US v. Glover, No. 03-CO-1030.
Citation | 851 A.2d 473 |
Decision Date | 10 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-CO-1030. |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Phillip M. GLOVER, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
John P. Mannarino, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and Gilberto Guerrero, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellant.
Lorenzo C. Fitzgerald, Jr. filed a brief for appellee.
Before STEADMAN and GLICKMAN, Associate Judges, and KING, Senior Judge.
The United States appeals pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-104(a)(1) (2001) from an order of the trial court granting Phillip Glover's motion to suppress evidence in his prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it. We reverse the trial court's ruling and remand for further proceedings on the motion.
The events that led to Glover's arrest and were the subject of the hearing on his suppression motion took place when Officer Armando De Los Santos and Sergeant David Sledge of the Metropolitan Police Department encountered a car being driven by Glover in an alley in Northwest Washington, D.C. Observing that the front license plate on this car was not displayed properly but rather was propped up on the passenger side of the dashboard against the windshield, the officers decided to make a traffic stop. They pulled their patrol car in front of Glover to bar his way and then exited their vehicle and approached Glover to speak with him. Both officers noticed that Glover appeared nervous and fidgety, which put them on their guard lest he be dangerous.
Officer De Los Santos testified that as they came up to Glover, the officers told him to get out of the car. Glover testified that the officers only told him to keep his hands on the steering wheel. Sergeant Sledge then opened the driver's side door, "because of his nervousness and I was afraid that he was gonna pull off," as he explained at the motion hearing. According to both officers, when Sergeant Sledge opened the door, Glover leaned sharply forward with his arms outstretched down between his knees. Concerned that Glover might be reaching for a weapon, Sergeant Sledge grabbed him by his arm and "escorted him out of the car." Glover, however, denied making any downward reaching movement. He testified that he "didn't have a chance to do anything" before he was jerked out of his seat. The motions judge did not explicitly resolve the several conflicts in the testimony, though in his subsequent rulings the judge accepted for the sake of argument (but without actually finding it as a fact) that Glover made the reaching movement to which the officers testified.
Officer De Los Santos conducted a pat-down of Glover and found no weapons on his person. In response to questioning, Glover stated that the car he was driving belonged to his father, a police officer. Glover insisted that the officers did not have probable cause to stop him or search the car, and he refused to consent to a search. Glover was not under formal arrest at this point. Nonetheless, because of Glover's apparent nervousness and his reaching movement, Officer De Los Santos decided to look under the driver's seat "to make sure there wasn't a weapon there or any type of contraband." On reaching under the seat, the officer found a burlap sack that could not be seen from outside the car. The sack was closed with a drawstring and its contents were not visible, but Officer De Los Santos testified that when he touched the sack, "it felt like individual bags of marijuana" were inside.1 The sack indeed contained "ziplocks of greenish weed which field-tested positive for the presence of THC," and Glover was placed under arrest.
Ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing, the judge granted Glover's motion to suppress the marijuana and his statements to the police on two distinct Fourth Amendment grounds. The judge ruled that in blocking Glover's car from leaving the alley, opening the car door and removing Glover from his vehicle, the police exceeded the bounds of a legitimate traffic stop and unlawfully "put [Glover] in custody" (which would have required probable cause to arrest Glover) for what was merely a minor, "non-arrestable" traffic infraction. In addition, the judge ruled that in searching an area under the driver's seat that was not in plain view when Glover was no longer in the car, the police exceeded the bounds of a legitimate protective search.
Although we defer to the motions judge's findings of fact, see, e.g., Carr v. United States, 758 A.2d 944, 945 (D.C. 2000)
(, our review of the judge's legal conclusions is de novo. ) Id. We are constrained to disagree with both prongs of the judge's legal analysis. The absence of express factual findings on material issues complicates our review. We hold, however, that the police made a valid traffic stop, not a custodial detention, in the course of which they were permitted to open the door of Glover's car, order him to exit, and question him. If Glover reached down between his legs when Sergeant Sledge opened his car door, we are satisfied that his forcible removal from the car was permissible and did not transform the stop into the functional equivalent of an arrest. We further hold that the scope of a legitimate protective search extended to the area under the driver's seat because that area could have concealed a weapon and would have been within Glover's reach upon his return to the car. Despite those conclusions, important unanswered questions of fact remain, such that while we reverse the ruling on appeal, we must remand for further proceedings on the motion to suppress.
116 S.Ct. 1769. The motions judge erred in viewing the stop as custodial merely because Glover was not free to leave. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37, 441-42, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ( ).
Having lawfully stopped Glover's vehicle for a traffic violation, the officers were permitted to order Glover to get out of the car as a routine safety precaution without regard to whether they had an articulable suspicion of criminal activity or specific reason to believe that Glover might be dangerous. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)
; see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997). Assuming that the officers did order Glover to exit as Officer De Los Santos testified, we attach no significance to the fact that Sergeant Sledge opened the car door for Glover; "there is little practical difference between ordering a person to open his door and get out of his car, on the one hand, and opening the door for the driver and telling him to get out, on the other." State v. Ferrise, 269 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn.1978). We acknowledge that it may be more intimidating for a police officer to take the initiative and open the car door himself. Nonetheless, "the actual invasion of privacy entailed in an officer's opening of the vehicle door is indistinguishable from, if not precisely the same as, that which occurs when an occupant is required to open a door to exit a vehicle pursuant to an order given under the authority of Mimms or Wilson." United States v. Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976, 983 (4th Cir.1997). Nor, without more, did the additional fact that Sergeant Sledge briefly grabbed Glover and pulled him out of the car transform the stop into an arrest or a custodial detention (not, at least, if Glover did make the suspicious reaching movement that the officers reported; it is a closer question otherwise). See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 730 A.2d 657, 660 (D.C.1999) ( ).
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