United States v. Harris
| Docket Number | 3:22-CR-00018-FDW-DSC |
| Decision Date | 06 March 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. DARRELL ALAN HARRIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's “Motion to Suppress Evidence and Motion for Franks Hearing,” Doc. 29, filed on January 20 2023. The Government's “Response in Opposition of Defendant's Motion to Suppress,” Doc. 31, was filed on January 27, 2023. The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on February 24, 2023.
The Motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is now ripe for consideration.
Having fully considered the record and following the evidentiary hearing, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant's Motion to Suppress be DENIED as discussed below.
Defendant is charged in a one-count Bill of Indictment with possession of firearm by felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). During the hearing, the Court heard testimony from Officers Charles Famulari, Jabari Barrett and Joseph Muha of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department. The Court also viewed portions of the videos captured by the officers' body worn cameras during the traffic stop.
On or around March 8, 2021, Officer Famulari initiated a voluntary contact with Defendant Darrell Harris in the vicinity of Catherine Simmons Drive and August Street in Charlotte. Famulari was part of an increased police presence in this high crime area. Defendant was operating a white Dodge Ram truck. A tag reading “TAG APPLIED FOR” was displayed on the truck. Famulari advised Defendant that his tag was improper. During the course of their contact Defendant gave the officer a fictitious name. Famulari did not document the contact and Defendant was not detained.
On March 15, 2023, Famulari spotted Defendant operating the same truck back in the area of Catherine Simmons Drive. The truck was still displaying the improper tag. The officer was going to initiate a stop for the improper tag. As Famulari approached in his cruiser, Defendant drove away and entered I-77 from La Salle Street. Defendant accelerated and Famulari reached a speed of ninety miles per hour attempting to stop the truck. Defendant pulled onto the shoulder of I-77 near Morehead Street. Famulari approached the passenger side of the truck. An eight year old child in the back seat was the only passenger. The officer detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the truck. He advised Defendant that he was being stopped for the improper tag and for driving “way too fast.” Defendant could not produce an operator's license or registration for the truck. He told Famulari that the truck was a rental from Enterprise. Famulari asked Defendant for his name and date of birth. He also asked if he could open the passenger door to locate the VIN number off the inside of the door frame. Defendant agreed. Once he opened the door, Famulari observed a partially smoked marijuana “blunt” in an ashtray on the console.
Famulari then went back to his patrol car, ran Defendant's information on his computer and spoke with dispatch. Another officer arrived on the scene and approached Famulari in his patrol car. Famulari stated “I already have odor” and explained Defendant and a child were the only ones in the vehicle. Dispatch informed Famulari that Defendant had an NCIC “hit” for an order for arrest (“OFA”) originating from a misdemeanor probation violation in Gaston County. In an attempt to reduce the jail population during COVID, Mecklenburg County Courts were not enforcing local orders for arrest on misdemeanors at that time. Because Defendant's OFA was for an out of county violation, Famulari asked dispatch to contact the jail to determine whether they would accept Defendant.
Famulari returned to the truck and ordered Defendant out. He advised him that there was a “strong odor of marijuana” and that he had a “couple of warrants.” He placed Defendant in handcuffs and moved him to the front of the patrol car. He then patted Defendant down. Defendant stated he was aware of the order for arrest and they discussed the situation. Famulari was ultimately told by dispatch that the order for arrest would not be honored.
Based upon the odor of marijuana and plain view sighting of the marijuana “blunt”, the officers searched the interior of the truck. They located a clear bag of marijuana and a firearm between the driver's seat and console. A scale was found in the driver's side door. Defendant was placed under arrest for possession of firearm by a felon, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and the misdemeanor probation violation from Gaston County.
On March 20, 2021, Famulari obtained a search warrant for Defendant's cell phone that was seized at the time of his arrest. On March 29, 2021, Famulari obtained another search warrant for Defendant's DNA to compare with the seized firearm.
Defendant moves to suppress all evidence seized from the vehicle on March 15, 2021. He asserts that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police unlawfully seized him and searched his truck. Defendant also moves for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). He asserts that the warrants for his cell phone and DNA contained deliberate and demonstrable falsehoods and/or a reckless disregard for the truth.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “When a police officer stops an automobile and detains the occupants briefly, the stop amounts to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated in part on other grounds by Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355-57 (2015), (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). “[T]he underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable.” Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 810 (“An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable' under the circumstances.”).
When a law-enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver has violated traffic laws, he may stop the vehicle to investigate. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (). Whether reasonable suspicion justified a traffic stop is determined by the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011).
In evaluating the reasonableness of a traffic stop, the court must consider: first, whether the officer's reason for the traffic stop was legitimate, and second, were “the officer's actions during the seizure “reasonably related in scope” to the basis for the traffic stop. United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 810). Based upon the evidence presented, the Court finds Famulari's testimony credible and concludes that Defendant was speeding and his truck displayed an improper tag. Therefore, Famulari had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The stop of Defendant's vehicle was proper and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant does not dispute the initial stop of his vehicle but argues that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. “A routine traffic stop becomes an unreasonable seizure when law enforcement impermissibly exceeds the stop's scope or duration.” United States v. Hill, 849 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). “Even a de minimis extension violates the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Miller, 54 F.4th 219, 228 (4th Cir. 2022). “If a police officer seeks to prolong a traffic stop to allow for investigation into a matter outside the scope of the initial stop, he must possess reasonable suspicion or receive the driver's consent.” Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507 (citing United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Here, Defendant argues that the officers had neither consent nor reasonable suspicion when they extended the scope of the traffic stop beyond investigating the speeding and improper tag violations. The Court disagrees.
When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts look to the totality of the circumstances and analyze whether the officer has a particularized, objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S 266, 273 (2002). The reasonable suspicion standard requires “‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.'” Kansas v. Glover, ---U.S. ----, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)). In order to meet this standard, an “officer's suspicions must ... be more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch'” of criminal activity. United States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2010). Rather, “a police officer must offer ‘specific and articulable facts' that demonstrate at least ‘a minimal level of objective justification' for the belief that criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 213 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008))...
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