United States v. Gonzalez-Godinez
| Decision Date | 12 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 19-CR-3506-BGS-DMS-1 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARIO GONZALEZ-GODINEZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER AFFIRMING JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
On January 27, 2020, Defendant-Appellant Mario Gonzalez-Godinez ("Defendant" or "Gonzalez") filed a timely notice of appeal to the district court. (ECF No. 44.) This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3402. For the reasons discussed below, the Court affirms.
I.
BACKGROUND
On September 12, 2019, Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America ("United States" or "Government") filed an information charging Defendant Gonzalez with attempted illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1), a misdemeanor. (ECF No. 12.) Gonzalez's case proceeded under the "Streamline" process, which the Department of Justice ("DOJ") uses to manage prosecution of misdemeanor charges brought under § 1325. See United States v. Chavez-Diaz, No. 18MJ20089 AJB, 2018 WL 9543024, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (), rev'd on other grounds, 949 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2020).
Gonzalez filed several pre-trial challenges, including a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the government failed to allege all the elements of the charged offense; (2) section 1325 violates equal protection and the nondelegation doctrine; and (3) his prosecution specifically violated equal protection. (See ECF Nos. 22, 32.) Gonzalez also moved to suppress his in-custody statements as involuntary and taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (See ECF No 22.) The court reserved ruling on the motions until the date of trial. (See ECF No. 39.)
A one-day trial was held on January 21, 2020, before Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal. (Id.) The government called two witnesses: Border Patrol Agent Chad Hewitt and Border Patrol Agent Marvin Jiron. (Trial Tr., ECF No. 55, at 2.) Agent Hewitt testified that on January 22, 2019, he was stationed near the border between the United States and Mexico in an area called Goat Canyon. (Id. at 6-7.) That morning, he came into contact with two individuals, one sliding down an embankment and one hiding in the brush, in an area approximately thirty yards from the border. (Id. at 7-8.) Upon investigation, Agent Hewitt questioned the individuals as to their citizenship and whether they had lawfully crossed the border. (Id. at 12-13.) Both individuals stated they were citizens of Mexico and did not have documentation or identification that would permit them to be in the United States legally. (Id. at 13-14.) Although Agent Hewitt, who testified via video, was unable to identify Gonzalez in court, he stated the last names of the two individuals arrested on January 22, 2019 were "Gonzalez-Godinez." (Id. at 12, 20.) Agent Hewitt placed the individuals under arrest and they were transported to the Imperial Beach Border Patrol Station for processing. (Id. at 15.)
Next, Agent Jiron testified regarding the post-arrest interview of Gonzalez. Agent Jiron positively identified Gonzalez in court. (Id. at 30-31.) Agent Jiron interviewedGonzalez at the Imperial Beach Border Patrol Station on January 22, 2019. (Id. at 29-30.) Before questioning Gonzalez, Agent Jiron, a native Spanish speaker, advised Gonzalez of his Miranda rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. (Id. at 31-33.) Agent Jiron testified that Gonzalez acknowledged verbal understanding of his rights and signed a document stating he understood the rights. (Id. at 31-32.) Gonzalez stated he was a citizen of Mexico and knew it was illegal for him to enter the United States. (Id. at 33-35.) Prior to questioning, Agent Jiron also read Gonzalez his administrative rights pertaining to immigration proceedings. (Id. at 35-36, 42.)
Following testimony, the court denied Gonzalez's motion to suppress his statements, as well as his pre-trial motions to dismiss. (Id. at 51, 55.) Gonzalez moved for judgment of acquittal, which the court denied, finding there was sufficient evidence to convict Gonzalez of attempted illegal entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). (Id. at 45, 54, 55-72.) The court found Gonzalez guilty and sentenced him to time served. (Id. at 70-73, 77.) This appeal followed.
II.
DISCUSSION
"In all cases of conviction by a United States magistrate judge an appeal of right shall lie from the judgment of the magistrate judge to a judge of the district court of the district in which the offense was committed." 18 U.S.C. § 3402. "A defendant may appeal a magistrate judge's judgment of conviction or sentence to a district judge within 14 days of its entry." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(B). The appeal's scope is "the same as in an appeal to the court of appeals from a judgment entered by a district judge." Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(D).
On appeal, Gonzalez raises six challenges to his conviction. First, Gonzalez argues his in-custody statements should have been suppressed. Second, Gonzalez argues the government failed to prove alienage beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, Gonzalez argues the charging document failed to allege knowledge of alienage. Fourth, Gonzalez argues § 1325(a)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the nondelegation doctrine. Fifth,Gonzalez argues his prosecution in the Southern District of California's "Streamline Court" violates the Equal Protection Clause. Sixth, Gonzalez argues § 1325 violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
First, Gonzalez argues his custodial statements during his post-arrest interview with Agent Jiron were involuntary and in violation of Miranda, and therefore the magistrate judge erred in declining to suppress them.
The Court need not reach the merits of this argument at this time. As laid out below, even if the Court were to exclude Gonzalez's custodial statements to Agent Jiron, the remaining evidence was sufficient to support Gonzalez's conviction for illegal entry under § 1325. Thus, if any error did occur, it was harmless. See United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2006) (); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) ().
Second, Gonzalez contends the government failed to prove alienage beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 1325(a)(1) prohibits "[a]ny alien" from "enter[ing] or attempt[ing] to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers." Alienage is a specific element of the offense, which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Higuera-Llamos, 574 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2009) ().
Gonzalez argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him because the only proof of his alienage is his own statements, which were not corroborated by independent evidence, as required by United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1992). "When the primary evidence of citizenship offered by the Government consists of the defendant's own admissions, those admissions require 'some independent corroboratingevidence in order to serve as the basis for a conviction.' " United States v. Hernandez, 105 F.3d 1330, 1332 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 589).
In Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit held that "[b]ecause corroboration of a defendant's admission is a mixed question of law and fact that is primarily factual, we review for clear error." 105 F.3d at 1332. Since then, however, the Ninth Circuit has reviewed de novo a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient corroboration of alienage, requiring the court to "ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Valdez-Novoa, 780 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Ruiz-Lopez, 749 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). Gonzalez cannot prevail under either standard. Even if the Court were to credit Gonzalez's argument that his statements to Agent Jiron should be suppressed, as discussed above, the Court finds the remaining evidence—Gonzalez's admissions to Agent Hewitt, corroborated by Agent Hewitt's observations—sufficient to sustain Gonzalez's conviction.
Here, upon apprehension, Gonzalez admitted to Agent Hewitt he was a citizen of Mexico without lawful permission to enter the United States. (Trial Tr. at 12-14.) These statements pertaining to his unlawful entry were supported by Agent Hewitt's independent observations. Agent Hewitt encountered Gonzalez in a remote area, only thirty yards from the border, and a section of the border fence in that area had been removed. (Id. at 8-9.) Agent Hewitt testified he observed two individuals, one of whom was sliding down the embankment and one of whom was hiding in the brush. (Id. at 8-9; 25-26.)
Gonzalez argues the Ninth Circuit has never held that "mode of entry" evidence alone is sufficient to prove that a person is not a U.S. citizen for the purposes of illegal entry or reentry prosecutions.1 However, that is not the issue presented here. Rather, thiscase concerns whether "mode of entry" evidence is sufficient to corroborate Gonzalez's admission that he had no legal authority to be in the United States. Gonzalez contends other judges in this district have held that similar evidence is not sufficient to corroborate an admission of alienage, but in United States v. Garcia-Villegas, 575 F.3d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth...
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