United States v. Collington

• Decision Date: 26 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-6721,19-6721
• Citation: 995 F.3d 347
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Chuck Parker COLLINGTON, a/k/a Chuck Berry Collington, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

995 F.3d 347

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Chuck Parker COLLINGTON, a/k/a Chuck Berry Collington, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 19-6721

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: January 28, 2021

Decided: April 26, 2021

ARGUED: Kimberly Harvey Albro, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Lauren L. Hummel, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sherri A. Lydon, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Wynn concurred.

FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Chuck Collington appeals the district court's denial of his motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. Collington was sentenced in 2010 to thirty years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to various federal narcotics and firearm offenses. In 2019, Collington moved for a reduced sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, contending that his sentence was ten years longer than the current statutory maximum. The district court denied Collington's motion, and he appealed to this Court, where the case was held in abeyance pending resolution of United States v. Chambers , 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020). We now vacate the district court's ruling and remand for further proceedings.

I.

A.

On March 24, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Collington for conspiracy to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base ("crack cocaine") in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count One); possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (Count Two); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Three). Collington and the government agreed that he would plead guilty to Count Two—possession of five or more grams of crack cocaine—in exchange for the dismissal of Counts One and Three. The parties further agreed that the district court could consider both dismissed counts at sentencing. At the time, a conviction under § 841 involving at least five but fewer than fifty grams of crack cocaine carried a statutory minimum sentence of five years and a statutory maximum sentence of forty years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2009).

Collington's presentence investigation report (PSR) held him responsible for roughly 5500 grams of crack cocaine and 2000 grams of powder cocaine. See Opening Br. at 3. The PSR also included a cross-reference for first-degree murder when establishing his offense level. Accordingly, Collington's offense level was forty-five with a recommended Guidelines sentence of 480 months.

The district court sentenced Collington on April 27, 2010. During the sentencing hearing, Collington waived any objection to any finding in the PSR—including the murder cross-reference—in exchange for a below-Guidelines sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. The district court accepted the agreement, imposing a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release. The court described the sentence as "appropriate" and "a fair and reasonable [sentence] under all of the circumstances." J.A. 43. In particular, the court stated:

I have considered all of the Title 18, United States Code, section [3553(a)] factors, and I think that this is appropriate punishment for [Collington's] conduct. He was involved in a serious drug offense here. He has been a significant drug dealer. And he has admitted also that he murdered this other individual.

So, I think 30 years is an appropriate sentence for this particular individual under all of the circumstances. And I have considered all of the Title 18, United States Code, section [3553(a)] factors.

J.A. 43. The court did not further explain its sentencing decision.

B.

Collington's timing was unfortunate. Less than four months after his sentencing, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. As we explained in detail in United States v. Wirsing , the Fair Sentencing Act reduced sentencing disparities between cocaine and crack cocaine offenses, which were widely criticized for producing racially disproportionate sentencing outcomes. 943 F.3d 175, 177–78 (4th Cir. 2019) ; Fair Sentencing Act, § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372. Under the Fair Sentencing Act's reforms, Collington's statutory maximum sentence would have been twenty years—ten years less than the thirty-year sentence imposed by the district court. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (setting a mandatory maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute five or fewer grams of crack cocaine).¹ However, the Fair Sentencing Act only gave prospective relief to individuals sentenced after its enactment, leaving those like Collington without access to sentencing relief. See United States v. Black , 737 F.3d 280, 284–85 (4th Cir. 2013).

In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act to remedy this gap by making the Fair Sentencing Act's reforms retroactive. See United States v. Chambers , 956 F.3d 667, 670 (4th Cir. 2020) ; see also First Step Act of 2018 ("FSA"), Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. In particular, section 404(b) of the First Step Act permits individuals such as Collington to petition the sentencing court to "impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ... were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." FSA § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222 (citations omitted).

C.

In 2019, Collington filed a motion for sentencing relief under section 404(b), arguing that his sentence is unconstitutional because it is in excess of the statutory maximum made retroactively applicable by the First Step Act. The district court entered a text order on April 24, 2019, holding that Collington was eligible for First Step Act relief; requesting sentencing memoranda; and indicating its intent to consider "the new statutory range, the advisory guideline range, the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and any evidence of post-sentencing mitigation." J.A. 18.

Collington submitted a sentencing memorandum on May 7, 2019, arguing again that the court should reduce his sentence by at least ten years to 240 months—the current statutory maximum. Collington also submitted some evidence of post-sentencing mitigation in the form of education courses taken while incarcerated as well as his prison work history. The government did not submit a sentencing memorandum.

On May 15, 2019, the district court entered a text order denying Collington's motion. The court correctly calculated Collington's statutory maximum sentence and Guidelines range but stated that "nothing requires the Court to reduce [Collington's] sentence," despite recognizing that he "is now subject to a statutory maximum of 20 years and a supervised release term of at least 3 years." J.A. 19. In denying Collington's motion, the district court stated that it had "thoroughly reviewed the record and the § 3553(a) factors," and based its decision on "the seriousness of [Collington's] drug count and the cross-reference to murder in [Collington's] PSR." Id. The district court also emphasized that it had originally sentenced Collington to thirty years’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement.

Collington timely appealed the denial of this motion.

II.

On appeal, Collington contends that the district court erred in declining to reduce his sentence to—at the very least—the new statutory maximum sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. We begin, as always, with the text of section 404 of the First Step Act:

(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—In this section, the term "covered offense" means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ... that was committed before August 3, 2010.

(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, ... impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ... were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.

(c) LIMITATIONS.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ... or if a previous motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.

FSA § 404, 132 Stat. at 5222 (citations omitted).

This Court has, in multiple cases, considered which individuals are eligible for relief because they were sentenced for "covered offenses" under section 404(a). See Wirsing , 943 F.3d at 185–86 ; United States v. Venable , 943 F.3d 187, 193–94 (4th Cir. 2019) ; United States v. Gravatt , 953 F.3d 258, 263–64 (4th Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Woodson , 962 F.3d 812, 815–17 (4th Cir. 2020). We have also instructed district courts as to the mandatory and permissive factors to analyze when considering sentence reductions for covered offenses. See Chambers , 956 F.3d at 671–75 ; United States v. Jackson , 952 F.3d 492, 500 (4th Cir. 2020). We now consider the limits of a court's discretion in disposing of First Step Act motions—namely, whether courts can retain a sentence above the retroactive statutory maximum and whether courts’ decisions must be procedurally and substantively reasonable.² In answering these questions, we are guided by our past precedent, which clarifies the...