Taylor v. Fine, 15437.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1953
• Docket Number: No. 15437.,15437.
• Citation: 115 F. Supp. 68
• Parties: TAYLOR v. FINE et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

115 F. Supp. 68

TAYLOR v. FINE et al.

No. 15437.

United States District Court, S. D. California, Central Division.

July 21, 1953.

William M. Taylor, in pro. per.

Walter S. Binns, U. S. Atty., Clyde C. Downing and Robert K. Grean, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants.

YANKWICH, Chief Judge.

Defendants are agents of the Immigration Service of the United States. In the course of their duties, on March 19th, March 28th, and April 7th, 1953, they approached the plaintiff's ranch in Riverside County, California, called to some Mexican laborers who were working there and asked them if they were legally in the United States. When they admitted that they were not, the officers took them into custody.

The plaintiff brought an action in a lower State court seeking damages in the sum of $200 for alleged trespass. On the application of the Government, the cause was removed to this court.

The Complaint alleged various acts of violence against the plaintiff, damage to his growing crops and even "kidnapping" of an employee.

After hearing the evidence, I am satisfied that no trespass was committed, no force was used, no damage inflicted on person or property, and that there was not even a "theoretical" trespass on any of the three occasions mentioned in the Complaint. See, Bell v. Hood, 1946, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939.

An immigration officer of the United States has the right to arrest a person without a warrant if he has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has been committed, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3052-3053; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a) (2).¹ Even in the absence of a special grant of such right, officers of the United States have the same rights as police officers of the State in which they are located. United States v. Di Re, 1947, 332 U.S. 581, 66 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210.

Under the law of California, a police officer has the right to make an arrest without a warrant, if he has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been committed. California Penal Code, Sec. 836, subd. 3.² The regulations of the Department of Immigration interpret the right of immigration officers in like manner and specifically provide:

"III (2) Arrest without warrant.

"Arrest without warrant of an alien who (1) is in the United States in violation of the immigration laws and (2) is likely to escape before a warrant for his arrest can be obtained is authorized by statute." (See Bulletin entitled, "Authority of Officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to Make Arrests," issued November 15, 1951).

The determination of the officer that the person is likely to escape will be sustained if there is a reasonable ground for it.³

An immigration officer has the right to inquire into the privilege of an alien or a person believed or suspected to be one, to enter, reenter, pass through or reside in the United States. 8 U.S. C.A. § 1225(a). He may also interrogate him. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a) (1). An alien illegally in the United States may be guilty of a felony. 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1325-1326.

The evidence satisfies me that the area in which the arrests were made is one in which many Mexican Nationals who are illegally in this country ("wet-backs" as they are called) are employed. Indeed, the testimony in the record shows that over a period of six months preceding the particular arrests, hundreds of illegal entrants were apprehended on the ranches in the vicinity of the Coachella district. Such condition denotes persistent law violations which constitute probable cause for action. Certainly, with this situation confronting them, it would be unreasonable to require immigration officers, under penalty of civil damages, to arm themselves with a warrant of arrest each time they look for illegal entrants in an area noted for their presence. Such requirement would play into the hands of those who, like the plaintiff, employ illegal entrants, safe in the knowledge that the law does not punish them, but only the illegal entrants.⁴

There is no evidence that anybody was molested or that "any hand was put upon any person". On every one of the three occasions, the evidence shows the presence on plaintiff's land of aliens illegally in the country. If it were possible to submit officers of the United States Immigration Service to harassment every time they search for illegal entrants, if they could be subjected to suits even for nominal damages,⁵ the landowners of the Coachella district would be erecting barriers against the United States Government, and, in effect, telling the officers of the Government, "Do not enter, no matter what federal laws are violated." Under the protection of barbed-wire fences, they could thus employ aliens illegally in the country and aid law violations. I am quite certain that if a warrant of arrest had been secured, the plaintiff, who is a lawyer, would have found other grounds for objecting to the acts of the officers, and interfering with their attempt to enforce the law, as he had done in the past.

The plaintiff has not proved any grounds for recovery under any of the causes of action stated in the Complaint.

Judgment will, therefore, be for the defendants. Formal Findings and Judgment to follow under Local Rule 7.

1 Incidental to a legal arrest whether with or without a warrant, the officers may conduct a reasonable incidental search: United States v. Bell, D.C.Cal.1943, 48 F.Supp. 986; United States v. Coffman, D.C.Cal.1943, 50 F.Supp. 823; Harris v. United States, 1946, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399; United States v. Rabinowitz, 1950, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S. Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653.

2 California courts are very liberal in assaying the acts which constitute probable cause. Generally, the reasonable ground or suspicion which justifies an arrest without a warrant has been declared to be a state of facts which would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of an offense. See, People v. Kilvington, 1894, 104 Cal. 86, 92, 37 P. 799, 801; Michel v. Smith, 1922, 188 Cal. 199, 206, 205 P. 113, 116; Bate v. Jolin, 1929, 206 Cal. 504, 508, 274 P. 971, 973; Stowell v. Evans, 1931, 211 Cal. 565, 296 P. 278; Murphy v. Murray, 1925, 74 Cal.App. 726, 731, 241 P. 938, 940; People v. Brite, 1937, 9 Cal.2d 666, 687, 72 P.2d 122; Coverstone v. Davies, 1952, 38 Cal.2d 315, 320-326, 239 P.2d 876.

3 See cases cited under Note 2. Cf. United States v. Coplon, 2 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 629.

4 The provision against harboring of aliens, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324, is no deterrent. Because of its requirements as to knowledge, it is...