United States v. Davis
| Decision Date | 15 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11 CR 62 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. REDELL DAVIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
A one-count indictment charged Defendant Redell Davis with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mr. Davis now seeks to quash his arrest and suppress all evidence recovered during the search of a vehicle in which he was a passenger as fruits of his allegedly illegal arrest (R. 68, Mot. to Quash), and to suppress statements he claims officers elicited in violation of Fifth Amendment (R. 69, Mot. to Sup). For the following reasons, the Court denies Mr. Davis' motions.
On April 2, 2013, the Court conducted a hearing on Defendants' motion to quash and motion to suppress. During the hearing, Chicago Police Department Officers Ricky Rivera and Sean Lewis testified. The Court carefully evaluated the demeanor and credibility of both witnesses, including their body language, tone of voice, facial expressions, mannerisms, and other indicative factors. In addition, the Court admitted the following exhibits: Government Exhibit Map, Government Exhibit Citation, and Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 - Disposition of Reginald Finley's traffic case. Defendant Davies did not offer any witnesses at the hearing oraffidavits in support of his motion. Rather, he relied exclusively on his cross-examination of the two officers who testified. The Court summarizes below the testimony of the witnesses.
On August 12, 2010, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Chicago Police Officers Ricky Rivera and Sean Lewis were on patrol in the 10th district when they observed a four door Buick, dark in color, driving west on West 16th Street. They both testified that they saw the Buick while they waited at a red light at the intersection of 16th Street and Keeler. Their police car was the first car waiting at the stoplight facing south. They did not observe the Buick speeding, and it did not go through a red light. Officer Rivera and Officer Lewis both testified that they looked into the Buick as it drove through the intersection and observed that neither the driver nor the passenger had their seatbelts fastened. They now know that Reginald Finley was the Buick's driver and Defendant Davis was the passenger in the vehicle. Both officers explained that they could see into the Buick because there are two streetlights at the intersection of 16th Street and Keeler. Additionally, when the Buick drove through the intersection, it passed by the headlights of their police vehicle. Officer Rivera testified that Mr. Finley and Defendant Davis were approximately twenty-five feet away as they drove through the intersection.
According to the officers, after they noticed that neither Mr. Finley nor Mr. Davis had their seatbelts fastened, in violation of Illinois law, they turned on the police car's emergency lights and followed the Buick on 16th street, attempting to pull it over. Officer Lewis drove the police car. Officer Rivera testified that they drove approximately two to three car lengths behind the Buick. He testified that, while driving along 16th Street, he again observed that neither Mr. Finley nor Defendant Davis had their seatbelts fastened. Mr. Finley did not immediately pull the Buick over, but instead made a right turn onto Tripp Avenue. He eventually pulled his car overat 1550 S. Tripp Avenue, on the west side of the road. Officer Lewis pulled the police vehicle into the middle of the road, less than a car length behind the Buick.
The officers exited their vehicle and approached the Buick. According to Officer Rivera, he got out first and approached the passenger's side of the car, and Officer Lewis approached the driver's side. At the hearing, Officer Lewis testified consistently with Officer Rivera on this point. He acknowledged, however, that in a report he wrote after the incident he made an error and stated that Officer Rivera had approached the driver's side. Officer Lewis testified that, at some point, Mr. Finley exited the driver's side and he placed Mr. Finley in handcuffs. The officers gave Mr. Finley a citation for failure to wear his seatbelt, although Officer Rivera testified that Officer Lewis did not write the ticket until approximately an hour after the incident. (See Government Exhibit Citation). The citation noted the location of the occurrence as 4216 West 16th Street, an address between Keeler and Tripp on 16th Street. (Id.)
According to Officer Rivera, as he approached the Buick, Mr. Davis appeared nervous and repeatedly turned back to look at the officers. He had observed Mr. Davis repeatedly turn around while driving down 16th Street as well. As Officer Rivera approached the Buick, he observed Mr. Davis crouch and place a metal object on the floorboard of the vehicle. Officer Lewis did not observe Mr. Davis with a metal object. Officer Rivera testified that Officer Lewis wrote a report indicating that Mr. Davis had thrown gun onto the floorboard. He said that he did not review Officer Lewis' report that night, but reviewed it later. Officer Rivera explained that the report was not entirely accurate because he saw Mr. Davis place a metal object, which he could not positively identify as a gun, but later learned was a gun, on the floorboard. Officer Lewis testified that at some point he searched the Buick and found a gun on the passenger-side floorboard. In one of his reports, he indicated both that he found the gun on the passenger-sidefloorboard and on the driver-side floorboard. Officer Lewis acknowledged that this was an error and confirmed that he had recovered the gun on the passenger side.
Officer Rivera further testified that, after placing the metal object down, Mr. Davis got out of the car and tried to run away. Mr. Davis also struck Officer Rivera several times in the face and head, resulting in bumps and scratches. Officer Rivera visited his doctor a day or two after the incident to tend to these injuries.
After placing Mr. Finley and Defendant Davis in handcuffs, other Chicago police officers transported them to the 10th district police station. Officer Lewis and Officer Rivera interviewed Defendant Davis in an interview room at the police station for approximately ten minutes. During the interview, Officer Rivera had to leave the room for about two to three minutes because someone wanted to know if he needed his injuries tended to, but, he denied medical treatment at that time. Both officers testified that, before questioning Mr. Davis, Officer Rivera read Mr. Davis his Miranda rights from the Fraternal Order of Police Handbook, as was Officer Rivera's practice. Officer Rivera further explained that he read the rights from the Handbook in order to make sure he read them completely and thoroughly. In addition, he also testified that in December 2010 he spoke with an Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") and told her that he thought Officer Lewis read Mr. Davis his rights. He testified during the hearing that he was mistaken when he spoke with the AUSA. Both Officer Lewis and Officer Rivera testified that, after Mr. Davis heard his rights, he orally waived them. Officer Lewis further testified that Mr. Davis did not seem to have any difficulty understanding his rights. Mr. Davis never asked to stop speaking with the officers or to speak with a lawyer.
The police did not have a warrant to search Mr. Finley's car or to arrest Defendant Davis.
"An arrest, of course, is the archetypical 'seizure' of a person under the Fourth Amendment." Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 719 (7th Cir. 2013). Specifically, a person is "seized" when a law enforcement officer terminates his freedom of movement by physical force or assertion of authority. Id. (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed.2d 690 (1991)). "A seizure rises to the level of an arrest when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest." Id. (internal quotation omitted). "Probable cause to justify an arrest exists if the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing that the arrestee had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime." Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714 (). Determining whether an officer had probable cause to arrest is a purely objective inquiry. Id.
Additionally, a law enforcement officer may make an investigative stop of a person based on well-founded suspicions that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. U.S. v. Smith, 697 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing U.S. v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1014-15 (7th Cir. 2011)). "[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889(1968). "The prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless stop is supported by probable cause." U.S. v. Garcia-Garcia, 633 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 2011).
A defendant may seek to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution's protections. See, e.g., U.S. v. Conrad, 673 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2012). "Indeed, unless one of various exceptions applies, exclusion will run not only...
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