United States v. Hassanshahi

• Decision Date: 05 November 2013
• Docket Number: Criminal Action No.: 13–274 (RC)
• Citation: 989 F.Supp.2d 110
• Parties: United States of America v. Shantia Hassanshahi, also known as Shantia Hassan Shahi, also known as Shahi, also known as Shantia Haas, also known as Sean Haas, and Hasston, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

989 F.Supp.2d 110

United States of America

v.Shantia Hassanshahi, also known as Shantia Hassan Shahi, also known as Shahi, also known as Shantia Haas, also known as Sean Haas, and Hasston, Inc., Defendants.

Criminal Action No.: 13–274 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

November 5, 2013

Frederick Walton Yette, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Re Document Nos.: 8, 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Denying the Government's Motion to Revoke Pretrial Release Order; and Denying Defendant's Motion To Strike

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Shantia Hassanshahi was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport on September 11, 2013, on one count of conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods and technology to Iran and to defraud the United States. On September 24, 2013, a Central District of California magistrate judge denied the Government's motion for pretrial detention and ordered that Mr. Hassanshahi be released on $560,000 bond and with electronic monitoring. The Government now appeals and seeks revocation of the magistrate judge's release order. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Government's motion.

II. BACKGROUND

Shantia Hassanshahi is a dual U.S.—Iranian citizen and owner of Hasston, Inc. See generally Indictment, ECF No. 7. According to the Government's allegations, Hasston, Inc. purchases protection relays on the U.S. market and sells them to a co-conspirator in Armenia; the co-conspirator then sells the items back to Kian Day, a company owned by Mr. Hassanshahi in Iran; and Kian Day then sells the relays to the Iranian government. See Gov't's Mot. Revoke & Stay 3, ECF No. 8. Protection relays are electromechanical devices that calculate the operating conditions on electrical circuits—a use that, at least at this time, the Government has not disputed is civilian in nature. See id. at 8 n.2; see also Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Revoke & Stay 4, ECF No. 9. In support of its allegations, the Government presents correspondence, spreadsheets, and other files recovered from Mr. Hassanshahi's computer.

On January 9, 2013, the Government filed a complaint outlining the above allegations against Defendants. See Compl., ECF No. 1. On that same date, Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson signed off on the complaint and issued a warrant for Mr. Hassanshahi's arrest. Mr. Hassanshahi was arrested on September 11, 2013, at Los Angeles International airport, and the Department of Homeland Security confiscated both his U.S. and Iranian passports at that time. See Gov't's Mot. Revoke & Stay 1–2 & n.1, ECF No. 8. He had spent the previous several months in Iran, where he reportedly stayed with a cousin. On September 16, 2013, he made his initial appearance in the Central District of California before Magistrate Judge Carla Woehrle. See id. at 2. At that appearance, the Government moved to have Mr. Hassanshahi detained pending trial on the theory that he presented a flight risk. See18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) (2012). On September 24, 2013, Judge Woehrle denied the Government's motion and ordered that Mr. Hassanshahi be released on $560,000 bond and with electronic monitoring. See Gov't's Mot. Revoke & Stay 2, ECF No. 8; Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Revoke & Stay 5, ECF No. 9.

The Government then moved in this Court for an order staying and revoking Judge Woehrle's release order. See generally Gov't's Mot. Revoke & Stay, ECF No. 8. After briefing on the motion was completed, Mr. Hassanshahi filed an objection and motion to strike the Government's reference in its reply brief to the infamous mobster Whitey Bulger. See generally Obj. & Mot. Strike, ECF No. 12.¹ Judge Emmet G. Sullivan, sitting as Acting Chief Judge, issued an order on September 26, 2013, staying the release order and requiring that Mr. Hassanshahi be brought to Washington, D.C. on or before October 7, 2013. See Order, ECF No. 4. Also on September 26, 2013, a grand jury indicted Mr. Hassanshahi and Hasston, Inc., charging them with conspiracy to unlawfully export U.S. goods and technology to Iran and to defraud the United States, in violationof 18 U.S.C. § 371; 50 U.S.C. § 1705; and 31 C.F.R. pt. 560. See Indictment, ECF No. 7.

October 7 came and went, and Mr. Hassanshahi was not transferred to D.C., apparently due to his medical condition. On October 15, 2013, the Court contacted both parties in an attempt to set up a hearing on Mr. Hassanshahi's detention—via video conference, if necessary. That day, Mr. Hassanshahi's then-attorney responded that he was still “in the process of determining whether there are facilities that are available and whether Mr. Hassanshahi's medical condition would permit him to participate in th[at] fashion.” The Court heard nothing further until October 25, 2013, when Mr. Hassanshahi's new local counsel phoned the Court to indicate that a motion for hearing would be forthcoming. On the evening of October 30, 2013, Mr. Hassanshahi filed his motion for hearing, which the Court granted. See Mot. Hr'g, ECF No. 18; Min. Order, Nov. 1, 2013. On November 4, 2013, the Court held oral argument on the Government's appeal and allowed Mr. Hassanshahi to appear via video conference from Los Angeles with his California counsel, who has not yet entered an appearance in this case. At the detention hearing, Mr. Hassanshahi was also arraigned on the charges in the Indictment.

III. ANALYSIS

The Government seeks review of Judge Woehrle's release order pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50, 3062 (2012)). Under that Act, the Government may seek review of a magistrate judge's release order by filing, “with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order....” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1) (2012). Authority to review the release order lies with the district judge. See, e.g.,United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 615–16 (10th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Johnson, 858 F.Supp. 119, 122 (N.D.Ind.1994)) (holding that only a district judge in the charging district, and not a magistrate judge in that district, may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district). This District Court reviews a magistrate judge's release order de novo. See, e.g.,United States v. Beauchamp–Perez, 822 F.Supp.2d 7, 9 (D.D.C.2011) (citing United States v. Hudspeth, 143 F.Supp.2d 32, 35–36 (D.D.C.2001)).

“Our system of criminal justice embraces a strong presumption against detention.” United States v. Hanson, 613 F.Supp.2d 85, 87 (D.D.C.2009). “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).² The Bail Reform Act requires that the Court release a defendant if there are release conditions that reasonably assure that the individual will not present a flight risk or a danger to the community. See18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012). The converse is also true: The Court is prohibited from releasing a defendant if the Court finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance in court or the safety of any other person or the community. Seeid. § 3142(e)(1). “[W]hen the government seeks pretrial detention of an individual on the ground that he poses a risk of flight, the standard it must satisfy is a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ ” United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C.Cir.1996) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 96 (D.C.Cir.1987)). Where detention is based on an individual's danger to other people or the community, a clear and convincing standard applies. SeeUnited States v. Hanson, 613 F.Supp.2d 85, 88 (D.D.C.2009).

Here, the Government moves to revoke the release order on the basis that Mr. Hassanshahi poses a flight risk. In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure that Mr. Hassanshahi does not pose a flight risk, the Court must consider:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged;

(2) the weight of the evidence against Mr. Hassanshahi;

(3) Mr. Hassanshahi's history and characteristics; and

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to other people or the community that would be posed by Mr. Hassanshahi's release.

See18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

In evaluating the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the judges of this District have considered the seriousness of the offense charged, including whether the alleged crime involves violence. See, e.g.,United States v. Richards, 783 F.Supp.2d 99, 102 (D.D.C.2011). The statute also requires the Court to consider whether the alleged offense involves sex trafficking of children; crimes of terrorism; a minor victim; or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device. See18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). Mr. Hassanshahi argues that this case involves articles that were to be used in the civilian power grid—not the exportation of military or nuclear items—and asserts that the Government conceded as much at the hearing in Los Angeles, see Def.'s Opp'n Mot. Revoke & Stay 4, ECF No. 9. The Government takes no position on this in the written record.³

To be sure, violation of our economic sanctions against Iran is a serious offense and undermines the objectives of American foreign policy. However, the underlying crime is not a crime of violence, nor does it involve any of the other factors set forth in section 3142(g)(1). Other defendants charged with violation of economic sanctions laws have been released with electronic monitoring by judges in this district. See, e.g.,Hanson, 613 F.Supp.2d at 91; United States v. Karni, 298 F.Supp.2d 129, 132–33 (D.D.C.2004). The facts of this case also do not suggest that Mr. Hassanshahi engaged in any violence, or threats of violence, in the...