United States v. Hatfield

• Decision Date: 04 May 2023
• Docket Number: 6:22-CR-07-CHB-HAI-2
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. OAKLEY D. WHITEY HATFIELD & JACKLYN R. JOHNSON, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. OAKLEY D. WHITEY HATFIELD & JACKLYN R. JOHNSON, Defendants.

No. 6:22-CR-07-CHB-HAI-2

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division

May 4, 2023

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Hanly A. Ingram, United States Magistrate Judge.

The Court considers a motion to dismiss that is both tardy and premature. Without sufficient justification, the motion was filed more than six months after the defensive-motions deadline expired. Denial on this basis would be appropriate particularly because the motion is not based upon any case-related development occurring since the deadline expired. More importantly, the motion is premature because it is premised upon facts that contradict the Superseding Indictment. The Court cannot invade the province of the jury by relying upon such facts so denial of the motion, with the possibility of reaching the legal issue raised following a jury trial, is appropriate.

POSTURE

On December 12, 2022, Defendant Oakley Hatfield, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the Counts charged in the Superseding Indictment against him. D.E. 278. Defendant Jacklyn Johnson joined the motion. D.E. 280. The government responded in opposition. D.E. 283. Hatfield replied. D.E 287. On January 19, 2023, District Judge Boom referred the matter to the undersigned. D.E. 288.

The Superseding Indictment charges both Johnson and Hatfield in Count One with conspiracy to “knowingly sponsor and exhibit animals in an animal fighting venture” in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1) (part of the Animal Welfare Act) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to violate federal law). D.E. 97. Both Defendants are also charged with knowingly attending an animal fighting venture, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(2)(A) (Counts Seven and Nine). Id.

An essential element of these charges, which the government must prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the venture was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce: 7 U.S.C § 2156(a)(1) (Count One) states, “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly sponsor or exhibit an animal in an animal fighting venture,” and 7 U.S.C § 2156(a)(2)(A) (Counts Seven & Nine) states, “It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly attend an animal fighting venture.” Subsection (f)(1) defines “animal fighting venture” as “any event, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, that involves a fight conducted or to be conducted between at least 2 animals for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment.” This definition is contained in paragraph 5 of the Superseding Indictment. D.E. 97 at 2.

“[A]n impact on interstate or foreign commerce” is an essential element of a prosecution under § 2156. United States v. Carrano, 340 F.Supp.3d 388, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); accord Hernandez-Gotay v. United States, 985 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. Jan. 14, 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Ortiz-Diaz v. United States, 2021 WL 4733320, 142 S.Ct. 336 (2021). Paragraph 15(a) of the Superseding Indictment alleges that the “regular animal fighting ventures at Bald Rock . . . routinely drew participants from the Eastern District of Kentucky and other states.” D.E. 97 at 4. Paragraph 15(b) states that “RICKIE D. JOHNSON collected admission fees from individuals who participated in the animal fighting ventures and shared those proceeds [with the owner of the Bald Rock property].” Id.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The factual premise of the motion runs afoul of well-settled principles articulated in case after case. In assessing a pre-trial motion to dismiss in a criminal case, the Court must apply the following legal standards.

A Defendant may challenge a defect in the indictment, including its constitutionality, via a pretrial motion to dismiss, provided “the basis of the motion is then reasonably available and the motion can be determined without a trial on the merits[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B). A defendant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute facially or as applied.... [A]n as-applied challenge alleges that the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant's alleged conduct. Carroll v. City of Cleveland, 522 Fed. App'x 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2013). When ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment, the Court accepts the factual allegations therein as true, and determines only whether the indictment is valid on its face. See United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Rife, 429 F.Supp.3d 363, 366 (E.D. Ky. 2019).

The indictment must be read as a whole, accepting the factual allegations as true, and construing those allegations in a practical sense with all the necessary implications. United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 140 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). An indictment is to be construed liberally in favor of its sufficiency. United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 411 (6th Cir. 2002).

United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2007). “[T]he Court must resolve factual issues in this case, such as they exist, in favor of the indictment.” United States v. England, No. 1:14-CR-73, 2014 WL 4988149, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2014); see also United States v. Chapman, No. 11-CR-51-GFVT, 2012 WL 6049629, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 2012) (“[A]ny factual issues present [in a motion to dismiss] must be resolved in favor of the indictment.”).

District courts are directed to dispose of all motions before trial if they are capable of determination without trial of the general issue. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b). Generally, motions are capable of determination before trial if they raise questions of law rather than fact. See United States v. Miller, 491 F.2d 638, 647 (5th Cir. 1974). However, Rules 12(e) and (g) clearly envision that a district court may make preliminary findings of fact necessary to decide the questions of law presented by pre-trial motion so long as the court's findings on the motion do not invade the province of the ultimate finder of fact. See Moore P 12.04 at 12-24, 25. Thus, a defense is “‘capable of determination' if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense.” United States v. Covington, 395 U.S. 57, 60, 89 S.Ct. 1559, 1561, 23 L.Ed.2d 94 (1969).

United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 664-65 (6th Cir. 1976).

From Jones and Rule 12(b), the Court distills two requirements for addressing a motion to dismiss the indictment which alleges that the government cannot establish the offense charged as a matter of law: (1) the issue raised must be a question of law and (2) the relevant facts must be undisputed. Jones, 542 F.2d at 665. The undisputed nature of the evidence is an important predicate to a court's determination of a motion to dismiss the indictment. If the evidence relating to the issue raised by the parties is disputed, the court runs the risk of treading upon the role of the grand jury[.]

United States v. Parker, No. 3:12-CR-154, 2013 WL 1497433, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2013) (Guyton), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1497432 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2013); accord United States v. Jarrett, No. 3:12-CR-144, 2013 WL 1117871, at *3-4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1120061 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2013); see also United States v. Med 1st, No. 3:16-CR-76-JHM, 2017 WL 4848823, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 26, 2017) (finding that pre-trial fact-finding as to venue “would intrude upon the province of the jury to determine what actions were taken by the defendants and where they occurred”).

[A] motion to dismiss the indictment is not “an opportunity to argue the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Silvius, No 1:12-CR-172, 2012 WL 5878841, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 21, 2012). In fact, “[w]hen a pretrial motion raises questions of fact intertwined with issues involving the merits of the case . . . a court should defer determination of that matter until trial.” Id.... Weighing the evidence “invade[s] the province” of the jury, and the Court declines to do so in the instant matter. Jones, 542 F.2d at 664.

Jarrett, 2013 WL 1117871, at *5.

Motions to dismiss before trial are capable of determination if the motion raises questions of law, not facts. [Jones, 542 F.2d at 664.] A District Court may make preliminary findings of fact if such findings are necessary to determine the presented questions of law, but such findings cannot “invade the province of the jury.” United States v. Craft, 105 F.3d 1123, 1126 (6th Cir. 1997). When a Defendant instead claims the allegations included in the indictment are false or untrue, this is not a question of law, but rather a fact to be tried by the jury. Universal Milk Bottle Service v. United States, 188 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1951).

United States v. Lundergan, No. 5:18-CR-106-GFVT-MAS, 2019 WL 1261354, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2019); see also United States v. Sisco, No. 7:20-CR-23-REW, 2021 WL 4066665, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 7, 2021).

ANALYSIS

Hatfield argues that the charges are unconstitutional as applied to him because they exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. He specifies that his constitutional challenge is an as-applied, rather than facial, challenge to § 2156: “Section 2156 is unconstitutional as applied to Hatfield: the conduct alleged in Counts 1 and 9 of the Indictment was purely intra-state and had no effect on inter-state commerce.” D.E. 278 at 2 (emphasis added). He further states, “A defendant may challenge the constitutionality of a statute either facially or ‘as applied.' An as-applied challenge such as Hatfield's here, alleges that the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant's alleged conduct. As-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.” I...