United States v. Estrada-Tepal

• Decision Date: 29 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 14–CR–105 MKB.,14–CR–105 MKB.
• Citation: 57 F.Supp.3d 164
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Jorge ESTRADA–TEPAL, Ricardo Estrada–Tepal and Victor Leonel Estrada–Tepal, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

57 F.Supp.3d 164

UNITED STATES of America

v.Jorge ESTRADA–TEPAL, Ricardo Estrada–Tepal and Victor Leonel Estrada–Tepal, Defendants.

No. 14–CR–105 MKB.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Sept. 29, 2014.

Melody Wells, Taryn A. Merkl, United States Attorneys Office, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.

Steven Gary Brill, James Lee Healy, Sullivan & Brill LLP, Matthew B. Keller, Matthew B. Keller Esq., David Gordon, New York, NY, Michelle A. Gelernt, Federal Defenders of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge:

Defendants Jorge Estrada–Tepal, Ricardo Estrada–Tepal and Victor Leonel Estrada–Tepal are charged with sex trafficking and sex trafficking conspiracy, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1591(a)(1)-(2), 1594(c), conspiracy to transport illegal aliens, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), and transportation of illegal aliens for financial gain, in violation of Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Currently before the Court is Defendant Ricardo Estrada–Tepal's (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss all counts brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1591 on the basis that the law is unconstitutionally overbroad.¹ For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is not unconstitutionally overbroad, and therefore denies Defendant's motion to dismiss all counts brought pursuant to that statute.

I. Background

a. The Estrada–Tepal trafficking organization

In approximately March 2013, Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) began investigating an extended family known as the “Estrada–Tepal trafficking organization” for sex trafficking activities.² (Compl. ¶ 3.) As part of the investigation, HSI interviewed a victim (“Victim # 1”) of the Estrada–Tepal trafficking organization. (Id. ¶ 4.) Victim # 1 described the methods by which the Estrada–Tepal trafficking organization engaged in the transportation of women to the United States to work in prostitution and the use of physical violence and threats to force the women to work in prostitution. (Id. ) HSI determined that the Estrada–Tepal Trafficking organization operated out of one or more locations in Queens, New York. (Id. )

Victim # 1 met Defendant in Mexico, where they started dating. (Id. ¶ 5.) Shortly thereafter, she moved in with Defendant at his home in Puebla, Mexico. (Id. ) Within a week of moving in, Defendant told Victim # 1 that they were going to travel to the United States to work. (Id. ) Defendant smuggled Victim # 1 into the United States on a train. (Id. ) Victim # 1 eventually met with Defendant's brother, Victor Leonel Estrada–Tepal (“Leonel”), in New Jersey on or about August 9, 2011. (Id. ) Leonel pressured Victim # 1 to pay her debt—the price of her smuggling into the United States. (Id. ) Victim # 1 attempted to obtain money from friends and family but Leonel told her that she would have to work as a prostitute to pay the debt. (Id. ) Victim # 1 told Defendant about this demand and Defendant told Victim # 1 to listen to Leonel. (Id. ) Victim # 1 was told that if she did not work, her family would pay the price. (Id. ) In October 2011, Victim # 1 decided to run away. (Id. ¶ 8.) Defendant called Victim # 1 and told her that if she did not return, something was going to happen to her or her family. (Id. )

Victim # 2 met Jorge Estrada–Tepal (“Jorge”) in Mexico where they began dating. (Id. ¶ 11.) Shortly thereafter, Jorge smuggled Victim # 2 into the United States where they lived together in Queens, New York. (Id. ) Jorge initially pressured Victim # 2 into working at a bar, and later forced Victim # 2 into prostitution. (Id. ¶ 12.) Victim # 2 worked as a prostitute for approximately four years. (Id. ¶ 13.)

In addition, Victim # 3 claims that she was asked by a member of the Estrada–Tepal trafficking organization to travel to the United States for work and was later forced into prostitution. (Id. ¶ 14.)

On January 30, 2014, HSI agents arrested Defendant, and his brothers, Leonel and Jorge, based on their illegal immigration status. (Id. ¶ 25.) Upon arrest, Defendant admitted that he paid approximately $5,500 to have another female victim smuggled into the United States, and after her arrival, she engaged in prostitution. (Id. )

II. Discussion

a. Overbreadth challenge

Defendant argues that “18 U.S.C. § 1591 is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face because it significantly infringes upon the right to free association guaranteed by the First Amendment....” (Def. Mem. at 17.) The government contends that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 does not substantially burden protected speech. (Gov. Opp'n Mem. at 35.) The Court agrees with the government.

“A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it punishes a substantial amount of protected free speech, judged in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep.” Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 127 n. 8 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir.2011) ); Adams v. Zenas Zelotes, Esq., 606 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2010) ; see also Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (“There are two quite different ways in which a statute may be considered invalid ‘on its face’—either because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application, or because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally ‘overbroad.’ ”). The Supreme Court has described an overbreadth challenge as “limited” and has noted that its force weakens as the regulated behavior at issue “moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct—even if expressive—falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws....” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) ; Gospel Missions of Am., a religious corporation v. City of Los Angeles, 419 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir.2005) (“The overbreadth doctrine's concern with chilling protected speech attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) )); United States v. Richards, No. 13–CR–818, 2014 WL 3765712, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2014) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908 ).

“The first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) ). The second step is to determine whether the statute, as construed by the court, “criminalizes a substantial amount of protected expressive activity.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 297, 128 S.Ct. 1830. “[I]n considering facial challenges we must ‘vigorously enforce[ ] the requirement that a statute's overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Adams, 606 F.3d at 38 (quoting Williams, 553 U.S. at 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830 ).

i. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1591

Defendant asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is a “criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.” (Def. Mem. at 19 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 474, 130 S.Ct. 1577 ).) Specifically, Defendant takes issue with “the lack of a necessary criminal purpose connected to many of the associational actions [18 U.S.C. § 1591 ] prohibits.” (Def. Mem. at 20.) The government appears to not contest Defendant's interpretation of the statute.³ As set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendant that 18 U.S.C. § 1591 unambiguously covers a broad range of conduct with no requirement that a defendant intend to further any underlying sex trafficking scheme.

In interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1591, the Court looks to the statute's text “to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 108 (2d Cir.2012). “[P]lain meaning can best be understood by looking to the statutory scheme as a whole and placing the particular provision within the context of that statute.” Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir.2003) ; see also Mary Jo C. v. New York State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir.2013) (stating that statutory analysis begins with a “review [of] the statutory text, considering ... the placement and purpose of those words in the statutory scheme”) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 585 F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir.2009) ), cert. dismissed, 569 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2823, 186 L.Ed.2d 881 (2013). The Court finds 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is plain and unambiguous.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 1591 states in pertinent part:

(a) Whoever knowingly—

(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person; or

(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1),

knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion ..., or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished....

18 U.S.C. § 1591. The plain language of the statute requires only that a person have knowledge that he or she is committing any of the seven prohibited actions enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) and knowledge, or reckless disregard of the fact, that a person subject to any of the prohibited actions will engage in...