United States v. Coulter

• Citation: 41 F.4th 451
• Decision Date: 18 July 2022
• Docket Number: 20-10999
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. Braylon Ray COULTER, Defendant—Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

41 F.4th 451

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellant,

v.Braylon Ray COULTER, Defendant—Appellee.

No. 20-10999

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED July 18, 2022

Stephen S. Gilstrap, Leigha Amy Simonton, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John Michael Helms, Jr., Esq., Law Office of John M. Helms, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:

A lone police officer performed a traffic stop on Appellee Braylon Ray Coulter in the middle of the night. Having been given reason to suspect that Coulter, who revealed an aggravated robbery conviction, had a gun, the officer handcuffed him and asked where it was. Coulter answered, and the officer's partner arrived later to find a .40 caliber pistol and .37 ounces of marijuana in Coulter's backpack between the front seats of the van he drove. Before Coulter divulged that information, the officer did not provide Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The admissibility of Coulter's unwarned statements therefore depends on whether he was "in custody" as contemplated by Miranda at the time he offered them.

We hold that a reasonable person in Coulter's position would not have thought that he was in custody for Miranda purposes. Moreover, the officer questioned Coulter in an environment that was not tantamount to a station house interrogation as contemplated by Miranda. All of Coulter's unwarned statements are therefore admissible. The district court's judgment suppressing those statements is REVERSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Coulter was driving an old van with "squeaky brakes" through a neighborhood at 2:41 a.m. on July 15, 2018. Officer Nino de Guzman of the Lancaster, Texas Police Department began following Coulter and discovered that the van "was registered to an address in a different city, that its registration was expired, and that it had no insurance." Officer Guzman thought Coulter might have been a burglar and decided to pull him over.¹

After Coulter voluntarily stepped out of the van, Officer Guzman twice asked him whether he had any guns. Coulter said "[m]m-mm" before answering no.² Officer Guzman then frisked Coulter before asking him who owned the van and where he came from. Coulter replied that it belonged to his boss and that he just left work. When Officer Guzman also asked Coulter for identification, he admitted to not having any. Officer Guzman then conducted a background check and learned that Coulter's driver's license was suspended.³ Coulter also disclosed that he was on parole for aggravated robbery. Following that admission, Officer Guzman asked Coulter for a third time whether he had a gun. Coulter once again insisted that he did not and then added that he did not own the van. Officer Guzman inquired more broadly as to whether "anything illegal" was in the van, even as he emphasized that he did not care if Coulter had a small amount of marijuana. Without admitting to possession, Coulter conceded that he smoked marijuana in the van the week before and that morning. This admission, combined with Coulter's "suspicious behavior," gave Officer Guzman probable cause to conduct a search.

After Officer Guzman smelled marijuana emitting from the van, the court found that Coulter told Officer Guzman he "want[ed] to be real with [him]" before volunteering that he "did not need any more ‘strikes’ and indicated ... that he had a gun in the van." Specifically, after Officer Guzman asked for a fourth time whether he had a gun, Coulter suggested that he would be "losing[ ]" by answering and that he did not "want to lose[.]" Coulter also insisted that he "had people trying to kill [him] .... [and did not] want to be caught out [there] with nothing." These comments prompted Officer Guzman to inform Coulter that he was "just going to detain [him]" so that he did not "run up and grab the gun." Coulter offered to walk farther away instead, though he never moved.

Officer Guzman then instructed Coulter to turn and face his police car and handcuffed him "for officer safety." As he did so, Officer Guzman reiterated that Coulter was "[j]ust detained. That's it." He also asked Coulter whether he understood what detention meant, but Coulter did not directly respond. Officer Guzman explained that the handcuffs were necessary because he did not want to "wind up fighting with [Coulter]." Coulter said "[n]o, no, no, no[ ]" before saying that Officer Guzman was "cool." Officer Guzman then emphasized for a third time that Coulter was "just detained" and asked again whether he understood what that meant. Coulter responded "[y]eah."⁴ Officer Guzman instructed Coulter "not to pull away, because [he] did not ‘want to tase [sic] [him] and do a bunch of paperwork.’ " Coulter said that was "fine." Coulter then reiterated that he "want[ed] to be real with [Officer Guzman]."

After securing Coulter in handcuffs, Officer Guzman asked him where the suspected gun was. Coulter then explicitly admitted for the first time that he had a gun in his backpack. Coulter later suggested that Officer Guzman could just take the gun and let him go. While Coulter remained handcuffed and standing in the street, a fellow officer arrived, searched the van, and located the gun along with .37 ounces (approximately 10 grams) of marijuana in his backpack.⁵ Officer Guzman then arrested Coulter.

A grand jury indicted Coulter in February 2019 for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). About one year later, he moved to "suppress all evidence and observations arising from the vehicle search." The district court held a hearing before denying that motion in June 2020. In doing so, the district court reasoned that Officer Guzman had reasonable suspicion to stop Coulter, reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity to continue the stop, and probable cause to ultimately search the van based on Coulter's behavior and admitted recent drug use.

After the district court denied Coulter's motion, a grand jury charged him in a second, superseding indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2), and engaging in a conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k) and (c)(2). The government added the conspiracy charge because Coulter allegedly influenced his boss to "fabricate a bill of sale for the gun found in the van and to falsely claim that [his boss] had left that firearm in [the van]."

Coulter then moved to "suppress all statements [he made] in response to the officer's questioning once he was in handcuffs." Coulter contended for the first time that he was in custody once handcuffed and that Officer Guzman did not deliver the requisite Miranda warnings. The government responded that Coulter was not in custody just because he was handcuffed, and Miranda warnings were therefore unnecessary.

The district court granted the suppression motion in October 2020 without holding another hearing. Reviewing the previous record, the court determined that "the amount of restraint on [Coulter's] physical movement, as well as Officer Guzman's statements regarding [Coulter's] freedom to move or leave, weigh[ed] in favor of finding that [Coulter] was in custody." Under these circumstances, and in the absence of the officer's stating Coulter's Miranda rights, the district court excluded "[a]ny statement made by [Coulter] after he was placed in handcuffs and before he was given Miranda warnings."

The government filed this interlocutory appeal from the district court's judgment and the trial has been continued pending resolution of the appeal. The government argues that the district court erred because a reasonable person in Coulter's position would not have thought that the restraint on his freedom was functionally equivalent to a formal arrest and that the environment in which he was questioned did not necessitate Miranda warnings.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Custody determinations under Miranda present ‘a mixed question of law and fact.’ " United States v. Arellano-Banuelos , 912 F.3d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S. 99, 102, 116 S. Ct. 457, 460, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) ). "When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions, including ... whether Miranda 's guarantees have been impermissibly denied, de novo." United States v. Nelson , 990 F.3d 947, 952 (5th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). In undertaking such a review, this court evaluates " ‘evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court,’ ... and [it] will uphold the district court's ruling on the motion ‘if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it[.]’ " United States v. Michalik , 5 F.4th 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Chavez , 281 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) and United States v. Michelletti , 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Fifth Amendment, incorporated against the states, provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...." "To safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court held, suspects interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation." Thompson , 516 U.S. at 107, 116 S. Ct. at 462 (citing Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612 ). In other words, "the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause."⁶ United States v. Patane , 542 U.S....