United States v. Gray, 26840.

• Citation: 421 F.2d 316
• Decision Date: 20 January 1970
• Docket Number: No. 26840.,26840.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Linell GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

421 F.2d 316 (1970)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Linell GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 26840.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 20, 1970.

David E. Crawley, III (court appointed), Louisville, Miss., for defendant-appellant.

Linell Gray, pro se.

Robert E. Hauberg, U. S. Atty., E. Donald Strange, Joseph E. Brown, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before GEWIN, COLEMAN and DYER, Circuit Judges.

DYER, Circuit Judge.

The only issue on appeal in this proceeding to revoke appellant's probation is whether the District Court abused its discretion when, after holding a hearing under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244, it found the appellant mentally competent to understand the proceedings against him and to assist his attorney in his defense. We have concluded that there was an abuse of discretion by the District Court and we reverse.

In 1966 appellant Gray pleaded guilty to charges of violating the Internal Revenue Laws pertaining to a still and nontax-paid whiskey. He was given a sentence of six years, five years and nine months of which were suspended, and he was placed on five years' probation.

In 1968 the Government filed a petition to revoke Gray's probation on the ground that he was then operating a still with mash and had non-tax-paid whiskey on hand. He pleaded guilty to violating his probation. Upon Gray's being questioned concerning the voluntariness of this plea, it appeared that he had previously been in a mental institution. On motion the court ordered him examined by Dr. Waldron, a psychiatrist. Dr. Waldron's written report stated that Gray was "suffering from a mental disease or disorder" known as "chronic brain syndrome", and that he was presently insane. The report went on to say that it was Dr. Waldron's "opinion that he Gray was presently unable to understand fully the proceedings against him and the consequences thereof, and that he is incompetent to assist in his own defense."

After receiving this report in evidence the District Court ordered Gray committed to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for further psychiatric examination. The Psychiatric Staff there filed written findings on Gray's mental condition and concluded that Gray was "not competent to stand trial." Dr. Pasquale Ciccone, Director of the Medical Center, sent a letter to the District Court stating that the Staff's "reported findings support an adjudication by the court that the subject is so mentally ill as to be unable to assist rationally in his defense or to have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him."

In addition to this evidence Gray's wife and brother testified that they thought something was wrong with Gray.

The Government's evidence consisted of the testimony of five lay witnesses, four law enforcement officers and a United States probation officer. The Government's brief accurately summarized the testimony of these witnesses as follows:

The law enforcement officers all testified that on prior occasions when they had arrested and been around the appellant he had always acted in a normal and rational manner. The Probation Officer likewise testified that appellant appeared normal and rational on the occasions when he had interviewed appellant and at the time he was preparing the pre-sentence report he had received some five or six letters from citizens in the appellant\'s community attesting to his being a good citizen but none suggested any mental problem.

The trial court found that Gray was mentally competent, revoked his probation, and imposed a five year sentence.

The test of mental competency under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 is whether a defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 1960, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824. The finding of whether a defendant is competent or not is a finding of fact by the trial court which may not be set aside on review unless it is clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. Feguer v. United States, 8 Cir. 1962, 302 F.2d 214, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872, 83 S.Ct. 123, 9 L.Ed.2d 110.

It is true that expert opinion on competency is not binding on the trier of facts. Ibid. But it is also true that "`while a lay witness's observation of abnormal acts by an accused may be of great value as evidence, a statement that the witness never observed an abnormal act on the part of the accused is of value if, but only if, the witness had prolonged and intimate contact with the accused.'" Wright v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 250 F.2d 4, 10, quoting from Carter v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608. (Emphasis added)

The relative weight of uninformed lay opinion and expert opinion was also considered in Fielding v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 251 F.2d 878, which involved the sufficiency of the evidence to...