United States v. Ecker, 73-1154.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 73-1154.,73-1154.
• Citation: 479 F.2d 1206
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Lewis C. ECKER, II, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

479 F.2d 1206 (1973)

UNITED STATES of America v. Lewis C. ECKER, II, Appellant.

No. 73-1154.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

May 29, 1973.

As Amended June 7, 1973.

Herbert M. Silverberg, Chief, Mental Health Division, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., was on the motion for Summary Reversal.

Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, Oscar Altshuler, Roger C. Spaeder, and Lawrence H. Wechsler, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the opposition to motion for Summary Reversal.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MacKINNON, Circuit Judge.

BAZELON, Chief Judge:

Appellant Ecker has moved for summary reversal of the District Court's denial of St. Elizabeths Hospital's recommendation for his conditional release from that hospital on the ground that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion. We deny the motion for summary reversal and, sua sponte, summarily affirm the decision below.

On the basis of this record, we find that the hospital's evidence raised sufficient questions about appellant's mental stability and about the adequacy of its own investigation into his mental status to support the trial judge's denial of Ecker's conditional release in February of 1973. This determination does not prejudice future recommendations for conditional release or attempts by the hospital to clarify the questions raised in this record, now five months old.

I.

The facts of this case need be only briefly recited. In 1968, appellant Ecker was acquitted by reason of insanity, in an uncontested proceeding, of the rape-murder of a young Congressional secretary. He was committed to St. Elizabeths with a diagnosis of severe sociopathic personality disturbance, sexual deviance (sadism) with organic features.¹ He spent a total of four years in maximum security in the John Howard Pavilion, and nineteen months in minimum security prior to the hospital's request for his conditional release.

This request, dated January 4, 1973, encompassed the pursuit of an educational program at a technical institute in Virginia and visits to his parents' home at the discretion of the hospital. A hearing was held on January 30, 1973, in the District Court. Dr. George Saiger, appellant's ward psychiatrist since July of 1971, was the only witness. He testified at length as to appellant's case history and hospital record, and gave his evaluation of Ecker's current mental status. The Government did not oppose the hospital's request for release for schooling,² but did oppose the request for visits to Ecker's parental home.

At the conclusion of the testimony and arguments, the District Judge found that Ecker was still suffering from mental illness; and that there were indications that many issues were still unresolved so that appellant, still in turmoil, could not control his impulses. Because of this uncertainty and instability, the judge denied the hospital's recommendation since, "if released into the community, Ecker might be likely to injure himself or others."³

II.

While the findings below are not a model of precision or completeness, we think the record offers a sufficient basis for the trial court's determination to withstand appellant's attack under the high standard set for motions for summary reversal.⁴ Moreover, we think that the interests of justice are best served by a sua sponte affirmance⁵ of the trial court since a careful study of the record convinces us that such relief is clearly warranted.

Without exploring and exposing the details of appellant's mental condition at greater length than necessary, we find that the testimony of Ecker's psychiatrist raises not only ambiguities, but real doubts about the sufficiency of the investigation of Ecker's condition, and the conclusions drawn therefrom that he was ready for a dramatic increase in both responsibility and unsupervised leave time from the hospital.

These doubts are raised by three aspects of Dr. Saiger's testimony. First, the extremely short period of time during which Ecker had been without medication.⁶ Second, the apparent haste to subject him to psychological testing and the inner turmoil still reflected therein.⁷ Third, Ecker's elopement from the hospital shortly after being told to assume a great deal of "responsibility" for his own future.⁸

These factors all raise doubts about appellant's reliance on the "down-to-earth persuasiveness" of Dr. Saiger's testimony. They point out at least the need for further observation and information. Furthermore, they call into question the hospital's conclusion that the likelihood of Ecker's being dangerous to others was reduced to such a degree in January so as to permit his extensive, although not unconditional, release. Doubts about the expert's conclusion were reflected in the trial judge's concern that it was still "likely" that Ecker might be dangerous if released into the community.⁹ The consequent refusal to allow conditional release at that time, based as it was on the facts and uncertainties revealed by the hospital's evidence, was not without a substantial basis in the record.

III.

Appellant challenges the validity of the trial judge's exercising such a broad power of review over the hospital's decision to release him. The thrust of this attack is that the differential handling of the release of civilly committed patients from those who, like Ecker, were civilly committed after a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, deprives the latter of the equal protection of the laws. In Bolton v. Harris,¹⁰ this court upheld the release provisions of D.C.Code § 24-301(e) which require court approval of the hospital's recommendation. We did not think "equal protection is offended by allowing the Government or the court the opportunity to insure that the standards for the release of civilly committed patients are faithfully applied to so-called "criminally" committed patients."¹¹

Appellant re-asserts the proposition that any differential treatment of the release of the two groups of patients violates equal protection. But he fails totally to assert any facts or reasons why the Bolton rationale should be abandoned.¹² At best, he argues that the trial court's function must be severely restricted to the limited review of an essentially "medical" judgment, along the lines of the standard set forth in Tribby v. Cameron.¹³ That the issue of what standard of review should be applied to release decisions is a question of constitutional dimensions is beyond dispute. This court is continually called upon to test the validity of the substantive and procedural terms of commitment against the requirements of the Constitution.¹⁴ Moreover, it does seem relevant to examine more closely the statutory requirements of D.C.Code § 24-301 in light of current developments in the law.¹⁵

However, this case does not provide the opportunity to do so. Even under the standard outlined in Tribby, that the court assess whether the hospital has made a "permissible and reasonable decision in view of the relevant information and within a broad range of discretion," the trial court's judgment must be sustained. In the record before us, we find to be crucial the lack of extremely relevant information concerning the termination of Ecker's medication. Not only is this important factor virtually brushed off by the psychiatric expert, but the period of time elapsed since the termination appears to us too short to provide any opportunity for adequate observation.¹⁶ We have noted previously the relevance of this type of medication to psychiatric evaluations of mental status¹⁷ and we find that the failure to deal with this issue undermines the "reasonableness" of the hospital's decision. Similarly, we note that the recommendation for conditional release was based on only five months of liberalized privileges since Ecker's elopement. Such a time span raises further doubts about whether the hospital's decision was based on adequate relevant information.

IV.

We have decided to take the somewhat unusual step of affirming the judgment in this case sua sponte for a variety of reasons. First, because we are convinced that the standard for summary disposition is met, on this record, by the Government. Second, we see no real prejudice to the rights of appellant in so doing. The emergency nature of appellant's motion — to obtain release for schooling in February — has already been frustrated. Rather than simply deny summary reversal and allow the appeal to follow its normal course, it will better serve the interests of justice to terminate now what we would see to be a process which could not in the end provide the relief requested and might therefore only waste both the parties' and the court's resources.

Moreover, our affirmance should in no way be interpreted as foredooming future recommendations for conditional release. We respect St. Elizabeths' obvious efforts to secure a meaningful educational experience for this patient and we would urge that these efforts not cease. There is nothing finally determined by the denial of conditional release — particularly so in this case where the record raised questions and doubts which can, and may, be readily answered by the passage of time. Refusal by the court to allow release as of January in no way prejudices future attempts, and should not discourage the hospital from seeking release arrangements for its patients.

If we were not convinced of the good faith of the trial judge in considering the...