United States v. Galecki
Decision Date | 29 July 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 18-4727, No. 18-4730,18-4727 |
Citation | 932 F.3d 176 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. Benjamin GALECKI, Defendant – Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. Charles Burton Ritchie, Defendant – Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: J. Lloyd Snook, III, SNOOK & HAUGHEY, P.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellants. Eric Matthew Hurt, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Christian L. Connell, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant Benjamin Galecki. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, Kevin Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DUNCAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Floyd and Senior Judge Duncan joined.
A federal jury convicted Benjamin Galecki and Charles Burton Ritchie ("Defendants") of charges related to a conspiracy to distribute controlled substance analogues. Defendants then appealed to this Court for the first time, challenging several of the trial court’s rulings, including the failure to compel a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) chemist to testify on their behalf, the exclusion of certain evidence, and the formulation of a jury instruction. In that appeal, we upheld the jury instruction, but vacated Defendants’ convictions and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the DEA chemist’s testimony was material to their case. United States v. Ritchie , 734 F. App'x 876 (4th Cir. 2018) (Ritchie II ). On remand, the district court held the chemist’s testimony was not material and declined to compel his presence at trial. United States v. Ritchie , No. 4:15-cr-18, 2018 WL 4693811 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2018) (Ritchie III ). Defendants now appeal that decision and renew several other evidentiary challenges that we declined to address in the prior appeal. As discussed below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate Defendants’ convictions, and remand for a new trial.
From 2010 to 2013, Defendants operated Zencense Incenseworks, LLC, which had facilities in Pensacola, Florida, and Las Vegas, Nevada. Zencense manufactured and sold a substance commonly called "spice," which contained a mix of crushed leaves and chemical additives. Consumers would generally smoke the spice, but Defendants packaged the product as "incense" and labeled it "Not for human consumption." J.A. 633. In late March or early April 2012, Defendants began using the chemical additives XLR-11 and UR-144 in their manufactured spice. These additives were not on the controlled substances drug schedule during the time period of the alleged conspiracy (February 8, 2012 to April 30, 2013).1 Defendants shipped their product around the country for sale by various retailers, including one in Hampton Roads, Virginia, which received a shipment on August 9, 2012.2
The Government had begun investigating Zencense’s operations because it suspected Defendants’ "incense" was actually synthetic marijuana, i.e., a substance "designed and intended to have an effect similar to controlled substances" (marijuana) when smoked. J.A. 110. In the Government’s view, this physiological effect, coupled with the chemical similarity of the additive XLR-11 to the controlled chemical in marijuana, JWH-018, makes Defendants’ spice a controlled substance analogue within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A). On that basis, the Government charged Defendants with conspiring to distribute controlled substances and controlled substance analogues, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 813 ; using a communication facility to promote unlawful activity, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; using a facility in interstate commerce to promote unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3), 2; and distributing controlled substances and controlled substance analogues, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
At Defendants’ joint trial, the Government had to prove a scientific element as to the spice and a mens rea element as to each Defendant. To establish the scientific element, the Government had to show that XLR-11 in the spice had properties "substantially similar" to the properties of JWH-018 in marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(A). And to establish the mens rea element, the Government had to satisfy one of two methods of proof: either that Defendants knew XLR-11 was a controlled substance analogue or that they knew the "chemical structure and physiological effects" of XLR-11 were substantially similar to those of JWH-018. See McFadden , 823 F.3d at 223. The Government proceeded under the second method of proof and attempted to "establish that ‘the defendant knew the specific analogue he was dealing with, even if he did not know its legal status as an analogue.’ " Id. (quoting McFadden v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2305, 192 L.Ed.2d 260 (2015) ). "Under this second method of proof, knowledge of the substance’s chemical structure and physiological effects is sufficient to support a conviction." Id. Defendants challenged both the scientific and mens rea elements of the Government’s case, contending XLR-11 is not chemically similar to JWH-018 and asserting they lacked knowledge of any similarity between the structures or physiological effects of the two chemicals.
Defendants’ first trial resulted in a hung jury on each count. During a second trial, the jury indicated it was at an impasse on the issue of substantial similarity, and the district court issued an Allen charge.3 The jury then convicted Defendants of all counts.
Defendants appealed, challenging a number of the trial court’s rulings. Our opinion addressed only two issues: the court’s refusal to compel DEA chemist Dr. Arthur Berrier to testify for Defendants and its formulation of a mens rea jury instruction. See Ritchie II , 734 F. App'x at 878–81.
Defendants framed Dr. Berrier’s exclusion from trial as a Sixth Amendment compulsory process violation. See id. at 878–79. Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant "enjoy[s] the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. Const. amend. VI. Though "not absolute," United States v. Prince-Oyibo , 320 F.3d 494, 501 (4th Cir. 2003), this right is violated when a defendant is "arbitrarily deprived of testimony that would have been relevant and material, and vital to the defense," United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal , 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and emphases omitted). To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a criminal defendant "must at least make some plausible showing of how [the excluded] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense." Id.
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