United States v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 15 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Criminal 19-10113-FDS |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of AMERICA v. LOUIS D. COLEMAN, III, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
ORDER ON GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR RESTITUTION
On June 1, 2022, following a three-week trial, defendant Louis D Coleman, III was convicted of kidnapping resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). On October 11, 2022, this Court sentenced Coleman to a mandatory term of life in prison. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), at the sentencing the Court deferred the determination of the amount of restitution, if any, to be paid to the family of the victim, Jassy Correia.
Since that time, the parties have conducted discovery on the issue of restitution, the government has submitted an expert report, and the parties have briefed the issues. For the following reasons, the Court will order restitution in the amount of $61,362.68, under the terms set forth below.
Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664 (1994), the court may order that a defendant convicted of an offense under Title 18 “make restitution to any victim of such offense, or if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate.”
18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A).[1]“An order of restitution made pursuant to this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d). “The purpose behind the statute is to ‘insure that the wrongdoer make good, to the degree possible, the harm he has caused to the victim.'” United States v. Acosta, 303 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2002) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 582 (1st Cir. 1997)).
There are three levels to the analysis: whether to award restitution at all; if so, the amount of any such award; and if so, the manner of payment.
Under the VWPA, whether to award restitution is within the discretion of the district court. In determining whether to order restitution, the district court is required to consider (1) “the amount of the loss sustained by each victim as a result of the offense”; (2) “the financial resources of the defendant, [and] the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents”; and (3) “such other factors as the court deems appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i). The statute also provides that the court may decline to order restitution where “the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of an order of restitution under this section outweighs the need to provide restitution to any victims ....” Id. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(ii).
Defendant contends that the Court should not order restitution because he is currently indigent and unlikely to earn any significant amount of money while incarcerated. To the extent that any of his prison earnings are used to pay restitution, his family will have to provide him additional funds for personal necessities in prison. The burden of paying restitution, therefore, would effectively be borne by his mother or other family members. Furthermore, defendant contends that the Court should decline to award restitution because the Correia family has already raised $150,305 through a GoFundMe campaign to cover travel costs associated with the trial, and restitution would therefore result in double payment.
The government acknowledges that a restitution order in this case will be “largely symbolic,” given defendant's limited financial prospects. Nevertheless, it contends that restitution is appropriate to ensure that, were defendant to receive additional financial resources in the future, the funds would be available to support Correia's daughter.
The Court agrees that it is unlikely that defendant will ever earn more than token amounts of income while incarcerated. Nonetheless, it is at least possible that his circumstances might change; for example, a relative might pass away, and he might come into an inheritance. See United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 592 (1st Cir. 1997) (); United States v. Phaneuf, 91 F.3d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Restitution awards may be imposed in order to make victims whole should the defendant become able to pay in the future.”); United States v. Lilly, 80 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1996) ( ). Under the circumstances, the Court concludes that an order of restitution is appropriate.
Where the Court decides to order restitution, it “shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). The government bears the burden of demonstrating the amount of a victim's losses by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). “The Court may not order restitution for losses that are unsubstantiated or speculative.” United States v. Williams, 946 F.Supp.2d 112, 117 (D.D.C. 2013).
The government seeks restitution for Correia's funeral expenses, her family's travel expenses associated with the trial, and her projected lost earnings. As an initial matter, defendant contends that the court should factor in his financial circumstances in determining the amount of restitution. While at least one court has held that approach to be appropriate, see United States v. Williams, 353 F.Supp.3d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2019), most courts that have addressed the question have concluded that the financial circumstances of the defendant may be considered “in deciding whether to order restitution and in setting the defendant's payment schedule, but not in setting the total amount of restitution due to the victims.” United States v. Sizemore, 850 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Diaz, 865 F.3d 168, 180 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (July 31, 2017); United States v. Day, 418 F.3d 746, 756 (7th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006). While the First Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, the latter approach is more consistent with the statutory text. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i) () and 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) () with 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A) ().
The Court will therefore address each proposed category of restitution without considering defendant's ability to pay.
In the case of an offense resulting in the death of a victim, the court may order that the defendant “pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services.” Id. § 3663(b)(3). The Correia family received $8,800 from the Massachusetts victim's compensation fund to cover funeral expenses.
The VWPA provides that “[i]n no case shall the fact that a victim has received or is entitled to receive compensation with respect to a loss from insurance or any other source be considered in determining the amount of restitution.” Id. § 3664(f)(1)(B). However, where “a victim has received compensation from insurance or any other source with respect to a loss, the court shall order that restitution be paid to the person who provided or is obligated to provide the compensation, but the restitution order shall provide that all restitution of victims required by the order be paid to the victims before any restitution is paid to such a provider of compensation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1).
Defendant does not object to restitution for those costs. Accordingly, the Court will order that restitution be paid in the amount of $8,800 to the Massachusetts victim's compensation fund, provided that full restitution is first paid to Correia's daughter.
“[I]n any case,” the court may order that the defendant “reimburse the victim for lost income and necessary child care, transportation, and other expenses related to participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(4).
The Correia family received $2,562.68 from the federal Crime Victims Fund to cover travel costs associated with attending court proceedings in this case. Defendant contends that restitution for those costs is unnecessary given the more than $150,000 raised through the GoFundMe campaign. Again, the VWPA is clear that “[i]n no case shall the fact that a victim has received or is entitled to receive compensation with respect to a loss from insurance or any other source be considered in determining the amount of restitution.” Id. § 3664(f)(1)(B). Despite defendant's argument that this provision was clearly intended to cover only “recovery from insurance companies or other entities determined to have a legal obligation to make payments,” the broad phrase “or any other source” is most reasonably read to include solicited donations.
Accordingly the Court will order that restitution be paid in the amount of $2,562.68 to the federal Crime Victims Fund, again provided that full restitution is first...
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