United States v. Guerrero
| Decision Date | 21 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 20-012 WES |
| Citation | 514 F.Supp.3d 410 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Juan GUERRERO, Defendant. |
Stacey Pires Veroni, United States Attorney's Office, Providence, RI, for United States of America.
John F. Cicilline, Cicilline Law Office, Providence, RI, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Juan Guerrero's Motion to Suppress, ECF No. 7. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED.
On February 11, 2020, Guerrero was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Guerrero subsequently filed the instant Motion to Suppress, and the Court held an evidentiary hearing via Zoom on October 29, 2020. Officers William Sherrill and Kalvin Rosado of the Providence Police Department testified, and several exhibits, including body camera video footage from four officers, were introduced into evidence.1 The Court heard argument on November 2, 2020.
In the early morning of October 21, 2019, while patrolling in separate cruisers, Officers Sherrill and Rosado received a radio call stating that shots had been fired. See Oct. 29, 2020 Hr'g Tr. 9-10, 82-83. As the officers drove towards the reported location, they observed a dark BMW sedan speeding in the opposite direction, about half a mile from the scene of the crime. See id. at 10-16, 39-40, 84. The officers reversed course and pursued the vehicle. See id. at 16-17, 22-23. As they got close, the BMW turned onto a side street. See id. at 17. Officer Sherrill activated his vehicle's lights and used a series of tones to indicate that the BMW should pull over, but the driver – later learned to be Guerrero - continued to drive recklessly, making four turns in quick succession. See id. at 18-19, 21, 40. After the BMW eventually stopped, the officers approached with weapons drawn. See id. at 23. More officers soon arrived. See Gov't Ex. 5, Lewis Body Camera, at 0:00–0:20.
Guerrero was in the driver's seat, and a sixteen-year-old was in the front passenger's seat. See Oct. 29, 2020 Hr'g Tr. 25-29, 34. Both were ordered to exit the vehicle, and the passenger fully complied. See Gov't Ex. 4, Rosado Body Camera, at 0:30–1:45. For officer security, the passenger was handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. Id. at 1:05-1:40; Oct. 29, 2020 Hr'g Tr. 88. The officers planned to release the juvenile, though, and at the end of the encounter they contacted his mother and drove him home. Oct. 29, 2020 Hr'g Tr. 88-90.
Guerrero, on the other hand, initially failed to follow police commands to exit the vehicle and to lie on the ground. See id. at 27-29; Gov't Ex. 4, at 0:00-1:00. After repeated orders he complied, at which point he was handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. See Oct. 29, 2020 Hr'g Tr. 27-29; Gov't Ex. 4, at 0:10-1:38. But, unlike his companion, Guerrero was never going to be released, as the officers considered him to be under arrest for eluding law enforcement. See Oct. 29, 2020 Hr'g Tr. 31-32, 96.
During these events, multiple officers began to search the BMW. See Gov't Ex. 3, Sherrill Body Camera, at 0:17-1:18; Gov't Ex. 4, at 1:45–4:28. Inside of a backpack in the back seat area, an officer found ammunition, which Guerrero now seeks to suppress. See Oct. 29, 2020 Hr'g Tr. 31, 59, 89. At all times during the search, both Guerrero and the passenger were handcuffed. See id. at 89-91; Gov't Exs. 3-6, Body Camera Footage. Additionally, at all times during the search, both were either inside of a police vehicle or guarded by multiple police officers. See Gov't Exs. 3-6, Body Camera Footage.2
Guerrero argues that the vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Suppress 2, ECF No. 7-1. The Government contends that the search was justified by concerns for officer safety under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Mem. Supp. Gov't Opp'n 7-8, ECF No. 12-1. The Court agrees with Guerrero.
"On a motion to suppress evidence seized on the basis of a warrantless search, the presumption favors the defendant, and it is the government's burden to demonstrate the legitimacy of the search." United States v. Serrano-Acevedo, 892 F.3d 454, 457 (1st Cir. 2018) (citation and quotations omitted). "Subject to limited exceptions, warrantless searches of private property are per se unreasonable." United States v. Lopez, 380 F.3d 538, 543 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) ).
One such exception was identified in Long: "[T]he [warrantless] search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons." 463 U.S. at 1049–50, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). Additionally, under United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1989), the officers must have in fact been motivated by officer safety; a search conducted solely for investigatory purposes cannot be justified by objective circumstances indicating dangerousness. See id. at 783–84. Thus, the Government bears the burden of showing both that the officers were subjectively motivated by officer safety and that the motivation was objectively reasonable.
Breaking down the rule from Long, it is clear that a protective sweep is unjustified unless the facts known to the officers established reasonable suspicion of at least three factors: (1) the automobile contained a weapon; (2) the suspect(s), if given the opportunity, would have used that weapon against the officers; and (3) the suspect(s) would have, at some point in the near future, been able to access the vehicle. See 463 U.S. at 1049–50, 103 S.Ct. 3469.
The first two requirements are easily met. Based on the BMW's temporal and geographic proximity to the gun shots, the direction in which the BMW was travelling (away from the location of the gun shots), Guerrero's reckless and evasive driving, and his lack of compliance with officer commands, there was reasonable suspicion to believe that the car contained a weapon and that Guerrero or his passenger would have used that weapon against the officers if given the chance. See Lott, 870 F.2d at 785 (); compare United States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 2014) (), and United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813, 821 (1st Cir. 2011) (), with United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) ().
But the requirement that the suspects could have accessed the vehicle is trickier, as both Guerrero and the passenger were handcuffed and under police control at the time of the search. To properly analyze this access requirement, a brief summary of the two categories of warrantless vehicle searches justified by officer safety - searches incident to arrest and protective sweeps during investigatory stops – is necessary.
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court established the now-familiar rule for searches incident to arrest: "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape." Id. at 762–63, 89 S.Ct. 2034. Additionally, the officer may search "the area within his immediate control ...." Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (quotations omitted). Applying that principle to the automobile context, the Court in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), held that when an officer "has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, [the officer] may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile" and "any containers found within ...." Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860.
But courts embraced this rule a little too enthusiastically, "treat[ing] the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel." Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). As part of this overreach, courts had allowed searches even where the arrestee was "handcuffed and secured[,]" thus rendering it "improbable" that the arrestee could have accessed weapons in the vehicle. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (citations omitted). The Gant Court reigned in these excesses: "[T]he Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and...
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