United States v. Coleman, CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1:17-cr-00318-WSD-RGV
| Decision Date | 14 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1:17-cr-00318-WSD-RGV |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ROBERT COLEMAN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Defendant Robert Coleman ("Coleman") is charged in a two-count indictment with knowingly possessing three firearms on August 19, 2017, and eight firearms on August 20, 2017, after having been previously convicted of a felony offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). [Doc. 8].1 Coleman has moved to suppress statements he made to federal agents during an interview outside of his apartment upon the execution of a search warrant, [Doc. 19], and after an evidentiary hearing on February 15, 2018,2 the parties filed post-hearing briefs,[Docs. 34, 38, & 41]. For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Coleman's motion to suppress statements, [Doc. 19], be DENIED.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") Special Agent Gary Dorman ("Agent Dorman") initiated an investigation after receiving information that an individual, later identified as Coleman, residing at apartment 3302 at 1371 Kimberly Way, Atlanta, Georgia, may have been involved in a burglary, or several burglaries, during which firearms were taken. (Tr. at 3-4); [Doc. 1]. Based on this investigation, which included gaining knowledge that Coleman had prior felony convictions and had been arrested 18 or 19 times, Agent Dorman obtained a federal search warrant for the Kimberly Way apartment. (Tr. at 4, 18, 25).
On August 20, 2017, at approximately 7:30 a.m., a team of about fifteen ATF agents and law enforcement personnel, including ATF Special Agent Nicholas Degennaro ("Agent Degennaro") and Agent Dorman, executed the federal search warrant at the Kimberly Way apartment. (Tr. at 4-5, 30). The ATF agents approached the residence, knocked on the front door while announcing their presence a minimum of three times, and breached the front door and made entry into the apartment after no one answered the door. (Tr. at 5, 24, 33). Upon entry, the agents encountered two children and seven adults, including Coleman, who wasfound in one of the three bedrooms, and they secured the apartment by handcuffing and gathering all of the adults outside of the apartment. (Tr. at 5-7, 17, 30, 32). After they secured the apartment,3 the agents allowed the two minor children and their mother to wait in the living room while another agent obtained biographical information, including name, date of birth, social security number, address, and phone number, from the other individuals. (Tr. at 7-8, 17).
During the execution of the warrant, ATF agents proceeded to interview the occupants of the apartment, and Coleman, who was the target of the investigation, was initially placed in a police car. (Tr. at 8-9, 23-25). Coleman was subsequently moved to Agent Dorman's vehicle and placed in the front passenger seat, with Agent Dorman seated in the driver's seat and Agent Degennaro seated directly behind Coleman in the rear passenger seat. (Id.). At this time, Agents Degennaro and Dorman identified themselves to Coleman, and Agent Dorman asked him about his name, including his "street name"; age; address; phone number; and educational background. (Tr. at 9-10, 18, 26).4
Following this initial exchange, which lasted about four minutes and forty seconds, Agent Dorman advised Coleman of his Miranda5 rights at approximately 7:55 a.m. (Tr. at 11, 27; Gov. Exs. 1 & 2). Specifically, Agent Dorman advised Coleman that he had the right to remain silent and that any statements he made could be used against him. (Gov. Ex. 1; Gov. Ex. 2 at 04:40-04:44). He further advised Coleman that he had the right to speak to an attorney, to have one presentduring the questioning, to have one appointed for him if he could not afford one, and, in the event he proceeded with questioning without an attorney, to stop answering questions at any time. (Gov. Ex. 1; Gov. Ex. 2 at 04:45-04:56). Coleman indicated that he understood his rights, and he placed his initials beside each question on the pre-printed Miranda form and then read and signed the waiver of rights portion, which states:
I have read this statement of my rights or it has been read to me, and I understand these rights. At this time I am willing to answer questions without a lawyer present. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or force of any kind has been used against me.
(Tr. at 11, 27-28; Gov. Ex. 1; Gov. Ex. 2 at 04:56-05:18). Agent Degennaro also signed the form as a witness. (Tr. at 13; Gov. Ex. 1).6
After advising Coleman of his rights, the agents asked him various questions, and Coleman proceeded to make certain incriminating statements. (Tr. at 13-14, 29; Gov. Ex. 2 at 07:04-1:04:35). The interview lasted just over an hour, and after concluding the interview, the agents moved Coleman back to the other police vehicle, but about ten to fifteen minutes later, Coleman asked if he could again speak with Agents Dorman and Degennaro, and the agents led him back to AgentDorman's vehicle and sat with him in the vehicle in the same positions as before. (Tr. at 11-12, 14-15, 29-30; Gov. Ex. 2 at 01:03:00-01:04:28). Agent Dorman advised Coleman "that he was still under his Miranda warnings that [h]e gave him earlier," and Coleman proceeded to make additional incriminating statements. (Tr. at 15, 30-31; Gov. Ex. 2 at 00:05-31:44). This second interview lasted a little more than thirty minutes, and after concluding this second interview, Agent Dorman took Coleman back to the other police vehicle. (Tr. at 15-16, 30-31; Gov. Ex. 2). Coleman was subsequently placed under arrest that day, (Tr. at 18, 31, 33), and Agent Dorman obtained a criminal complaint the following day, (Tr. at 31); [Doc. 1].7
During the course of the interview, Coleman appeared to understand the questions asked of him and provided responsive answers, never declined to answer a question asked of him, never asked for an attorney, and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. (Tr. at 12, 16, 28). Coleman "mentioned that he had recently gotten shot . . . in his leg or thigh area," which "bothered him a little bit," but he never requested any pain medication or asked to get out of the vehicle. (Tr. at 12); see also (Gov. Ex. 2). Neither Agent Dorman nor Agent Degennaro madeColeman any promises in order to obtain a waiver of his rights, nor did they threaten him in any way. (Tr. at 28-29; Gov. Ex. 2).
Coleman was indicted on September 13, 2017, [Doc. 8], and he now moves to suppress the statements he made on August 20, 2017, [Doc. 19]. Following an evidentiary hearing and post-hearing briefing by the parties, [Docs. 31, 34, 38, & 41], the pending motion to suppress is now ripe for ruling.
Coleman moves to suppress the statements he made during the interview at his residence upon the execution of the federal search warrant on the grounds that the statements made prior to being advised of his Miranda rights "went well beyond routine booking or biographical questions." [Doc. 34 at 1]. Coleman also argues that his "post-Miranda statement should be suppressed as tainted by the pre-Miranda questioning." [Id.]. The government responds that Coleman's pre-Miranda statements are admissible because Miranda warnings were not required at that time since he was not subjected to an interrogation, and that his post-Miranda statements are admissible because he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and agreed to speak with the ATF agents. See [Doc. 38].
Coleman contends that the statements he made to Agents Dorman and Degennaro during the initial questioning were obtained in violation of Miranda because the agents "asked several questions designed to get [him] to incriminate himself, and to which his answers were testimonial." [Doc. 34 at 7]. In particular, Coleman points out that "[t]hose statements included, among others, his 'street' name, the length of time he had lived at the apartment, why he had given another address to the first officer, when he got out of jail, when[ ]he went in and why he went to jail," [id.], and that the agents "got him to admit, pre-Miranda, facts that would result in a probation violation at the very least," [id. at 8]. The government responds that the statements are admissible because "[t]here is no evidence . . . that the agents had any idea that Coleman would or could be prosecuted for [a state probation violation], nor is there any evidence that the agents had any control over whether such a prosecution would be brought," and the questions posed by Agent Dorman before the rendering of Miranda warnings were not "'designed' to elicit incriminating responses," but were instead routine, booking questions that did not constitute interrogation. [Doc. 38 at 13-15].
The ruling in Miranda requires law enforcement officers to apprise a defendant in custody of his Fifth Amendment rights before engaging ininterrogation. See Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d 1487, 1489 (11th Cir. 1994). "A defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda when there has been a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). However, "Miranda was never meant to apply to all statements taken by the police after a person has been taken into custody, but only to those statements that result from express questioning or its functional equivalent." United States v. Springfield, No. CR406-390, 2007 WL 1140912, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 13, 2007), adopted by 2007 WL 1302282, at *1 (S.D. Ga. May 1, 2007) (citation and internal marks omitted). Interrogation for Miranda purposes "means 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other...
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