United States v. Hartsell
| Decision Date | 25 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-CR-9 DRL-MGG,CAUSE NOS. 3:19-CR-14(02) |
| Citation | 448 F.Supp.3d 975 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Charles HARTSELL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Luke N. Reilander, US Attorney's Office, South Bend, IN, for Plaintiff.
Charles Hartsell requests emergency release from detention because of the COVID-19 pandemic, his heightened risk given his unique and serious medical condition, and recent injury sustained on January 29, 2020. On March 18, 2020, the magistrate judge denied Mr. Hartsell's motion for emergency release. Mr. Hartsell requested an emergency appeal.
He may appeal here. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). The court reviews the magistrate judge's detention order de novo , meaning it must decide anew and independently whether detention or temporary release is warranted. See United States v. Jones , 804 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (N.D. Ind. 1992). Following today's hearing, with additional evidence and proffer, the court agrees with the magistrate judge's order and denies Mr. Hartsell's request for emergency release from detention.
As confirmed at the hearing's start, Mr. Hartsell proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) alone. That was the sole basis for release before the magistrate judge. This statute allows a court to "permit the temporary release, in the custody of a United States marshal or another appropriate person, to the extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be necessary for preparation of the person's defense or for another compelling reason."
There's a real question whether this statute was intended to cover today's appeal. First, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 applies to the release or detention of a defendant pending trial, but Mr. Hartsell is pending sentencing on his guilty plea to the charge of conspiring to sell a firearm to a known drug user, see United States v. Hartsell, No. 3:20CR9. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) applies to the release or detention of a defendant pending sentencing, and that statute has no corresponding cousin to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) that would authorize temporary release for a compelling reason.
Second, the language authorizing temporary release in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) is appended to the statutory requirements for a detention order under § 3142(e) —so, through construction, ostensibly evinces a congressional intent to consider and permit that temporary release before a guilty plea, but not after. Admittedly, the language first contemplates release that is "necessary for preparation of the person's defense." Any tendency to read "defense" broadly to include sentencing would be cabined by the statute, which would seem to cover trial but not sentencing post-guilty plea. No request was made under 18 U.S.C. § 3143 to alter Mr. Hartsell's detention status at the time of his guilty plea, and rightly so on this record.
Third, there is intended interplay between § 3142 and § 3143, but not § 3142(i). In specific circumstances, § 3143 refers to § 3142. For instance, the court must consider § 3142 in determining release or detention pending appeal by the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(c)(2). Section 3143 also incorporates § 3142(b, c) under certain circumstances in which release or detention is being considered when the defendant appeals or when the defendant pends sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(a), (b). At no time does § 3143 reference § 3142(i). That Congress married these two statutes in specific ways and notably not with reference to § 3142(i) underscores a view that § 3142(i) applies to pretrial detainees, but not those who have pleaded guilty and merely await sentencing.
Fourth, the statutory dichotomy between § 3142 and § 3143 has real meaning. Before trial, the government has the burden to show that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) ; see also United States v. Portes , 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 1985). After all, "detention prior to trial or without trial is [a] carefully limited exception" to liberty. United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). That understandably changes after a guilty plea. A presumption then favors detention. United States v. Davis , 442 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2006). Then, the defendant (not the government) has the burden—and often the burden is to show (except for certain crimes and violent offenses) "by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released." 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) ; see also United States v. Abuhamra , 389 F.3d 309, 320 (2d Cir. 2004). That Congress omitted a § 3142(i) counterpart in § 3143, at minimum, mirrors the design of this burden-shifting dichotomy.
Fifth, no party cites any case in which § 3142(i) has been used for temporary release of a defendant who has pleaded guilty. The court's review of certain federal cases reflects this same absence of authority. Naturally the thinking on this issue has been developed in the context of an emergency appeal, without briefing from either side on this precise issue to aid the court. The court isn't inclined to cement its views on this issue without that, even recognizing counsel's able contributions at the hearing when asked. The reality is that the government concedes and the defendant agrees in this instance that 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) applies, so the court analyzes this appeal accordingly, albeit with sound reservation.
To be sure, the court is not insensitive to Mr. Hartsell's history, unique circumstances, health condition, or the risks posed by COVID-19. The pandemic presents an ever-evolving fluid situation. The court rules today based on facts and a reasonable assessment of risk. There has been no reported case of COVID-19 in Elkhart County Jail or for that matter in any state or federal facility in the Northern District of Indiana. Mr. Hartsell is no more at risk of contracting COVID-19 inside Elkhart County Jail than he would be if released to the community. Today, Indiana reports nineteen cases of the virus in St. Joseph County, five cases in Elkhart County, one case in Noble County, but no others in counties that surround Elkhart County. Cases have grown exponentially in public since the first reported case in the United States in late January 2020, and as testing has increased, but thus far not in the...
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