United States v. Edward Thayer

• Decision Date: 09 March 1908
• Docket Number: No. 390,390
• Citation: 28 S.Ct. 426,209 U.S. 39,52 L.Ed. 673
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. EDWARD S. THAYER
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

209 U.S. 39

28 S.Ct. 426

52 L.Ed. 673

UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err.,

v EDWARD S. THAYER.

No. 390.

Argued February 25, 1908.

Decided March 9, 1908.

Attorney General Bonaparte and Assistant Attorney General Cooley for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 39-40 intentionally omitted] Messrs. J. M. McCormick and F. M. Etheridge for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 40-41 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an indictment for soliciting a contribution of money for political purposes from an employee of the United States in a postoffice building of the United States occupied by the employee in the discharge of his duties. By the civil service act of January 16, 1883 (chap 27, § 12, 22 Stat. at L. 403, 407, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, pp. 1217, 1223), 'No person shall, in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by any officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act, or in any navy yard, fort, or arsenal, solicit in any manner whatever, or receive, any contribution of money or any other thing of value for any political purpose whatever.' By § 15 a penalty is imposed of fine, imprisonment, or both. The indictment is in eleven counts, and charges the sending of letters to employees, which were intended to be received and read by them in the building, and were so received and read by them in fact. It is admitted that the defendant was not in the building. There was a demurrer, which was sustained by the district court on the ground that the case was not within the act. 154 Fed. 508. The only question argued or intended to be raised is whether the defendant's physical presence in the building was necessary to create the offense.

Of course it is possible to solicit by letter as well as in person. It is equally clear that the person who writes the letter and intentionally puts it in the way of delivery solicits, whether the delivery is accomplished by agents of the writer, by agents of the person addressed, or by independent middlemen, if it takes place in the intended way. It appears to us no more open to doubt that the statute prohibits solicitation by writing as well as by spoken words. It forbids all persons to solicit 'in any manner whatever.' The purpose is wider than that of a notice prohibiting book peddling in a building. It is not, even primarily, to save employees from interruption or annoyance in their business. It is to check a political abuse which is not different in kind whether practised by letter or by word of mouth. The limits of the act, presumably, were due to what was considered the reasonable and possibly the constitutional freedom of citizens, whether officeholders or not, when in private life, and it may be conjectured that it was upon this ground that an amendment of broader scope was rejected. If the writer of the letter in person had handed it to the man addressed, in the building, without a word, and the latter had read it then and there, we suppose that no one would deny that the writer fell within the statute. We can see no distinction between personally delivering the letter and sending it by a servant of the writer. If the solicitation is in the building, the statute does not require personal presence, so that the question is narrowed to whether the solicitation alleged took place in the building or outside.

The solicitation was made at some time, somewhere. The time determines the place. It was not complete when the letter was dropped into the post. If the letter had miscarried or had been burned, the defendant would not have accomplished a solicitation. The court below was misled by cases in which, upon an indictment for obtaining money by false pretenses, the crime was held to have been committed at the place where drafts were put into the post by the defrauded person. Com. v. Wood, 142 Mass. 459, 462, 8 N. E. 432; Reg. v. Jones, 4 Cox, C. C. 198. But these stand on the analogy of the acceptance by mail of an offer, and throw no light. A relation already existed between the parties, and it is because of that relation that posting the letter made...