United States v. Debs

• Decision Date: 08 January 1895
• Citation: 65 F. 210
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. DEBS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

65 F. 210

UNITED STATES v. DEBS et al.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois.

January 8, 1895

T. E Milchrist, Moritz Rosenthal, Asst. U.S. Dist. Atty., and Edwin Walker, for the United States.

John S Getting, Col. Harper, and S. S. Gregory, for defendants.

GROSSCUP District Judge (orally).

The indictment charges the defendants with having on the 29th of June, 1894, in this division and district, unlawfully corruptly, and wickedly conspired and agreed together, and with other persons to the grand jury unknown, to commit an offense against the United States, to wit, knowingly unlawfully, and willfully to obstruct and retard the mails of the United States, and that, to effectuate the object of such conspiracy, certain of the defendants, on different days subsequent to June 29th, and within this division and district, unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully did in fact obstruct and retard the mails of the United States. The means whereby such obstruction was brought about are set out in detail. The indictment thus charges a conspiracy, and the overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy. The defendants now move to quash.

Their first objection to the indictment is that it nowhere charges that the acts done were done 'feloniously.' This word is one of those legal adjectives that have grown out of the common law criminal procedure. The word itself seems to have no special, inherent meaning. It was held necessary in those indictments which, under the old common law, fell within the classification of felonies. The fact that a crime is not denominated a 'felony' does not make the felonious intent indispensable, unless it was one of those felonies that have come over from the common law. No case or statute has been called to my attention which shows that the obstruction of the mails was, under the old procedure, known as a felony. I am of the opinion that it was not, and that, therefore, on the authority of U.S. v. Staats, 8 How. 41, irrespective of whether it is a felony now or not, the felonious intent is not indispensable.

The second objection is that the defendants charged with the overt acts of retarding the mail trains are not charged with having known at the time that the trains carried the mails of the United States. It is said that no intent against the mails can be inferred unless the perpetrators had knowledge that the mails were on board the trains obstructed. I do not concur in this view. The defendants are properly chargeable with an intent to...