United States v. Elliott

• Citation: 64 F. 27
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. ELLIOTT et al.
• Decision Date: 24 October 1894
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

64 F. 27

UNITED STATES v. ELLIOTT et al.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri.

October 24, 1894

Wm. H Clopton, U.S. Atty.

W. W Erwin, S. S. Gregory, and W. A. Shumaker, for defendants.

PHILIPS District Judge (orally).

This case was submitted yesterday on the demurrer filed to the bill by certain of the defendants. The district attorney submitted the same on the pleadings; and the defendants, on the pleadings and an extensive brief. This suit grew out of the recent 'strike,' and the bill was filed on behalf of the United States, by the district attorney, under direction of the attorney general of the United States, to enjoin the defendants form the consummation of an organized conspiracy, which threatened to obstruct and was impeding the passage of the United States mails, and interfering with interstate commerce. The demurrer, of course, admits all the material allegations of the bill; that is, all facts which are well pleaded. These averments may be summarized as follows: It is charged, in substance, that the defendants have combined and confederated together to prevent the several railroads named in the bill,--being about all of the many important roads coming into the city of St. Louis Mo.,-- which are engaged in carrying the United States mails and in interstate commerce, carrying passengers and freights from conducting their customary business in transporting passengers and freights between and among the different states of the Union, and foreign countries. It is further charged that said defendants have combined and conspired to induce persons in the employ of said railroads to leave the service of their respective companies, and to prevent the companies from securing the services of other persons in the place of those induced to quit, the object of such conspiracy being to prevent said railroad companies from hauling cars which are extensively used in the necessary transaction of their business in interstate commerce. The bill charges the commission of divers and sundry acts by the alleged conspirators in furtherance of the objects of the confederation. Among other things, it is alleged that certain of the defendants, under the leadership of one Debs, have issued orders and directions to persons in the employ of of said railroads to act subject to their direction, whereby said employees have been commanded and required to cease from operating the respective railroads. It is further charged that certain of said defendants have threatened to tie up the entire operations of trains of such of said companies as refuse to accede to certain demands made upon them by the leaders of the conspiracy, and that it is the purpose and object of the defendants to so obstruct and cripple the business of said roads as to prevent them from performing their duties and functions as common carriers of freights and passengers among the several states through which the several lines of said roads pass. It is further alleged that it is among the objects and plans of said conspirators to control the interstate commerce between the city of St. Louis and points in other states, and thereby prevent the owners of said roads from exercising any independent control thereof in the transaction of interstate commerce. The bill further sets up, what is quite an historic fact in commercial circles, that the city of St. Louis is a large live-stock market for the sale and slaughter of cattle and hogs, and the preparation of the same for food, and is also a large manufacturing center, from which point these food supplies and manufactured articles are distributed to various points throughout the United States, and other necessaries of life, which have become essential to the commerce, growth, and development of the country, and for its domestic life, and that the aforesaid interference with the transportation of these supplies is a great public detriment, not only to said city, of 600,000 people, but to all the people of the various states reached by the exertions and efforts of this distributing point, who, by the course of business, have become largely dependent upon this source of supply. The object of the bill is to have these parties, and their aiders and abettors, enjoined and restrained from the further prosecution of their unlawful purpose and dangerous conspiracy.

The demurrer raises the question of the jurisdiction of this court over the subject-matter, and the right of the United States to bring such suit in equity; and various other suggestions are made, of minor importance. As recited in the temporary order of injunction made by Judge THAYER, the suit was instituted upon the authority of the attorney general of the United States, and the bill is properly sworn to, in the usual form. I do not propose to go into any extended discussion of the many various questions discussed by counsel in the brief.

It is a fact of supreme importance, to be stated at the very threshold of this discussion, that the regulation and control of commerce among the states of the Union, and with foreign nations, is, by the federal constitution, reposed exclusively in the congress of the United States. The felt necessity of this federal jurisdiction was the one great impelling cause that led to the formation of the federal Union, and the adoption of the federal constitution. As early as 1778 this question was pressed upon the consideration of congress by a memorial from the state of New Jersey, and in 1781 Dr. Witherspoon, one of the statesmen of that day, presented a resolution which declared that 'it is indispensably necessary that the United States, in congress assembled, should be vested with a right of superintending the commercial regulations of every state, that none may take place that shall be partial, or contrary to the common interests. ' And in 1786 Virginia adopted a resolution appointing commissioners to meet with like commissioners from other states, and the resolution to that effect, formulated by Mr. Madison, recited in the preamble that 'Whereas, the relative situation of the United States has been found on trial to require uniformity in their commercial regulations,' etc. That great jurist, Chief Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 445, most aptly presents this matter, as follows:

'The oppressed and degraded state of commerce previous to the adoption of the constitution can scarcely be forgotten. It was regulated by foreign nations with a single view of their own interests, and our disunited efforts to counteract their restrictions were rendered impotent by want of combination. Congress, indeed, possessed the power of making treaties, but the inability of the federal government to enforce them had become so apparent as to render that power, in a great degree, useless. Those who felt the injury arising from this state of things and those who were capable of estimating the influence of commerce on the prosperity of nations, perceived the necessity of giving the control over this important subject to a single government. It may be doubted whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of the federal government contributed more to that great Revolution which introduced the present system than the deep and general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by congress. It is not, therefore, matter of surprise that the grant should be as extensive as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce and all commerce among the states. To construe the power so as to impair its efficacy would tend to defeat an object in the attainment of which the American public took, and justly took, that strong interest which arose from a full conviction of its necessity. ' 'What, then, is the just extent of a power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states? ' 'The power is coextensive with the subject on which it acts, and cannot be stopped at the external boundary of a state, but must enter its interior. ' 'Commerce is intercourse. One of its most ordinary ingredients is traffic.'

In the passion of the hour, we are apt to forget the pit from which we were dug, and the rock of permanency upon which our feet were planted, by the wise and patriotic men who constructed the fabric of our government. The power to regulate commerce among the states carries with it, as the supreme court has repeatedly held, the power to protect and defend.

On July 2, 1890, congress passed the law entitled 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' section 1 of which is as follows: 'Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. ' It may be conceded that the controlling objective point, in the mind of congress, in enacting this statute, was to suppress what are known as 'trust' and 'monopolies.' But, like a great many other enactments, the statute is made so comprehensive and far-reaching in its express terms as to extend to like incidents and acts clearly within the expression and spirit of the law. It declares that every act, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the states, or with foreign nations, is forbidden. Therefore, any combination or confederation among two or more persons, in restraint of trade or commerce, comes within the express letter of the statute. The term 'restraint of commerce' was used in its ordinary, business understanding and acceptation. Among the recognized meanings of the word are Prohibition of action; holding or pressing back from action; hindrance; confinement; restriction. ' It is a restriction or hindrance created by the...