United States v. Davis

• Decision Date: 14 August 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 11–2325–cr.
• Citation: 726 F.3d 357
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Corey DAVIS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

726 F.3d 357

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Corey DAVIS, Defendant–Appellant.

Docket No. 11–2325–cr.

United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 30, 2013.

Decided: Aug. 14, 2013.

Tina Schneider, Law Office of Tina Schneider, Portland, ME, for Defendant–Appellant Corey Davis.

Amir H. Toossi, Assistant United States Attorney (Emily Berger, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

Before: CABRANES, WESLEY, Circuit Judges, and FURMAN, District Judge.^*

JESSE M. FURMAN, District Judge:

Defendant–Appellant Corey Davis appeals from a June 7, 2011 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (John Gleeson, Judge ), convicting him, following a jury trial, of committing an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 113(a)(6). Davis raises various claims on appeal, most of which we reject in a summary order filed today. In this opinion, we address Davis's most substantial argument: that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”)—a federal prison in Brooklyn, New York, where the assault took place—was within “the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” We agree with Davis that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence on this point at trial. Nevertheless, we affirm the judgment of the district court because we find that the jurisdictional status of the MDC is a “legislative fact” of which we may take judicial notice.

BACKGROUND

On May 8, 2009, while he was incarcerated at the MDC, Davis struck fellow inmate Robert Wright four times in the face, breaking Wright's jaw. As a result of this incident, a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York returned an indictment charging Davis with one count of committing an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 113(a)(6). That Section provides that “[w]hoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” commits an “[a]ssault resulting in serious bodily injury” shall be punished by a fine or up to ten years' imprisonment, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) (emphasis added). To find a defendant guilty of violating Section 113(a)(6), therefore, the Government must prove, and the jury must find, three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that the defendant assaulted another person by intentionally striking him; second, that, as a result, the other person suffered serious bodily injury; and third, that the assault took place within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See id.; see also United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725, 727–28 (9th Cir.1991). ¹ This appeal concerns the third element.

Title 18, United States Code, Section 7 defines the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” To the extent relevant here, it includes the following:

Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.

18 U.S.C. § 7(3). At trial, the only proof that the MDC fell within that definition was the testimony of Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employees assigned to the MDC. Most notably, Steven Rivera, a Special Investigative Technician, testified that the MDC is “a federal prison” that is “on federal land.” Transcript of the Trial of Corey Davis (Nov. 9, 2010) (“Trial Tr.”) at 21. On cross examination, however, Rivera acknowledged that he did not “know what year [the] land was obtained from the [New York] state government,” did not “know how the federal government accepted jurisdiction,” and did not “know when New York State agreed to the transfer.” Id. at 37. He further testified that, aside from working for the BOP at the MDC, he had “no other basis for knowing it's federal land.” Id.

After the Government rested its case, Davis moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Among other things, Davis argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction because the Government had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the assault had occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 188–90. In opposing the motion, the Government argued that the jury could find from the evidence that the MDC was a federal prison on federal land and that was “[all] that's necessary” to satisfy the jurisdictional element of Section 113(a)(6). Id. at 191–92. Citing United States v. Hernandez–Fundora, 58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir.1995), in which this Court found that the testimony of an FBI agent regarding the jurisdictional status of a federal correctional facility was sufficient to satisfy that element, the district court denied Davis's motion in a ruling from the bench. Id. at 196, 198.

The district court then turned to the jury instructions. Davis asked the district court to instruct the jury that it must find that the assault occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States and to define that term by quoting Section 7(3). Additionally, Davis asked the district court not to take judicial notice that the MDC was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, but to leave that issue for the jury to decide. Id. at 199–203. By contrast, the Government argued that, in light of Hernandez–Fundora, the district court should instruct the jury that the jurisdictional element was satisfied if it found that the crime occurred in a federal prison. Id. at 201. The district court granted Davis's request not “to take judicial notice of anything,” stating that it “shouldn't take the issue about the MDC being the sort of the property that establishes the jurisdictional element from the jury.” Id. at 210. Nevertheless, the district court declined to give the instruction requested by Davis, concluding that “the testimony of Rivera about it being a federal prison on federal land does the trick if believed by the jury.” Id. Thus, the district court explained that it would tell the jury that the Government “may establish” the jurisdictional element “by proving that the alleged assault occurred in a federal prison on federal land.” Id. at 266.

In summation, the Government therefore argued—over an objection by Davis—that the jurisdictional element of the crime had been satisfied by the testimony of Rivera that the MDC is “a federal prison ... on federal land.” Id. at 213. Davis, on the other hand, argued that the jurisdictional element had not been met because the Government had failed to prove that the MDC was on federal land: “[T]he government has to show that the jail was on federal land. They can't just say it's a federal prison. It must have been on federal land.... And just because someone works at a federal facility doesn't mean it was on federal land.” Id. at 247. In rebuttal, the Government acknowledged that it had not presented any “maps or charts or deeds,” but cited the testimony of Rivera and the other BOP employees that the MDC was a federal prison. Id. at 250. “When you're in a federal post office,” the Government contended, “you're on federal land. When you're in a federal courthouse, you are on federal land, and when you are in a federal prison, you are on federal land. You can infer that from the testimony that you have.” Id.

Consistent with its ruling at the charge conference, the district court then instructed the jury that, to convict Davis, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the assault occurred ... within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, meaning in this context any land reserved or acquired for the use of the United States and under its exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. The government may establish this element by proving that the alleged assault occurred in a federal prison on federal land.

Id. at 266 (emphasis added). Thereafter, the jury returned a general verdict convicting Davis of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of Section 113(a)(6).

On January 25, 2011, represented by new counsel, Davis moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial pursuant to Rules 29 and 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing once again that the evidence was insufficient to establish the jurisdictional element of the crime. At sentencing on June 3, 2011, the district court denied the motion from the bench, concluding that Davis's case was indistinguishable from Hernandez–Fundora. As the district court explained:

The [Hernandez–Fundora ] court held that where a competent witness testifies that an incident occurred in a location where the federal government exercises jurisdiction and that testimony remains uncontradicted, the jury can find jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt.... The only distinction between this case and Hernandez–Fundora is that the agent there testified that the criminal act took place in the federal prison that was under concurrent jurisdiction, while in this case Rivera testified that the act took place in a federal prison on federal land. I don't find that distinction significant. The Circuit in Hernandez–Fundora presumed that the agent's testimony regarding concurrent jurisdiction was presumably based, among other things, on the “[c]ommonplace knowledge that a federal prison is likely to be a location where federal jurisdiction is at least concurrently exercised.” ... The agent could draw an inference that federal jurisdiction existed from the fact that he actually had...