United States v. Corbine, 5:20-CR-50052-JLV

Decision Date27 April 2021
Docket Number5:20-CR-50052-JLV
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MELVIN CORBINE and RICARDO BARRAGAN, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DANETA WOLLMANN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE8

Pending are Defendants' Motions to Suppress (Docs. 44 46).[1] A hearing was held on Wednesday, January 6, 2021. Mr. Corbine was personally present and represented by his attorney of record, Thomas Diggins. Mr. Barragan was personally present and represented by his attorney of record, Conor Duffy. The Government was represented by the Assistant United States Attorney Kathryn Rich. Three witnesses testified at the hearing, and five exhibits were received into evidence. Supplemental briefing concluded on 2/23/2021. Based on careful consideration of all the evidence, and counsel's written and oral arguments, the Court respectfully makes the following:

RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Suppress (Doc 44) be denied.

JURISDICTION

Both defendants are charged in an Indictment with Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841 (b)(1)(A) and Possession of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841 (b)(1)(B). The pending Motions were referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and United States District Judge Jeffrey L. Viken's Standing Order dated April 1, 2018.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ricardo Barragan first came to the attention of the law enforcement in 2018 when an agent with the Unified Narcotics Enforcement Team (UNET) received information he was transporting methamphetamine from Denver, Colorado to Rapid City, South Dakota. (Doc. 63 at 62-63.) Then, in May and June of 2019, law enforcement worked with a confidential informant to conduct two controlled drug purchases from Melvin Corbine. Id. at 63. As part of one of these purchases, Mr. Corbine had the informant take him to a residence on Outlook Circle to obtain methamphetamine to sell to the informant. Id. Law enforcement later obtained a search warrant for the residence. Id.

Law enforcement first came into contact with Mr. Barragan during the execution of a search warrant at the residence on Outlook Circle in July of 2019. Id. During the search, law enforcement discovered roughly two ounces of methamphetamine, bulk cash, and a digital scale. Id. at 64.

In November of 2019, law enforcement spoke again to a confidential informant regarding Mr. Corbine and Mr. Barragan. Id. at 64-65. The informant told law enforcement he/she received methamphetamine from Mr. Corbine from approximately February to March of 2019. Id. at 65. The informant also stated that after this time, their source of methamphetamine shifted to Mr. Barragan from approximately March to June of 2019. Id.

Based upon information obtained from this investigation, UNET Agent and Rapid City Police Department Detective Cade Bloomenrader acquired a search warrant in February, 2020 to track the vehicles of Mr. Barragan and his wife, Jennika Bettelyoun. Id. at 67. A short while later, both vehicles ended up in the Denver area at the same time. Id. The vehicles were later noted to be traveling back to Rapid City. Id. at 68.

On March 8th, 2020, Detective Bloomenrader conducted a briefing with South Dakota Highway Patrol Troopers and other UNET agents. Id. The purpose of the briefing was to provide some background on the investigation and inform the other officers of the vehicle being driven by either Mr. Corbine or Mr. Barrigan. Id. Among those in attendance were South Dakota State Troopers Tyler Jackson and Dennis Mez. Id. The Troopers were informed by Special Agent Bloomenrader that the individual they were looking for was one of the defendants, Ricardo Barragan, who was believed to be transporting narcotics on Highway 16 in a silver Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck. Id. at 89.

After the debriefing, Trooper Jackson and Trooper Mez traveled to and sat stationary at mile marker 59 on Highway 16 to wait for the vehicle. Id. at 9-10. The vehicle was first spotted by other officers, who then conveyed that information to Troopers Jackson and Mez to conduct the stop.[2] Id. at 10. As the vehicle passed Trooper Jackson, he noticed the top part of the vehicle's license plate was obscured by an after-market back up camera so that the issuing state could not be read. Id. at 11, see Doc. 62, Ex. 3. Trooper Jackson testified that he believed the vehicle to be in violation of SDCL § 32-5-98, which requires the license plate to be conspicuously displayed.[3]

Trooper Jackson then initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. Id. at 16. As he approached the vehicle, he testified that he smelled the odor of raw marijuana. Id. By this time, Trooper Mez and Sergeant Brian Swetts had arrived on the scene. Id. at 20. Together, the three conducted a search of the vehicle. Id. Within the vehicle, the officers found approximately 523 grams of cocaine; approximately 1.5 ounces of marijuana; two grams of hash oil; a methamphetamine pipe and small baggie, both of which tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine; and five cell phones. Id., see Doc. 62, Ex. 2.

DISCUSSION

Mr Barragan argues the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle should be suppressed because there existed no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. (Doc. 45 at p. 3). Specifically, he argues 1) SDCL § 32-5-98 requires only the numbers of the license plate be visible; 2) Trooper Jackson's reliance on SDCL § 32-5-98 was an objectively unreasonable mistake of law; and 3) the information relied upon in the UNET investigation was too stale and non-particularized to give law enforcement reasonable suspicion. (Doc. 45 at p. 3, Doc. 67 at pp. 2, 6). Mr. Corbine joins in the arguments put forth by Mr. Barragan. (Doc. 68 at p. 1).

The government argues 1) SDCL § 32-5-98's requirement that license plates be “conspicuously displayed” also includes the name of the issuing state and 2) even if that statute does not require visibility of the name of the issuing state, Trooper Jackson's mistake of law was objectively reasonable. (Doc 53 at 5-6.)

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In terms of the Fourth Amendment, the law is settled that “a traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver ‘even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.' Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). “For purposes of constitutional analysis, a traffic stop is characterized as an investigative detention, rather than a custodial arrest....As such, a traffic stop is governed by the principles of Terry v. Ohio . . . .” United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

Therefore, to be valid pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop “must be supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.” United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

A law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion when the officer is aware of particularized, objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime is being committed. The more rigorous standard of probable cause exists when the totality of the circumstances justifies the belief that a crime has been committed and the person being seized committed it.

Id. (internal quotations omitted). “An officer has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop when he observes even a minor traffic violation. This is true even if a valid traffic stop is a pretext for other investigation.” United States v. Sallis, 507 F.3d 646, 649 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, the officer's interpretation of the law need not be perfect to justify the warrantless stop of a vehicle. [G]rounds for a traffic stop may rest on an officer's mistake of law or fact, provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable.” United States v. Farlee, 427 F.Supp.3d 1123, 1126 (2019) (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60-61, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014).

The relevant South Dakota statutes include:

32-5-98. Operation of motor vehicle without visible license plates prohibited-- Removal of unauthorized plates--Violation as misdemeanor. Except as otherwise specifically provided, no person may operate or drive a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state unless the vehicle has a distinctive number assigned to it by the department, and two number plates, bearing the number conspicuously displayed, horizontally and in an upright position, one on the front and one on the rear of the vehicle, each securely fastened. The plates shall at all times, as far as is reasonably possible, be kept clear and free of mud, ice, or snow so as to be clearly visible. All number plates, markers, or stamps evidencing registration or licensing of any vehicle in this or any foreign state territory, district, or possession and any plate, marker, or stamp used in substitution for or in lieu of the number plates required by this section by virtue of any law or executive order for any prior year or years shall be removed from such vehicles.
32-5-46. Vehicles owned by
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