United States v. Coffman

• Decision Date: 06 July 1943
• Docket Number: No. 6707,6765.,6707
• Citation: 50 F. Supp. 823
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. COFFMAN (two cases).

50 F. Supp. 823

UNITED STATES v. COFFMAN (two cases).

Nos. 6707, 6765.

District Court, S. D. California, S. D.

July 6, 1943.

Charles H. Carr, U. S. Atty., by Maurice Norcop, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.

David H. Cannon, of Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

YANKWICH, District Judge.

On May 13, 1943, Adrian L. Wilbur, and three other Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, arrested the defendant, Roscoe Alexander Coffman, under an indictment returned by the Grand Jury of this District, on May 12, 1943, which charged, in four counts, that the defendant "knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully counseled, aided and abetted" two persons, registrants under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, "to evade service in the land and naval forces of the United States." 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 311. The arrest was made with a bench warrant properly issued on May 12, 1943, at a ranch owned and occupied by the defendant near Fallbrook, San Diego County, California. The officers appeared at the ranch at eleven o'clock in the morning. They found the defendant in the field, about a quarter of a mile from the dwelling house on the premises, which he and his family occupied. They took him into custody on the spot, then proceeded, over his protest, to the dwelling house, brought him into it, handcuffed him and, still over his protest, and without a search warrant, searched the premises for over three hours, seizing the material and papers described in a stipulated list. Some of the seized documents were copies of letters written to the Selective Service Board and of telegrams sent to Lloyd Coffman, his nephew, one of the registrants whom he charged with aiding to evade service. The major portion of the material seized, consisted, however, of purely private letters, some relating to the ranch and to the cost of its operation, others written by the defendant to various persons, some of them men in American public life, including Senators of the United States, and a great variety of pamphlets, circulars and dodgers of various groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, The America First Committee, and various Pelley and Coughlin groups, which, before America's entry into war, were noted for, and outspoken in, their agitation against our participation in the war, against the present administration, and their opposition to and denunciation of certain racial and religious groups in our country.

The defendant has moved to suppress this evidence upon the ground that it was seized illegally, in violation of his constitutional rights.

On June 23, 1943, the Grand Jury of this District returned a new indictment against the defendant, charging substantially the same offense in four counts. The defendant has repeated his motion to suppress the evidence in this second prosecution. It has been stipulated that on this second motion, I could consider the facts relating to the arrest testified to on the hearing of the motion to suppress on the first indictment, and that I could also take into account the endorsement of the service of the warrant upon the defendant under the first indictment. The ruling here made will, therefore, apply to both cases.

The right of officers to search the premises of an accused incidental to his lawful arrest cannot be questioned. See: 4 Am.Jur. Arrest, Pars. 68, 69; United States v. 71.41 Ounces Gold Filled Scrap, 2 Cir., 1934, 94 F.2d 17; United States v. Feldman, 3 Cir., 1939, 104 F.2d 255, 256; and see my opinion in United States v. Bell, D.C.Cal.1943, 48 F.Supp. 496. It is also given recognition by the Congress in the proviso to Section 53a of Title 18 U.S.C.A., which excepts searches by officers serving a warrant of arrest from the penalties of searches without a search warrant. But the right is not unrestrained. See: United States v. Lefkowitz, 1932, 285 U.S. 452, 463-466, 52 S.Ct. 420. 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775; United States v. Thompson, 7 Cir., 1940, 113 F.2d 643, 129 A.L.R. 1291. It is limited to the time and place of the arrest. In other words, the search must be contemporaneous with the arrest and be made at the place where the arrest occurs. See: Vachina v. United States, 9 Cir., 1922, 283 F. 35; Kathriner v. United States, 9 Cir., 1921, 276 F. 808; Sayers v. United States, 9 Cir., 1924, 2 F.2d 146; Wida v. United States, 8 Cir., 1931, 52 F.2d 424; Vecchio v. United States, 8 Cir., 1931, 53 F.2d 628; Kelley v. United States, 8 Cir., 1932, 61 F. 2d 843.

A search at a location distant from the place of arrest, after the arrest has been completed, and where the entry of the place is not made prior to, or at the time of the arrest, but after, is illegal. The Supreme Court has spoken very clearly on the subject in Agnello v. United States, 1925, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 5, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409, where Mr. Justice Butler said: "The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 39 A.L.R. 790; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, L.R.A.1915B, 834, Ann. Cas.1915C, 1177. The legality of the arrests or of the searches and seizures made at the home of Alba is not questioned. Such searches and seizures naturally and usually appertain to and attend such arrests. But the right does not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks distant from Alba's house, where the arrest was made. When it was entered and searched, the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot be sustained as an incident of the arrests." And see: Marron v. United States, 1927, 275 U.S. 192, 199, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231.

Our own Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has sustained these limitations in Papani v. United States, 1936, 84 F.2d 160, 163. We quote from the opinion:

"The second element which must exist in order to bring a case within the exception to the general rule is that in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest. The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise it is not incident to the arrest. Agnello v. United States, supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20, at page 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 409, and in Marron v. United States, supra, 275 U.S. 192, 198, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 and in United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, 285 U.S. 452, 464, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775, it is said that officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then the search is not incidental to the arrest. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 47 S.Ct. 248, 71 L.Ed. 520; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, supra, 282 U.S. 344, 358, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374; United States v. Lefkowitz, supra, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775; Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6, 52 S.Ct. 466, 76 L.Ed. 951.

"Summarizing the above rules, it would seem that a search is not incidental to the arrest, unless the search is made at the place of arrest, contemporaneously with the arrest." (Italics added.)

And see, Bell v. United States, 9 Cir., 1925, 9 F.2d 820; Walker v. United States, 5 Cir., 1942, 125 F.2d 395.

In language of unmistakable clarity, the Courts have thus...