United States v. Hanson
Decision Date | 15 May 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1528.,71-1528. |
Citation | 460 F.2d 337 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis Allen HANSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
C. A. Frerichs, Frederick G. White, Waterloo, Iowa, for defendant-appellant.
Allen L. Donielson, U. S. Atty., John B. Grier, First Asst. U. S. Atty., Des Moines, Iowa, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before GIBSON, HEANEY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
Curtis Allen Hanson, whose request for classification as conscientious objector was denied by his local board, was convicted by a jury on an indictment charging him with willfully and knowingly refusing to submit to induction in violation of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462, and was sentenced as a young adult offender under the Federal Youth Correction Act. This appeal is taken from the denial of Hanson's motion for judgment of acquittal, notwithstanding the verdict, and in the alternative, for a new trial.
The two principal questions raised on this appeal are 1) whether Hanson's Form 150 made a prima facie case for conscientious objector status, and 2) whether the failure of the local board to state the reasons for its refusal of the conscientious objector classification required the court to enter a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. We answer both questions in the affirmative.
The principal legal question to be decided in any case such as this is whether or not there is a "basis in fact" for the classification given to the registrant. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946).
United States v. O\'Bryan, 450 F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1971). See United States v. Iverson, 455 F.2d 79, 81 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Wood, 454 F. 2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Stetter, 445 F.2d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1971).
The facts relating to the classification procedure utilized in this case are lengthy and complex, and we will recite only those relevant to the request for and denial of the conscientious objector classification. Suffice it to say that Hanson registered in 1964, and from that time until his refusal to submit to induction on July 21, 1970, there were several changes of classification and four orders to report for induction.
Hanson filed his Form 150 requesting conscientious objector (I-O) status on July 16, 1969. He signed the portion of the form which stated as follows:
He also supplemented that signed statement with additional information required by the form.1
On August 14, 1969, after a board meeting, a classification memorandum was placed in Hanson's file showing his classification to be I-A(3) and containing the notations "Does Not Warrant Reopening," and "If remain 1-A ask if he wishes to visit with the L.B." By letter, on August 14, 1969, the local board wrote Hanson the following:
The Board again wrote Hanson on September 10, 1969, and on October 8, 1969, giving him the opportunity to appear before the board on September 16 and October 14, respectively, but Hanson failed to appear at either session. On October 14, 1969, an SSS Form 119 was placed in Hanson's file stating that Another classification memo was placed in his file indicating Hanson's classification remained 1-A(3).
Hanson notified the board that he wished to appeal the classification by letter dated November 8, 1969. On January 14, 1970, the state appeal board upheld the 1-A classification. On May 13, 1970, another Form 119 was placed in Hanson's file which indicated the local board reviewed the file again on that date and stated as follows:
By letter of May 21, 1970, Hanson was advised of this action and given further instructions on reporting.
On July 8, 1970, Hanson met with the local board and answered questions concerning his beliefs, his schooling and problems relating to drugs. Another memorandum was filed indicating no change in classification. Then on July 9, 1970, he was ordered to report for induction on July 20, 1970.
Although certain events described above took place subsequent to the appeal to the State Appeal Board, for obvious reasons we must judge the legality of the classification on the basis of the action of the local board prior to the appeal.
During the period relevant to this case, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j), provided as follows:
In determining whether the Form 150 filed by Hanson made out a prima facie case for classification as a conscientious objector, we must apply the test laid down in 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j), and the cases interpreting that statute. That test is whether, if the facts alleged in his Form 150 are true, Hanson is conscientiously opposed to "participation in all war," Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 443, 91 S. Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971), and whether his personal beliefs are held with the strength of religious conviction in his life, rather than stemming solely from political, sociological, or philosophical views. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340-343, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L. Ed.2d 308 (1970).
The form statement signed by Hanson included a statement that he is "conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." In other parts of the questionnaire he stated, "I am against war and violence," "I want no part of war and death," "I hate war and death," and "it would be a moral sin to do anything for your war machine." There are no statements by Hanson in the Form 150 which would indicate that he was selective in his opposition to wars. We think these statements, taken together, essentially allege that Hanson is opposed to participation in war in any form.2
As to whether the form indicates that his personal beliefs are held with the strength of religious conviction in his life, rather than stemming solely from political, sociological or philosophical views, a similar analysis may be made. Hanson signed the form stating he was conscientiously opposed to war in any form "by reason of my religious training and belief." He also stated in the Form 150 that he was a member of the Bahai Faith and that his beliefs were derived from "my acquaintances and other surroundings." It is true that other statements are made which appear to represent his political, sociological or philosophical views; but as the Supreme Court stated in Welsh v. United States, supra, 398 U.S. at 341, 90 S.Ct. at 1797, when a registrant states that his objections to war are "`religious,' that information is highly relevant to the question of the function his beliefs have in his life." See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965). The fact that the form discloses political, sociological and philosophical as well as religious views does not detract from the prima facie validity of the claim, when it is evident that his views stem at least in part from his religious training and belief. In this regard, the Supreme Court, in Welsh v. United States, supra, 398 U.S. at 342-343, 90 S.Ct. at 1798, made this statement:
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