United States v. Hardnett, Case No. 3:03cr212

Citation417 F.Supp.3d 725
Decision Date24 October 2019
Docket NumberCase No. 3:03cr212
Parties UNITED STATES of America v. Alexander James HARDNETT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Sherrie S. Capotosto, United States Attorney's Office, Norfolk, VA, Kaitlin Gratton Cooke, Stephen Eugene Anthony, Peter S. Duffey, United States Attorney's Office, Richmond, VA, for United States of America

Robert James Wagner, Office of the Federal Public Defender, William Jeffrey Dinkin, Stone Dinkin & Amirshahi PLC, Richmond, VA, Eric Christopher Tew, Dykema Gossett PLLC, Washington, DC, for Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

M. Hannah Lauck, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Alexander Hardnett's Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018 (the "Motion"). (ECF No. 335.) Hardnett asserts that the First Step Act entitles him to relief because he committed a covered offense before August 3, 2010. (Mot. 1–3.) The United States responded, asserting that the First Step Act does not afford Hardnett relief "because the quantity of crack cocaine for which he was responsible satisfies the increased threshold in the Fair Sentencing Act" (the "Opposition"). (Opp'n 1, ECF No. 336.) Hardnett replied. (ECF No. 337.) The United States filed a sur-reply, (ECF No. 340), and a Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply 19 Minutes Out of Time, (ECF No. 343). These matters are ripe for disposition. For the reasons articulated below, the Court will grant the Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply 19 Minutes Out of Time and grant in part and deny in part the Motion.

I. Background

On June 16, 2003, a Grand Jury indicted Hardnett and five others in a twenty-three-count indictment, charging them with various offenses related to a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in the Eastern District of Virginia. (PSR ¶ 1, ECF No. 334-1.) Within that indictment, the Grand Jury listed Hardnett in seven counts. The Court later dismissed on the United States' motions three of the seven counts that Hardnett faced. (ECF Nos. 76, 92.) Hardnett proceeded to trial on the four remaining counts: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base (Count One); possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a mixture containing cocaine hydrochloride (Count Three); possession with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (Count Five); and possession with intent to "distribute a quantity of a mixture and substance described in Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(b)(1)(C), which contained a detectable amount of cocaine base, commonly known as ‘crack,’ a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance," (Count Six). (Indictment, ECF No. 17.)

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851,1 the government filed an information charging Hardnett with a prior drug conviction.2 (ECF No. 58.) The prior conviction raised Hardnett's mandatory minimum sentence for Count One from 120 months to 240 months. After a bench trial, the Court found Hardnett not guilty of Counts Three and Five and guilty of Counts One and Six.

Following these convictions, a United States Probation Officer prepared a presentence report ("PSR") to help the Court determine the appropriate sentence. The PSR stated that the United States "recommended that [Hardnett] be held accountable for distributing in excess of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base between late 1998 and December 2002." (PSR ¶ 32.) The PSR calculated for Hardnett an Offense Level of 46 and Criminal History Category VI. To make this calculation, the PSR used offense level 38 based on a drug weight in excess of 1.5 kilograms. (PSR Wkst. C); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(1), (c)(4) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2003) ("USSG") (specifying base offense levels in drug quantity table).3 The PSR then added two offense levels for possession of a firearm, four levels for a supervisory role in the offense, and two levels for obstruction of justice, which resulted in an adjusted offense level of 46. (PSR ¶¶ 109–11, Wkst. C.)

At sentencing on February 12, 2004, the Court made findings with respect to Hardnett's possession of a firearm, obstruction of justice, and supervisory role in the conspiracy, and adopted the PSR. (Sent. Tr. 9–10, ECF No. 336-1.) These findings increased Hardnett's offense level from 32 (based on the conviction for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine), resulting in a recommendation for a life sentence. The Court sentenced Hardnett to the mandatory term of life on Count One and 360 months (30 years) on Count Six, to run concurrently. (Sent. Tr. 12, ECF No. 336-1.) The Court further imposed a supervised release term of ten years for Count One and six years for Count Six, to run concurrently. (Id. )

Hardnett appealed. (ECF No. 130.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Hardnett's sentence after finding that it violated "the rule announced in United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)," which the Supreme Court of the United States decided after Hardnett's initial sentencing hearing. United States v. Hardnett , 124 F. App'x 767, 768 (4th Cir. 2005). At the July 13, 2005 resentencing on remand—where a life sentence was no longer mandatory—the Court sentenced Hardnett to 396 months on Count One and 360 months on Count Six. (ECF No. 179.) Looking to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the Court considered mitigating evidence regarding Hardnett's traumatic childhood and Hardnett's positive involvement with his family. (July 13, 2005 Sent. Tr. 16; ECF No. 336-2.) Noting that a life sentence "is the second most serious penalty that can be imposed short of the death penalty," the Court weighed whether Hardnett's crime warranted that serious federal penalty. (Id. ) The conclusion was no. Judge James R. Spencer specifically identified that "if left to my own devices, would I have given Mr. Hardnett life? No." (Id. 16-17.) Because of the serious nature of the crime, the Court then imposed a 396 month (33 years) sentence on Count One and a 360 month (30 years) sentence on Count Six. (Id. 17.)

Later, the Sentencing Commission reduced the Guidelines for Hardnett's offense.4 (ECF No. 259.) Specifically, Amendment 750 as set forth in Supplement to the 2010 Guidelines Manual (effective November 1, 2010), reduced the statutory penalties for cocaine base ("crack cocaine") offenses such as Hardnett's in Count One. (ECF Nos. 269, 282.) On motion by Hardnett, the Court reduced his sentence for Count One from 396 months to 360 months. (ECF No. 282.) Because of the drug weight attributed to Hardnett in Count One, however, the twenty-year mandatory minimum remained in effect. The 30-year sentence for Count Six did not change and the supervised release terms remained in place.

In 2016, during the Clemency Initiative that President Barack Obama authorized during his administration, pro bono Counsel reviewed Hardnett's case to determine whether he was eligible to seek clemency or other sentencing relief. (ECF No. 321.) As part of that request, pro bono Counsel compiled Hardnett's prison records, obtained several letters written on his behalf, documented pre-conviction and post-conviction mitigating evidence, and thoroughly analyzed his criminal history points and evaluated how, in 2016, certain criminal history points would no longer count against him in sentencing. (Id. )

After conducting this review, pro bono Counsel asked the Court and the United States Attorney's office to consider implementing a reduction of Hardnett's sentences in accordance with the procedure used in Holloway v. United States , 68 F. Supp. 3d 310 (E.D.N.Y 2014). In response to that inquiry, on January 7, 2016, Judge Spencer declined to follow the resentencing procedure used in Holloway , but added the following:

Counsel, alternatively, seeks a statement from the Court that Mr. Hardnett would receive a substantially lower sentence today. The Court affirmatively responds to that inquiry. Yes, if Mr. Hardnett were sentenced today, he would receive a substantially lower sentence.

(ECF No. 322.)

Finally, in this First Step Act filing, Hardnett supplied numerous records and letters in support of his request for First Step Act relief. (ECF No. 337-1.) The records show that Hardnett has engaged in many prison programs and has only handful of minor disciplinary infractions during his incarceration. (Id. ) His Education Teacher remarked, for example, that Hardnett "exhibits himself as an individual who has developed and persevered during his incarceration." (Reply Ex. A. 72, ECF No. 337-1.) His immediate supervisor in the recreation services department at the Federal Correctional Complex in Petersburg, Virginia writes of Hardnett that he is "consistently dependable and pleasant," he is "widely respected by inmates and staff alike," concluding that "in my 16 years of experience; Mr. Hardnett is the most modeled and exceptional inmate I have encountered." (Reply Ex. A. 68, ECF No. 337-1.) Another Recreation Specialist who supervises Hardnett commends his ability to plan out "his daily responsibilities for each day," adding that he "balances his work life with his church life and education." (Id. 71.) Hardnett himself wrote to the Court, accepting responsibility for his actions, expressing remorse, and recognizing that his "past cost [him his] life." (Id. 89.) Hardnett knows that he "was wrong and my decisions as well as my actions I've made in the past were solely of my own doing and the blame belongs to me. No matter how I tried to justify my wrongs to make them appear to be right, they were still wrong and that is the fact of the matter." (Id. ) The United States responded in Opposition, arguing that the drug amounts affiliated with his offenses preclude First Step Act relief.

Hardnett has served roughly 196 months (more than 16 years) of his 360-month sentence and, according to the parties, is scheduled to be...

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