United States v. Giles
| Decision Date | 19 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 19-311 (RC) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Samuel GILES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Sara Guccini Vanore, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS; AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE UNDER FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 404( B ) AND 609
Defendant Samuel Giles is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
He has moved to dismiss the indictment against him and suppress physical evidence that he argues was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 33; Mot. to Suppress, ECF No. 34. In addition, the Government has filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of Giles's past convictions at trial under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609. See Gov't Mot. in Lim., ECF Nos. 21. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2020, to take evidence on Giles's motion to suppress. See Minute Entry (Sept. 18, 2020); Evidentiary Hr'g Tr.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Giles's motions to dismiss and suppress. It will also grant in part and deny in part the Government's motion in limine.
In the early morning of September 2, 2019, three police officers with the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") were on patrol in southeast Washington, D.C. Evidentiary Hr'g Tr. at 9–10. Officers James Wilson, Brandon Varone, and Mikal Barnes were sitting in a parked squad car when they saw a dark-colored Dodge sedan drive by without a license plate on its front bumper. See id. at 9–10, 42. The officers pulled out of the parking lot where they were parked to follow the sedan, which then turned off the main road. Id. at 42–43. When the officers discovered the sedan parked without its lights on in an alleyway, the sedan began to move forward. Id. at 18–19. The officers activated their squad car's emergency lights and "g[ave] loud verbal commands ... to stop the vehicle."1 See id. at 19.
After continuing to drive onward for a few moments, Giles exited the sedan, asked the officers why they were pulling him over, and ran down the street. Id. at 19. Barnes noticed that Giles was clutching something black to his waistband, but he could not tell what it was. Id. at 23. Wilson and Varone exited the squad car and chased Giles. Id. at 20. Meanwhile, the sedan had begun to roll backwards, so Barnes reversed the squad car to get out of the way. Id. When the sedan stopped moving, Barnes ran over to it and put it in park. Id. The engine was still running. Id. at 21. Barnes then joined Wilson and Varone, who were trying to put Giles in handcuffs in a field across the street. Id. Barnes testified that the officers pepper sprayed Giles because he was resisting. Id. at 24–25. The officers eventually subdued Giles and placed him under arrest. Id.
Soon, several other police officers and some paramedics arrived at the scene. See id. While paramedics treated Giles across the street, Varone discovered a black fanny pack and a knife in the field where Giles was handcuffed. Gov't Ex. 6, Varone's Body-Worn Camera Footage ("Gov't Ex. 6") at 26:00–26:15. Varone walked over to Giles and asked, "Before I look in that bag—what's in that bag over there?" Id. at 29:29–31. Giles responded, .... Id. at 29:31–35. Varone repeated, "The bag that you dropped when we were scuffling in the exact location where you're at—what's in that bag next to the knife over there?" Id. at 29:35–29:42. Giles again denied having a bag. See id. at 29:42–44 (). Varone and Wilson then opened the fanny pack. Id. at 32:36–52. Inside were a handgun, ammunition, and Giles's identification card. Evidentiary Hr'g Tr. at 30–31; Gov't Omnibus Opp'n to Mots. to Dismiss and Suppress ("Gov't Omnibus Opp'n") at 3, ECF No. 43. A federal grand jury indicted Giles for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Indictment at 1, ECF No. 1.
Giles moves to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the Government will be unable to establish a chain of custody for the firearm it alleges he illegally possessed. Mot. to Dismiss at 1–2. The premise of his argument is that neither of the police officers who discovered the firearm would be able to testify. See id. at 4; see also United States v. Mitchell , 816 F.3d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2016) . Wilson resigned and moved away from the District of Columbia; Varone was injured in a car accident. See Notice ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, ECF No. 27. But the Government has informed the Court that Varone has recovered from his injuries and is prepared to testify. See Evidentiary Hr'g Tr. at 7. Because Giles's motion to dismiss depended on Varone's absence, the motion is denied as moot.
In his motion to suppress, Giles argues that the evidence discovered in the fanny pack—most significantly, the gun and ammunition—were fruits of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed.2 Mot. to Suppress at 1, 4. Under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, "evidence that would likely not have been found but for a Fourth Amendment violation must usually be suppressed." United States v. Peyton , 745 F.3d 546, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Giles asserts that two violations of his Fourth Amendment rights led to officers discovering the gun and ammunition. First, he says that the police officers unlawfully seized him when they conducted the traffic stop. Id. at 8. Second, he challenges the officers’ search of the fanny pack as unlawful. Id. at 8–9. The Court examines each of his arguments in turn.
A traffic stop is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). But "the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable"—and therefore constitutional—"where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769. That is true "even if the offense is a minor one." United States v. Mitchell , 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (). And importantly, reasonableness is assessed against an objective standard, so if the circumstances leading up to the stop support it, the subjective motivation of the officer is irrelevant. See Whren , 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; United States v. Hill , 131 F.3d 1056, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Applying that rubric, it is clear that the police officers’ traffic stop was constitutional. District of Columbia law provides that motor vehicles "shall display two (2) current identification tags, with one (1) on the front and the other on the rear." D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 422. Barnes testified that "the first thing [he] observed" when he saw Giles's car was that it "did not have any front tags," Evidentiary Hr'g Tr. at 18, and Giles does not contest Barnes's recollection. Indeed, photographs taken after Giles's arrest confirm that the car did not have a license plate on its front. See id. at 18, 64; Gov't Ex. 7. The circumstances reasonably indicated that Giles had committed a traffic offense. Consequently, the traffic stop was reasonable. See United States v. Draine , 48 F.3d 562, 1995 WL 66735, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (); United States v. Glover , 851 A.2d 473, 476 (D.C. 2004) ().3
Warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ). Giles argues that, because the officers lacked a warrant, their search of his fanny pack was unconstitutional. See, e.g. , Mot. to Suppress at 8–9. The Government responds that the officers’ search fit within two of the narrow exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court finds that only one of them permitted the search.
First, the Government claims that the officers were entitled to search the fanny pack incident to Giles's arrest. See Gov't Omnibus Opp'n at 12–15. Searches incident to arrest comprise one exception to the warrant requirement. Gant , 556 U.S. at 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710. The validity of such a search must be grounded in a lawful arrest, United States v. Bookhardt , 277 F.3d 558, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2002), but that is not where Giles addresses his counterargument.4 Giles asserts instead that the search of the fanny pack exceeded its permissible scope. See Mot. to Suppress at 8–9; Def.’s Suppl. to Mot. to Suppress at 7–8, ECF No. 53. "[A] search incident to arrest may only include the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control," meaning "the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Gant , 556...
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