United States v. Coleman
Docket Number | 20-4093 |
Decision Date | 09 November 2021 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEVON SCOTT COLEMAN, a/k/a Cuz, a/k/a Devin Scott Coleman, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Michael Allen Bragg, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jean Barrett Hudson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Thomas T. Cullen, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
A federal grand jury indicted Devon Scott Coleman on three counts after a deputy sheriff with the Washington County Sheriff's Office ("WCSO") conducted an investigative stop and subsequently discovered a firearm and drugs, among other items, in his vehicle. Coleman moved to suppress those items and his attendant statements, arguing that the deputy did not have reasonable suspicion to perform the investigative stop. The district court denied that motion and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.
As students were arriving at Patrick Henry High School in Washington County, Virginia, on the morning of Wednesday, September 20, 2017, a school administrator reported to the WCSO that an unknown man was parked erratically on the campus. The administrator described the man-later identified as Coleman-as "asleep or passed out" in his vehicle with a crossbow visible in the backseat. J.A. 38. Deputy Sheriff David Johnson of the WSCO, who primarily served as a school resource officer, was dispatched to the school to investigate. When he arrived on the campus, the school administrator identified the reported vehicle, a Pontiac Sunfire, in the student/faculty parking lot. The vehicle, which was stopped but running, was primarily parked in a travel lane, with the brake lights engaged and the front end partially positioned into a marked parking spot. The bulk of the vehicle sat in a travel lane.
Deputy Johnson later testified that he was immediately J.A. 38. As for the crossbow, he believed its possession was illegal under Virginia Code section 18.2-308.1 because it could fire "a projected missile on the school campus." J.A. 53. As relevant here, by virtue of section 18.2-308.1 and its cross-reference to the weapons enumerated in section 18.2-308(A), Virginia law prohibited the knowing possession of certain weapons on school grounds.[1] Neither statute, however, expressly mentions crossbows.
Deputy Johnson pulled behind the vehicle, but when he opened the door of his police cruiser, Coleman began to drive away. Finding this behavior suspicious under the circumstances, Deputy Johnson engaged his emergency lights to then stop Coleman. When Deputy Johnson approached the vehicle after it came to a stop, he observed the butt of a crossbow in the backseat behind Coleman and noted that Coleman, who did not appear to be a student, [2] seemed lethargic. Deputy Johnson explained to Coleman that "[t]he school had contacted [the police] and the call had been made that [Coleman] was there on the school campus and they were concerned." J.A. 41. He then inquired whether Coleman had any weapons in the vehicle, and Coleman responded that he had a firearm in the vehicle's center console. Deputy Johnson asked Coleman to exit the vehicle "[f]or the safety of [himself], Devon Coleman, and all of the school students around [them]." J.A. 80. When Coleman stepped out of the vehicle, Deputy Johnson observed "a fairly large bag of a green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana" in between the door and the driver's seat. J.A. 43.
Deputy Johnson administered Coleman a field sobriety test, while another deputy searched the vehicle. That search revealed marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, individual baggies, a scale, a Smith & Wesson .38 Special revolver, and the crossbow. Coleman was arrested immediately.
A federal grand jury subsequently indicted twenty-eight defendants, including Coleman, for participating in a drug trafficking organization. Coleman was named in three counts: conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(C), 843(d), and 846 (Count 1); possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) (Count 16); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 17). Coleman moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his vehicle and any attendant statements, arguing that Deputy Johnson did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because possession of a crossbow on school grounds is not illegal under Virginia law.
The Government countered that Coleman could have been committing various criminal activities-e.g., a parking violation, unlawfully operating a vehicle, trespassing, or possessing a crossbow on school grounds-all of which created reasonable suspicion to support the investigative stop. With regard to the crossbow, the Government argued that Deputy Johnson had reasonable suspicion because, although section 18.2-308(A) does not expressly identify crossbows, Coleman's possession of one was nonetheless illegal as the statute broadly prohibits "weapon[s] of like kind," and crossbows so qualify. And even if Deputy Johnson was mistaken in his belief that crossbows are forbidden on school property under that statute, the Government posited that his mistake of law was a reasonable one under Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014), meaning it did not undercut the conclusion that he had reasonable suspicion.
J.A. 94 (footnote omitted).
Coleman proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him on all three counts.[3] The court sentenced him to 211 months' imprisonment. Coleman timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo as to the district court's legal conclusions and for clear error as to its underlying factual findings. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 141- 42 (4th Cir. 2018). "When, as here, a motion to suppress has been denied, we view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2013).
On appeal, Coleman challenges the validity of the investigative stop, arguing that Deputy Johnson did not have reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity because possessing a crossbow on school property is not illegal under Virginia law and, in any event, Deputy Johnson's mistake of law on that point was unreasonable. However, we need not reach these arguments. Even if Coleman had not possessed the crossbow, the totality of the remaining circumstances nonetheless provided Deputy Johnson with reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigative stop. Alternatively, we reach the same conclusion when considering Coleman's crossbow possession in our analysis, assuming, without deciding, in that scenario that Virginia law does not prohibit possession of a crossbow on school property. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Coleman's motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Terry, the Supreme Court recognized that an officer may stop and search a person without probable cause in limited circumstances. The Court instructed that to justify such an investigative stop "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant . . . intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. In other words, the officer must "observe[] unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." Id. at 30. The Court employed an objective standard on this inquiry: "[W]...
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