United States v. Estrada

• Docket Number: 23-50012
• Decision Date: 24 August 2023
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARLOS ARMANDO ESTRADA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CARLOS ARMANDO ESTRADA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 23-50012

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

August 24, 2023

Argued and Submitted July 18, 2023 Pasadena, California

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California No. 3:20-cr-03113-TWR-1 Todd W. Robinson, District Judge, Presiding

Todd W. Burns (argued), Burns &Cohan Attorneys at Law, San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Amy B. Wang (argued) and Zachary J. Howe, Assistant United States Attorneys; Daniel E. Zipp, Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate Section Chief, Criminal Division; Randy S. Grossman, United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges, and Kathleen Cardone, ^[*] District Judge.

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SUMMARY^[**]

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court's judgment on the third revocation of Carlos Armando Estrada's supervised release.

Applying the rationale of United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014), which involved the same issue in the context of probation revocation, the panel held that because Estrada was serving a term of supervised release when he committed the instant violation, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release and impose an additional term of imprisonment, regardless of any error in the sentence imposed on the second revocation.

The panel declined to reach Estrada's argument that the term of supervised release imposed on his second revocation exceeded the statutory maximum. Consistent with Castro-Verdugo and earlier precedent, the panel held that an appeal challenging a supervised release revocation is not the proper avenue through which to attack the validity of the underlying sentence.

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OPINION

TASHIMA, CIRCUIT JUDGE

Carlos Armando Estrada challenges the district court's judgment on the third revocation of his supervised release. He contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction because, at the time of his third violation, he was serving a term of supervised release that exceeded the applicable statutory maximum.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court had jurisdiction over the third revocation of Estrada's supervised release. We decline to consider his improper collateral attack on the supervised release term imposed on his prior, second revocation of supervised release.

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BACKGROUND

Estrada was arrested at the United States border in 2020 with fentanyl concealed on his person. He pleaded guilty to one count of importation of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960. The district court imposed a time-served term of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release.

Estrada repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release. On the first revocation of his supervised release, the court imposed an eight-month term of imprisonment and three-year supervised release term. On the second revocation of his supervised release, the court imposed a time-served 38-day term of imprisonment and 58 months of supervised release. Estrada did not object to or appeal from this sentence. On the third revocation of his supervised release, the district court imposed ten months of imprisonment without any further term of supervision. Estrada timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo the district court's assumption of jurisdiction over revocation proceedings regardless of any failure to object before the district court. See United States v. Pocklington, 792 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 2004).

DISCUSSION

Estrada contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction or power to revoke his supervised release and impose an additional ten-month term of imprisonment. Estrada asserts that the court lacked jurisdiction because, at the time of his violation, he was serving an unlawful term of supervised release. Specifically, Estrada contends that the

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58-month term of supervised release imposed on the second revocation of his supervised release exceeded the maximum term of supervision authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1) and United States v. Knight, 580 F.3d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 2009).

Relying on United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2014), the government contends that the district court had jurisdiction over the third revocation proceedings and that Estrada is procedurally barred from challenging a prior supervised release sentence on a direct appeal from a subsequent revocation. The government also contends that the supervised release term imposed on Estrada's second revocation was statutorily permissible because 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(F) trumps the maximum set forth in § 3583(b)(1) and authorizes a lifetime term of supervision.

In Castro-Verdugo, the district court imposed a sentence on an illegal reentry conviction that...