16).
I. Background
On May 1, 2018, a grand jury sitting in the Northern District of West Virginia returned a one-count indictment against Cobb, charging him with Possession of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2) (Dkt. No. 1). After Cobb moved to suppress the evidence of child pornography on July 6, 2018 (Dkt. No. 16), the Court referred the motion to the Honorable Michael J. Aloi, United States Magistrate Judge, for initial review and report and recommendation ("R&R") (Dkt. No. 17).
Magistrate Judge Aloi conducted two evidentiary hearings on the motion (Dkt. Nos. 25; 31), at which Cobb presented the testimony of Sergeant Kevin Alkire of the Marion County Sheriff's Department (Dkt. No. 25) and Cathy Reed-Vanata, a former Marion County Magistrate (Dkt. No. 31). The facts adduced at thosehearings are summarized fully in the R&R, and the Court has reviewed the audio recordings and transcripts of both hearings.
On August 24, 2018, Magistrate Judge Aloi recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Cobb's motion to suppress (Dkt. No. 36). He reasoned that, although both warrants were supported by probable cause, only the first warrant was sufficiently particular to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 10-26. He concluded that the second warrant was no more than a general warrant that allowed unlimited and unchecked exploratory rummaging into Cobb's private life. Id. at 16-26. And because the second warrant was not sufficiently particular, he rejected the applicability of the plain-view exception. Id. at 24.
Magistrate Judge Aloi determined that the constitutional sufficiency of both warrants was not affected by the superfluous language each contained. Id. at 26-29. In addition, he ruled out the applicability of the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines, id. at 24 n.8, and concluded that the Leon1 good-faith exception did not apply because an objectivelyreasonable officer would have known that the second warrant was so facially deficient as to be invalid, id. at 29-36.
In its objections, the Government challenged the R&R's conclusions that the second warrant was not sufficiently particular, and that the Leon good-faith exception did not apply (Dkt. No. 41). It argued that both conclusions ignore controlling Fourth Circuit precedent. Id. at 1-2. It also asserted that the child pornography on Cobb's laptop would have been inevitably discovered by a lawful source. Id. at 1.
In Cobb's response, he argued that Magistrate Judge Aloi's conclusion that the second warrant was not sufficiently particular was correct (Dkt. No. 42 at 3-16). Moreover, he asserted that the good-faith exception was not applicable, and that the inevitable discovery doctrine should not apply because the information was not obtained from an independent source. Id. at 11-17.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a magistrate judge's R&R pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court must review de novo those portions to which objection is timely made. Otherwise, "the Court may adopt, without explanation, any of the magistrate judge's recommendations to which the [defendant] does not object." Dellacirprete v. Gutierrez, 479 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603-04 (N.D. W. Va. 2007) (citing Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983)). Courts will uphold portions of a recommendation to which no objection has been made unless they are "clearly erroneous." See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
IV. APPLICABLE LAW
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . and effects . . . against unreasonable . . . searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Sims v. Labowitz, 877 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)). As the Supreme Court has stated time and again, "[r]easonableness isalways the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis, and reasonableness is generally assessed by carefully weighing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." Cty. of Los Angeles, Calif. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
V. DISCUSSION
After reviewing de novo the portions of the R&R to which the Government has objected, and the remaining portions for clear error, the Court concludes that both warrants not only were supported by probable cause, but also were sufficiently particular to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Even assuming the second warrant was not sufficiently particular, the evidence need not be suppressed because the Leon good-faith exception applies.
Neither party objected to Magistrate Judge Aloi's conclusion that both warrants are supported by probable cause. Finding no clear error (Dkt. No. 36 at 8-13), the Court ADOPTS that recommendation.
Neither party objected to Magistrate Judge Aloi's conclusion that the first warrant was sufficiently particular. Therefore, finding no clear error (Dkt. No. 36 at 13-16), the Court ADOPTS that recommendation as well.
The parties dispute the conclusion that the second warrant was not sufficiently particular because (1) its broad language gave the executing officers "complete and absolute discretion," and (2) the officers could have included additional information to make it more particular (Dkt. No. 36 at 16-26). According to the Government, the second warrant was sufficiently particular because it identified a specific illegal activity, Wilson's homicide, which properly limited the executing officer's discretion during its execution (Dkt. No. 41 at 8-15).
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The particularity requirement has two important purposes, "(1) preventing generalsearches, and (2) ensuring that the executing officer is able to distinguish between those items which are to be seized and those that are not." United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 693 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd in part on other grounds, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)). Although that "requirement is fulfilled when the warrant identifies the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes and when the description of the items leaves nothing to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant," United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976)), "the test . . . is 'a pragmatic one: The degree of specificity required when describing the goods to be seized may necessarily vary according to the circumstances and type of items involved.'" Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 693 (quoting United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir. 1979)).
Here, the application for the second warrant cited "first degree murder" as the underlying crime and requested permission to search for and seize (Dkt. No. 19-2). This warrant was sufficiently particular for two reasons.
First, as the Government has pointed out, the second warrant only allowed Sergeant Alkire to search for and seize evidence of a particular crime—Wilson's homicide (Dkt. No. 19-2). Although the warrant is broad in its description, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly upheld search warrants that limit the executing officers' "discretion by allowing them to seize only evidence of a particular crime." United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1313 (4th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 693-94 (...
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