United States v. O'DELL
| Citation | 462 F.2d 224 |
| Decision Date | 16 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 71-1606 to 71-1610.,71-1606 to 71-1610. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tom O'DELL, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Arlie MURR, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D. C. RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Junior HICKS, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glen SHOEMAKER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Dale Quillen, Nashville, Tenn. (Court-appointed), for appellants Arlie Murr, D. C. Ramsey, Junior Hicks and Glen Shoemaker.
John F. Dugger, Ben W. Hooper, II, Newport, Tenn., on brief, for appellant O'Dell.
W. Thomas Dillard, Jerry Foster, Chattanooga, Tenn., John L. Bowers, Jr., U. S. Atty. (Eastern Dist. of Tenn.), Carl P. McDonald, Asst. U. S. Atty., Knoxville, Tenn., Jerry Foster, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chattanooga, Tenn., on brief, for appellee.
Before CELEBREZZE and PECK, Circuit Judges, and O'SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
In an indictment handed up in August, 1970, a federal grand jury charged seven Cocke County, Tennessee law enforcement officials,1 a private bail bondsman and "other persons to the Grand Jury unknown" with participation in a scheme designed to pervert the workings of justice in Cocke County and to make the criminal law of Tennessee a source of personal gain for those who administered it. The net effect of such scheme, according to the indictment, was to coerce and intimidate inhabitants and citizens of the United States in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The indictment alleged that over a period of months, constables and deputy sheriffs of Cocke County arrested a number of persons as they drove away from local taverns, charging them with drunk driving or driving while intoxicated.1a Once placed in the County jail the prisoners were not taken before a magistrate. Instead they were told that they faced an unenviable choice: make "bail" in amounts ranging up to $350.00 or be sentenced to "11 months and 29 days on the road." It was allegedly explained to the prisoner-victims — all of whom resided outside of Cocke County — that whatever conventional notions of bail might be, in Cocke County one paid over the money, departed without a receipt and did not return — for trial or otherwise. It was alleged that the prisoners consistently chose the less onerous of the alternatives, scraped together the "bail" money with the aid of relatives, and departed. Thereafter, upon motion of the arresting officer, charges against them were dropped.
Upon the return of the federal indictment setting forth this scheme the law enforcement officials and others alleged to have assisted them were brought to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
After a lengthy jury trial, five defendants — all law enforcement officials — were found guilty of the offenses with which they were charged. Four, Arlie Murr, D. C. Ramsey, Junior Hicks and Glen Shoemaker were convicted of "willfully depriving" persons of their constitutionally guaranteed rights in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 242. The fifth, Tom O'Dell was convicted of conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate" citizens in the exercise of such rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. All five defendants have taken appeals to this Court.
All the Appellants suggest that they were entitled to directed verdicts of acquittal because the proof offered at their trial failed to establish the facts alleged in the indictment. Appellant O'Dell also urges that his trial and conviction were improper, constituting such double jeopardy as is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. All Appellants join in raising numerous other allegations of error in the conduct of their trial which, they argue, entitle them to reversal of their convictions and new trials. We believe that Appellant O'Dell's double jeopardy plea was properly rejected.2 We also believe that the evidence introduced at trial would have been sufficient to support the guilty verdicts had the jury been properly instructed. However, in light of the error committed by the trial court in instructing the jury and the likelihood of prejudice resulting from that error we conclude that the Appellants are entitled to new trials.
18 U.S.C. § 241 provides in relevant part:
18 U.S.C. § 242 provides in relevant part:
"Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. . . ."
It is apparent from the bare statutory language that in any prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 a central question facing the trier of fact will be whether a right protected by the Constitution or federal laws has been plotted against or taken from a citizen or inhabitant of one of the United States. In answering this question, it is, of course, essential that the trier of fact have before it a clear conception of what rights are so protected.
The District Court recognized this need and carefully informed the jury:
"As to both of these statutes, ladies and gentlemen one of the rights and privileges secured to every citizen of this country, and protected by its Constitution is the right to due process of law; and, it is his immunity under that Constitution not to be deprived of his liberty or his property, including money, by a state without due process of law."
The Court then went on to define the "right" in question:
"No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what is, and what is not, due process of law; but for your purposes, due process of law is that process which is due a person who is charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or some other charge, according to the law of Tennessee." (emphasis supplied).
The Court expanded on the definition, referring to the protected right throughout as, "due process of Tennessee law." Seeking to clarify the phrase, the District Judge set forth in great detail (and over the objections of defense counsel) the Tennessee rules governing arrest, the setting and receiving of bail, commitment to jail and release of arrested persons. Included in his descriptions were such procedural rules as those requiring: that an arrested person be taken before a magistrate promptly; that an arrested person be allowed to make one phone call before being booked; that the court clerk and not a law enforcement officer take custody of any driver's license confiscated from one accused of driving while intoxicated; and that the maximum bail set for a person accused of the latter offense not exceed $200.00.
Having listed these and other procedural requirements of the Tennessee laws the District Court concluded this section of its charge by instructing the jury:
Simply put, the instructions informed the jury that the State of Tennessee had established certain rules concerning criminal procedure, that these rules each protected an element of the due process of law which is guaranteed to arrested persons, and that willful violations of these rules would constitute that deprivation of Constitutionally guaranteed rights which is made criminally punishable by 18 U.S.C. § 242.4 Similarly, the instructions informed the jury that a conspiracy to violate such Tennessee rules would violate 18 U.S.C. § 241.5
We believe these instructions reflect an improper view of the relevant principles of law.
The origins of the District Court's erroneous instructions likely can be traced to an apparent confusion between that due process which is guaranteed by the federal Constitution and "due process of Tennessee law" which, insofar as it is not identical with federal due process, is not directly guaranteed by the Constitution. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are concerned only with deprivations of rights guaranteed by federal law or the Constitution. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945).
It is clear that the mere fact that a state rule has been willfully violated or that a conspiracy has been formed to violate such rule, does not itself give rise to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242.6 This principle was recognized in Screws, supra:
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