United States v. Godfrey

• Decision Date: 28 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 129-68.,129-68.
• Citation: 409 F.2d 1338
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Timothy GODFREY, Defendant. Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

409 F.2d 1338 (1969)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Timothy GODFREY, Defendant. Appellant.

No. 129-68.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

April 28, 1969.

Peter J. Adang, Albuquerque, N. M., for appellant.

John A. Babington, Asst. U. S. Atty. (John Quinn, U. S. Atty., Albuquerque, N. M., was with him on the brief) for appellee.

Before LEWIS, BREITENSTEIN and HICKEY, Circuit Judges.

DAVID T. LEWIS, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico of a Dyer Act violation, 18 U.S.C. § 2312, the interstate transportation of a stolen automobile knowing the same to have been stolen. He appeals, asserting the single contention that a statement made by him to an arresting state officer was improperly admitted in evidence at trial. The issue was first heard by the court on motion to suppress and, after a full hearing, the motion was denied.

On February 27, 1968, appellant was observed by Officer Alexander of the Hobbs, New Mexico police department to drive an automobile through a red traffic signal. The car had three other occupants. The officer gave chase and stopped the vehicle. Appellant then left the automobile and walked back to the police unit. The officer covered appellant with his gun, walked him back to the automobile and searched appellant, the other occupants, and the vehicle for weapons. Following the searches and after appellant was unable to produce either a driver's license or a car registration the officer placed appellant under arrest for aggravated careless driving and lack of a driver's license, ordered him into the police car, and proceeded to take him to the police station.

En route to the police station the officer received a call on his radio asking if he would like a "1028" and "1029" on the vehicle that appellant had been driving and after answering in the affirmative, the officer was asked by the appellant what the code numbers meant. The officer told appellant that these were call signals to run a check on whether the subject automobile was stolen. Shortly thereafter and at approximately the time the officer reached the police station appellant said to the officer, "I'll tell you something, if you'll let the others go." After the officer asked "What's that," and appellant repeated the statement, the officer replied that "it was not up to him; that any felonies or anything else, would be up to the detective division." Appellant then stated, "Well, since you're going to find out, anyway, the car is stolen out of Nevada." It is the trial court's admission of this inculpatory statement that forms the basis of this appeal. Appellant was not given the Miranda¹ warnings until after he entered the police station.

There can be no doubt that at the time appellant made his statement he was in custody and had been exposed to the natural coercive atmosphere of a subjectively protective but totally justified arrest by the officer. Under these...