United States v. Greaux-Gomez
| Docket Number | 19-2065 |
| Decision Date | 27 October 2022 |
| Citation | 52 F.4th 426 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alexander GREAUX-GOMEZ, Defendant, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Victor A. Ramos-Rodriguez, Johnny Rivera-Gonzalez, and Wilfredo Diaz-Narvaez, on brief, for appellant.
W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Mariana E. Bauza-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief, for appellee.
Before Lynch and Kayatta, Circuit Judges, and Laplante,* District Judge.
Following lengthy pre-trial litigation, including motions to suppress and dismiss, a jury convicted Alexander Greaux-Gomez of enticement of a 15-year-old minor for unlawful sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and transportation of a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Additional post-verdict litigation ensued, which the district court resolved in the government's favor. Greaux appeals, asserting numerous challenges to the criminal judgment, mostly related to the district court's evidentiary rulings and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Finding no merit to Greaux's challenges, we affirm. In doing so, we hold that a defendant could be found to persuade, entice, or induce a victim in violation of Section 2422 notwithstanding purported evidence that the victim agreed to engage in sexual activity.
"We typically recite those facts relevant to sufficiency claims and challenges to a denial of a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the verdict or to the district court's ruling." United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2015). "For other issues, such as claims of prejudicial error, we offer a balanced treatment, in which we objectively view the evidence of record." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Because "we cannot simultaneously recite the facts in both manners, we limit our initial summary ... to those details essential to framing the issues on appeal," id., and "describe other facts, where necessary, in the appropriate discussions of [Greaux's] challenges." United States v. Brown, 945 F.3d 597, 599 n.1 (1st Cir. 2019).
In 2016, Greaux was a 39-year-old teacher and athletic coach at the Albergue Olímpico ("Albergue"), a school in Salinas, Puerto Rico that specializes in sports education. Greaux met the victim, JFR,1 while she was a student at the Albergue.2 When JFR was 15 and in tenth grade, Greaux was her track-and-field coach and teacher. Their relationship became more personal, and later, sexual, and Greaux abused his position of authority to entice JFR for unlawful sexual activity. Greaux eventually had oral and vaginal sex with JFR, who at 15 was too young to legally consent, at the school, in his vehicle, and in a vacant home in Cayey, Puerto Rico that Greaux had used as a homeschool. To get to the vacant homeschool in Cayey, JFR would arrange for her mother to drop her off at a supermarket in Cayey, and then Greaux would pick her up and take her to the home. The victim's mother did not know Greaux was picking JFR up from the supermarket and instead believed that she was ‘going to train.’
JFR also communicated with Greaux via cellular phone using the messaging application WhatsApp. Using WhatsApp, the two exchanged sexual messages, and Greaux asked JFR to send him photographs of a sexual nature, which she did on several occasions. Greaux also used code words in his messages to describe his sexual desires or to arrange for a location to meet JFR to have sex.
The victim's mother discovered that JFR was exchanging sexual messages and images with Greaux and confiscated her phone. The victim's mother then brought the phone to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Investigations office ("HSI") in December 2016. HSI agents determined that the number JFR was messaging with belonged to Greaux and obtained a warrant to search and seize his phone.
While executing the search warrant in January 2017, agents encountered Greaux outside of his residence. After confirming his identity, agents showed Greaux the warrant, explained why they were there, and asked if he would agree to answer some questions, to which Greaux replied "yes." Agents then instructed Greaux to get inside their vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, agents had Greaux review the warrant and explained that he was not under arrest. They also verbally provided Greaux his Miranda warnings and presented him with a written Miranda acknowledgment and waiver form, which Greaux signed. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ().
Agents then began questioning Greaux. During questioning, Greaux made several incriminating admissions. Agents also seized Greaux's cell phone during the search. Forensic evaluations of both JFR's and Greaux's phones revealed some of their WhatsApp messages and various photographs of a sexual nature, including a photograph of JFR in her bra and underwear and photographs of JFR's vagina.
A grand jury charged Greaux with production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251, enticement of a minor for unlawful sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and transportation of a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). After a two-day trial, the jury acquitted Greaux on the production of child pornography charge, but convicted him on the enticement and transportation charges. The district court sentenced Greaux to 240 months' imprisonment, followed by fifteen years of supervised release.
Greaux appeals the district court's suppression ruling, argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him on the enticement and transportation charges, and contends that the district court committed the following errors, the cumulative effect of which entitle him to a new trial: (1) its decision to exclude evidence of a prior criminal proceeding involving JFR and a different adult male; (2) its decision to exclude other allegedly exculpatory evidence; (3) its allowance of leading questions during JFR's direct examination; (4) its acceptance of a material, prejudicial variance between the facts alleged in the indictment and those proven at trial; and (5) its admission of one of the prosecution's exhibits. We consider and reject each challenge in turn, beginning with the suppression issue.
Greaux moved to suppress the inculpatory statements he made to law enforcement officers during their execution of the warrant for his phone, arguing that they were the product of an invalid Miranda waiver and coercive custodial interrogation. After an evidentiary hearing at which two officers and Greaux testified, the district court denied the motion.
"When reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress, we consider its ‘conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings, including its credibility determinations, for clear error.’ " United States v. Melo, 954 F.3d 334, 339 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. De La Cruz, 835 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2016) ). "In the Miranda context especially, we are reluctant to disturb the district court's suppression decision," and we will affirm that decision so long as "any reasonable view of the evidence supports" it. Melo, 954 F.3d at 339 (quoting United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 2008) ).
Greaux argued that he was in custody when three armed officers questioned him for nearly 30 minutes in the back of an unmarked government vehicle. The evidence reasonably supports the district court's conclusion3 that he was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes when he was questioned. Even if agents subjected Greaux to a custodial interrogation, however, the district court's factual findings, including its decision to credit most of the agents' testimony over Greaux's, were not clearly erroneous and plainly show that: (1) agents advised Greaux of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and provided him the requisite Miranda warnings; (2) Greaux understood and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights, both in writing and through his conduct; and (3) the agents did not engage in coercive official tactics, as claimed by Greaux, and thus, Greaux was not pressured or intimidated into waiving his rights against self-incrimination or making incriminating statements during the interview. See United States v. Simpkins, 978 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2020) .
We need not dwell on this issue. "[W]hen lower courts have supportably found the facts, applied the appropriate legal standards, articulated their reasoning clearly, and reached a correct result, a reviewing court ought not to write at length merely to hear its own words resonate." United States v. Wetmore, 812 F.3d 245, 248 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting DeBenedictis v. Brady-Zell (In re Brady-Zell), 756 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) ). So it is here. We nevertheless offer two additional observations.
First, the balance of factors used to determine whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes clearly favored the prosecution here. See United States v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012) ...
To continue reading
Request your trial