United States v. Guzman

Decision Date26 July 2012
Docket NumberNo. 10–CR–074 (JFB).,10–CR–074 (JFB).
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Aldalberto Ariel GUZMAN, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, John J. Durham, Raymond A. Tierney, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, for United States of America.

Steven Losquadro, Steven Losquadro, P.C., Rocky Point, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

On May 21, 2010, the government filed a Juvenile Information against defendant Aldalberto Ariel Guzman (“Guzman” or “the defendant) charging him with one count of conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); two counts of murder in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1); two counts of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); and two counts of causing the death of another through the use of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). Specifically, Guzman is charged with participating, in aid of the racketeering activities of the MS–13 street gang, in the execution-style murder of a nineteen-year-old woman and her two-year-old son in the woods of Central Islip on February 4, 2010.

The government subsequently moved, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032, to transfer the case to district court in order to prosecute the defendant as an adult. On November 29, 2010, after written submissions had been filed with the Court, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the government's transfer motion. On December 14, 2010, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order transferring the case to district court for prosecution of the defendant as an adult.

On September 16, 2011, Guzman moved to suppress statements he made to law enforcement officers after his arrest on May 17, 2010, arguing that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowing and voluntary due to the circumstances surrounding his interrogation and the failure of law enforcement officials to contact his mother after his arrest. On October 7, 2011, the government opposed the motion to suppress. On December 5, 2011, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Guzman's motion. The Court allowed the defendant to submit a post-hearing letter, which was filed on December 20, 2011. The government responded on December 23, 2011. Trial is scheduled to commence on September 10, 2012.

For the reasons that follow, the motion to suppress is denied. In particular, Guzman argues, inter alia, that his post-arrest statements should be suppressed because it is undisputed that the law enforcement agents failed to notify his parents of his arrest as is required for a juvenile under the Juvenile Delinquency Act.

As a threshold matter, although neither the Supreme Court nor Second Circuit has addressed this precise issue, the Court holds that violations of the Juvenile Delinquency Act's parental notification requirement at the time of the juvenile's arrest do not require a per se suppression of the juvenile's post-arrest statements. The plain language of the statute does not require such a remedy, and such a rule could easily lead to absurd results that were clearly not intended by Congress. Here, the law enforcement agents had clear and compelling law enforcement reasons for deciding not to make the parental notification—namely, (1) agents believed that Guzman's mother had assisted Guzman and his co-conspirators' flight to El Salvador after the murders, (2) agents were on the ground in El Salvador at the time of Guzman's arrest in the United States looking for one of Guzman's co-conspirators, and (3) agents were reasonably concerned that, if notification was made of Guzman's arrest to his mother, that family or friends would alert the co-conspirator in El Salvador of this development and thereby jeopardize the safety and law enforcement objectives of the agents in El Salvador in locating the co-conspirator. Per se suppression of Guzman's post-statements under these circumstances would provide a judicial windfall to Guzman, even though no such remedy is dictated by the plain language of the statute, or the United States Constitution. Thus, this Court declines to impose such a per se suppression remedy for a violation of this statutory (rather than constitutional) rule. Instead, the Court adopts the approach of the Sixth Circuit and holds that, under these circumstances, the test remains the same as utilized for analyzing post-arrest statements generally—that is, whether the Miranda waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made under the totality of the circumstances. Under that test, the lack of parental notification is simply one factor, among many—including the juvenile's experience and background, the conditions of the interrogation, and the conduct of the law enforcement officials—that the Court must consider under the totality of the circumstances.

Applying that test, the Court finds that Guzman's Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. First, Guzman was read his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver. Second, with respect to his personal characteristics, Guzman was only four days shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of his arrest, was capable of logical and coherent thinking, was familiar with the criminal justice system because of his prior arrests, and had lived independently of his mother for several months in El Salvador. Third, the conditions of interrogation were conducive to a voluntary waiver in that, inter alia, he was given food and drink, allowed to use the bathroom, and questioned in a calm environment. Fourth, he was not subjected to any threatening or coercive statements or conduct by the interviewing law enforcement agents. Fifth, he did not ask to speak to his mother or an attorney. Having conducted a full evidentiary hearing (including an evaluation of the demeanor of the testifying witnesses), the Court finds Guzman's version of the events in his affidavit to be wholly incredible and, instead, fully credits the version of the interviewing agents as elicited at the hearing. Accordingly, the Court finds that the government has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.

I. Findings of Fact

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) agents who detained and interviewed Guzman on the day of his arrest testified at the suppression hearing. Guzman called no witnesses.1 After evaluatingthe credibility of the witnesses (including their demeanor) and the other evidence offered at the evidentiary hearing, as well as the defendant's affidavit, the Court makes the following findings of fact.

On April 23, 2010, United States Magistrate Judge William Wall issued a warrant for Guzman's arrest, charging him with knowingly and intentionally murdering Vanessa Argueta and Diego Torres. (Ex. 1.) 2 At the time the arrest warrant was issued, officials believed Guzman to be in El Salvador. (Tr. 45:17–20.) Officials placed Guzman's arrest warrant in the NCIC database that tracks fugitives and alerts law enforcement officials when a fugitive surfaces in some way. ( Id. 45:21–46:8.)

On May 17, 2010, FBI Special Agent Kathryn Weidman was alerted that Guzman was scheduled to arrive at Miami International Airport early that evening. ( Id. 4:22–5:6.) Guzman arrived at the airport aboard American Airlines flight 926, arriving from El Salvador. ( Id. 5:7–13; Ex. 3.) Weidman and two officers from the United States Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) met the plane at the gate. (Tr. 6:6–7.) The two CBP officers conducted a check of all passengers on the flight, identified Guzman as the fugitive sought, and placed him in custody. ( Id. 6:13–7:9, 8:14–18.) The CBP officers conducted a pat-down of Guzman and placed him in handcuffs. ( Id. 8:16–18.) Guzman was transported to the CBP holding area in the Terminal E office sometime between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. ( Id. 8:16–9:2.)

Once inside the CBP holding area, Guzman was processed and then handcuffed by one hand to a bench in the general area of the office. ( Id. 9:5–7.) Guzman was offered food and drink and allowed to use the bathroom, if necessary. ( Id. 9:12–15.) Guzman remained handcuffed to the bench until around 10:30 p.m., when Special Agent Sean McMullen, a Special Agent in the Long Island Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, arrived to question Guzman. ( Id. 9:16–18, 10:11–13.) Between his arrival at the CBP holding area and 10:30 p.m., Guzman left the bench with an escort to use the bathroom. ( Id. 21:17–22:5.) While in the CBP holding area, Guzman did not ask to speak to his mother or an attorney. ( Id. 9:19–24.)

When Agent McMullen arrived at the CBP office, he identified himself to Guzman and informed Guzman that there was a warrant out for his arrest for the murders of Argueta and Torres. ( Id. 47:8–15.) At that time, Agent McMullen did not question Guzman regarding the Argueta and Torres murders or Guzman's alleged involvement in La Mara Salvatrucha (“MS–13”), a street gang with members on Long Island. ( Id. 47:16–21.) Guzman's demeanor was calm throughout this encounter. ( Id. 47:22–23.)

Agents McMullen and Weidman moved Guzman into an interview room in the CBP office.3 ( Id. 10:22–25, 48:18–19.) The room was windowless, as the office was underground; however, there was an observation window in the door that opened to the CBP office. ( Id. 27:4–9, 32:3–4, 69:12–14.) After Guzman was placed in the room, Agent McMullen stepped out with Agent Weidman to give her basic facts about the case. ( Id. 48:20–49:4.) Both agents entered the room, and Agent McMullen again advised Guzman of the reason for his arrest. ( Id. 49:5–9.)

Agent McMullen then advised Guzman of his Miranda rights from an “Advice of Rights” form. ( Id. 49:10–15; Ex. 2.) Agent McMullen read from the form, and then asked Guzman to read and repeat the rights out loud. (Tr. 49:10–15.)...

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