United States v. Hallford

Decision Date20 November 2017
Docket NumberCriminal Case No. 13–335 (RJL)
Citation280 F.Supp.3d 170
Parties UNITED STATES of America, v. Joseph Daniel HALLFORD, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Elizabeth Harper Danello, Michael Justin Friedman, T. Patrick Martin, Thomas A. Gillice, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Jonathan Jeffress, Federal Public Defender for D.C., Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

On November 6, 2013, defendant Joseph Daniel Hallford ("Hallford" or "defendant") was questioned by United States Secret Service agents while involuntarily committed to a local psychiatric hospital. The agents questioned Hallford, an Alabama resident, in response to statements he made regarding the Secret Service while visiting Washington, D.C. to attend a protest march. During the course of the questioning, the Secret Service agents elicited incriminating statements from Hallford regarding his unlawful possession of firearms and other weapons in the District.

Hallford asks this Court to suppress those statements, arguing that they were obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Def.'s Mot. Suppress Statements [Dkt. # 50]. It is undisputed that the Secret Service agents failed to inform Hallford of his Miranda rights. Therefore, the only issue this Court must resolve is whether Hallford was in custody while questioned. If so, then Hallford was entitled to Miranda warnings and the agents' failure to provide those warnings mandates suppression of the statements; if not, then Hallford was not entitled to protection under Miranda and the statements were obtained lawfully. Upon consideration of the entire evidentiary record, including testimony from Hallford, the parties' briefing and supplemental briefing, the oral arguments held on this issue, and the relevant law, the Court concludes that the defendant was in Miranda custody when questioned by the Secret Service agents on November 6, 2013. The Court therefore GRANTS Hallford's motion to suppress.

BACKGROUND

The facts at issue here—which center around the Secret Service's questioning of an individual both mentally and physically ill during his involuntary commitment at a local psychiatric hospital—are as troubling as they are unique. Before laying out those facts, however, it is helpful to review the procedural history and present posture of this case.1

As discussed in more detail below, on November 6, 2013, two agents of the United States Secret Service traveled to a local psychiatric hospital, United Medical Center ("UMC"), in order to question Hallford. United States v. Hallford , 816 F.3d 850, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (" Hallford I "). At the time, Hallford, an Alabama resident who was visiting Washington, D.C. for a protest march, was involuntarily committed to UMC. Id. at 852–53. The Secret Service agents sought to question Hallford about statements that he had made that were "causing concern with the Secret Service." 6/5/14 Hr'g Tr. 51:12–13. At some point during the questioning, the focus shifted from Hallford's statements (which, by that time, the agents had determined were harmless) to his weapon ownership. Id. at 65:13–17, 101:5–18. Ultimately, the agents elicited incriminating admissions from Hallford regarding his unlawful possession of firearms and other weapons in the trunk of the car he had parked in the District of Columbia. See id. at 69:22–70:2; Hallford I , 816 F.3d at 854. Those admissions were subsequently used to gather evidence and commence a criminal prosecution against Hallford. Hallford I , 816 F.3d at 854–55.

Defendant moved to suppress his statements from the November 6, 2013 interview. See generally Def.'s Mot. Suppress Statements Taken in Violation of the U.S. Constitution 2–4 [Dkt. # 10]. He argued, as relevant here, that the statements were non-voluntary and obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda . Id. This Court held evidentiary hearings over the course of three days to consider those issues. Ultimately, after considering the evidence and evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, I agreed with Hallford that his November 6, 2013 statements were involuntarily made and elicited in violation of Miranda . I therefore granted Hallford's suppression motion. See 12/16/14 Hr'g Tr. 2–14 [Dkt. # 26]; United States v. Hallford , 103 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015).

The Government, not surprisingly, appealed my decision and, following briefing and oral argument, our Circuit issued its opinion. See Hallford I , 816 F.3d 850. In that opinion, our Circuit first concluded that Hallford's statements were not the product of "a substantial element of coercive police conduct" and were therefore "voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 858, 859 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the course of its analysis, the majority cast aside a few of my factual findings—findings that were made following my observation of witness testimony at the evidentiary hearings. See id. at 857–59. Of particular relevance here, the majority rejected my conclusion that Hallford "was summoned by agents for an interview, not asked if he would submit to an interview." Id. at 857 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Wilkins dissented from that portion of the opinion, writing that the majority's "focus solely on the evidence that undermines the District Court's factual findings represents, in my respectful view, its failure to adhere to the deferential standard of review we employ when evaluating a District Court's factual findings." Id. at 860–62 (Wilkins, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).

As for the Miranda issue, our Circuit held that the record was not "sufficient" to decide whether Hallford was entitled to receive Miranda warnings. Id. at 859. Recognizing that the Miranda -custody inquiry is "fact intensive," the Circuit vacated my decision and remanded the case to me "to determine whether Hallford was in Miranda custody." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). It directed me to "take care to answer" the question whether Hallford's environment "presented the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda ." Id. at 860 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) ).

In light of the remand and our Circuit's concern that the record as it stood was insufficient to decide the Miranda -custody issue, I held an additional evidentiary hearing and oral arguments on the subject. At the evidentiary hearing, Hallford testified—credibly, in my judgment—about the events surrounding his November 6, 2013 questioning by the Secret Service agents. See generally 5/22/17 Hr'g Tr. [Dkt. # 59]. Some of defendant's testimony was consistent with the evidentiary record as reviewed by our Circuit in Hallford I ; some of it was not. Other testimony, including, most critically, testimony regarding what Hallford was told by UMC staff prior to being escorted to the Secret Service interview, provided new facts not examined by our Circuit.2

For present purposes, I need not recount the entirety of the factual background, which was set out by our Circuit in Hallford I . See 816 F.3d at 852–54. Instead, I will begin discussion of my factual findings on remand with Hallford's arrival at George Washington University Hospital ("GW Hospital") on November 5, 2013. When Hallford arrived at GW Hospital, he complained of pain, bleeding, and related symptoms as a result of his hemophilia

. Id. at 853. In the course of waiting for treatment, Hallford made a number of troubling statements to hospital personnel, including statements that he wanted "to be shot by the Secret Service ... so his parents could own the agency" and desired to "hurt the government." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In light of Hallford's actions at GW Hospital and his apparently unstable mental condition, hospital personnel decided to transfer Hallford to UMC for an "involuntary psych evaluation." Id. (citing D.C. CODE §§ 21–521 to – 522 ). According to Hallford, he was informed by an individual at GW Hospital that "they were having [him] evaluated and that [he] would be transferred to another hospital." 5/22/17 Hr'g Tr. at 5:25–6:1. When Hallford responded that he did not "want to do that" and "just want[ed] to go home," the individual informed Hallford that GW Hospital had a "court order" to hold him involuntarily. Id. at 6:4–6. The individual also informed Hallford that the basis of the involuntarily commitment was "some comment" or "comments" made by Hallford; the individual did not "elaborate" on that explanation. Id. at 16:18–19.

Hallford was transferred by ambulance from GW Hospital to UMC at approximately 3 P.M. on November 6, 2013. Hallford I , 816 F.3d at 853. During the transfer, Hallford was put on a gurney and "strapped down" by his arms and legs. 5/22/17 Hr'g Tr. 6:12–13. Upon arrival at UMC, Hallford was immediately forced to surrender to UMC staff "everything that [he] had on [him]," including his wallet, cell phone, keys, clothes, and shoes. Id. at 6:25–7:7. UMC personnel directed Hallford to change into an open-backed hospital gown and did not provide him with any "underwear to put on underneath." Id. at 7:12–14. Hallford was then brought to a hospital room.

Shortly after his arrival at the hospital room, Hallford heard a knock outside his door. Id. at 8:6–7. He turned and saw three members of the UMC staff, two of whom were nurses. Id. at 8:15–17, 38:11–23. One of the nurses told Hallford that he "needed to come with them." Id. at 8:8–9. When Hallford asked why, the nurse responded "that the Secret Service and the FBI were there to talk to" Hallford, and that he "had to go talk to them." Id. at 8:9–11. When Hallford asked whether he had to go "talk to them right now," the nurse...

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