United States v. Fisk

Decision Date01 December 1865
Citation18 L.Ed. 243,3 Wall. 445,70 U.S. 445
PartiesUNITED STATES v. FISK
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THE 'Internal Revenue Act,' of 30th June, 1864, 'to provide ways and means for the support of government, and for other purposes,' declares, by its 99th section, as follows:

'All brokers and bankers doing business as brokers, shall be subject to pay the following duties and rates of duty upon the sales of merchandise, produce, gold and silver bullion, foreign exchange, promissory notes, stocks, bonds, or other securities, and shall also be subject to all the provisions of the act for making returns, assessments, and collection of the duties.'

The ninth paragraph of the 79th section of the same act says:

'Brokers shall pay $50 for each license. Every person, firm, or company (except such as hold a license as banker), whose business it is as a broker to negotiate purchases or sales of stocks, exchange, bullion, coined money, bank notes, promissory notes, or other securities, shall be regarded as a broker [and shall make oath or affirmation that all their transactions are made for a commission], provided that any person holding a license as a banker shall not be required to take out a license as a broker.'

On the 3d of March, 1865, Congress passed an act to amend the former act. The last act amends the former by inserting, after the words 'other securities' (given above in italics), the words 'for themselves or others;' and by striking out from the paragraph that part of it above included in brackets.

In this state of the statutes it was decided, in the preceding case of United States v. Cutting, that 'brokers' were liable to pay the duties and rates of duty prescribed by the 99th section of the act of 1864, whether the sales were made for themselves or for others.

In the present case a different question arose.

Fisk & Co. were bankers, doing a general business as such, making a returns, and paying duties and taxes imposed by law upon their capital and deposits. As such they negotiated and sold for the United States large amounts of government securities. At the same time they bought and sold government securities for themselves, and not for others or for a commission.

The distinction, then, between the two cases was:

1. That, in the present case, the defendants were licensed as 'bankers,' and carried on the business of banking and nothing else, and did not act as 'brokers;' while the defendants in the preceding case were licensed as 'brokers,' and did business as such, as well, as on their own account.

2. That the sales by the defendants in this action, upon which the duty was sought to be recovered, were of government securities only, held and owned by them in their own right; while the sales by the defendants in the preceding case embraced other stocks, bonds, and securities, as well as government securities.

On a suit by the government against Fisk & Co., for duties on sales made by them, the question was, whether on these sales they were liable to pay the duties imposed by the 99th section upon 'brokers, and bankers doing business as brokers,' in addition to those imposed upon them as bankers?

The first paragraphs of the 79th section of the act of 1864, which concerns bankers as distinguished from brokers, is as follows:

'Bankers using or employing a capital not exceeding the sum of $50,000, shall pay $100 for each license; when using or employing a capital exceeding $50,000, for every additional...

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96 cases
  • In re Watson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Vermont
    • December 1, 1882
    ... 15 F. 511 IN re WATSON. United States District Court, D. Vermont. December 1, 1882 ... S. C ... Shurtleff, for ... [ U6 ] Northrup v. Shook, 10 Blatchf. 243; ... U.S. v. Cutting, 3 Wall. 441; U.S. v. Fisk, 3 Wall ... [ V6 ] U.S. v. Kenton, 2 Bond, 97 ... [ W6 ] Young v. The Governor, 11 Humph ... ...
  • United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • January 25, 2022
    ...("[C]ourts are often compelled to construe ‘or’ as meaning ‘and,’ and again ‘and’ as meaning ‘or.’ " (quoting United States v. Fisk , 70 U.S. 3 Wall. 445, 447, 18 L.Ed. 243 (1865) )). And again, the context here is Congress's broad intent to stop "pay[ing] overly inflated prices for prescri......
  • United States v. Garcon
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • December 6, 2022
    ...understood across the pond in American law. The Supreme Court expressly recognized this fluidity in United States v. Fisk , 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 445, 447, 18 L.Ed. 243 (1865), and legal dictionaries of the era did as well. See 1 Alexander M. Burill, A New Law Dictionary and Glossary: Containin......
  • Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Andrus, s. 75-1931 and 75-1932
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • February 22, 1978
    ...76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956); Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 Wall. 759, 764, 18 L.Ed. 759 (1867); United States v. Fisk, 3 Wall. 445, 447, 18 L.Ed. 243 (1865).22 "It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence o......
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