Hernández-Gotay v. United States, 19-2236

Decision Date14 January 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-2236, No. 20-1084,19-2236
Citation985 F.3d 71
Parties Nydia Mercedes HERNÁNDEZ-GOTAY; Faustino Rosario-Rodríguez; Luis Joel Barreto-Barreto; Carlos Quiñones-Figueroa; Laura Green, Plaintiffs, Appellants, Club Gallístico de Puerto Rico, Inc., Plaintiff, and Asociación Cultural y Deportiva del Gallo Fino de Pelea; Ángel Manuel Ortiz-Díaz; John J. Olivares-Yace; Ángel Luis Narváez-Rodríguez; José Miguel Cedeño, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES; United States Department of Agriculture; Sonny Perdue, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture; United States Department of Justice; Jeffrey A. Rosen, Acting Attorney General; Donald J. Trump, President, Defendants, Appellees. Asociación Cultural y Deportiva del Gallo Fino de Pelea; Ángel Manuel Ortiz-Díaz; John J. Olivares-Yace; Ángel Luis Narváez-Rodríguez; José Miguel Cedeño, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Club Gallístico de Puerto Rico, Inc.; Nydia Mercedes Hernández-Gotay; Faustino Rosario-Rodríguez; Luis Joel Barreto-Barreto; Carlos Quiñones-Figueroa; Laura Green, Plaintiffs, v. United States; United States Department of Agriculture; Sonny Perdue, Secretary of the Department of Agriculture; United States Department of Justice; Jeffrey A. Rosen, Acting Attorney General; Donald J. Trump, President, Defendants, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Edwin Prado-Galarza and María A. Domínguez, with whom Rafael Ojeda, Félix Román Carrasquillo, San Juan, PR, and DMRA Law LLC were on briefs, for appellants.

Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Sr., with whom Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, Abby C. Wright, Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division, and John S. Koppel, Attorney, Appellate Staff Civil Division were on brief, for appellees.

Isaías Sánchez-Báez, Solicitor General of Puerto Rico, and Carlos Lugo-Fiol on brief for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, amicus curiae.

Jorge Martínez-Luciano, San Juan, PR, Emil Rodríguez-Escudero, Ponce, PR, and M.L. & R.E. Law Firm on brief for the Puerto Rico Association of Mayors, amicus curiae.

Ana Maria Hernandez Marti and Jessica L. Blome, Berkeley, CA, on brief for Animal Wellness Action, Animal Wellness Foundation, and the Center for a Humane Economy, amici curiae.

Before Howard, Chief Judge, Lynch and Barron, Circuit Judges.

LYNCH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases challenge the constitutionality of Section 12616 of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 ("Section 12616"), which bans the "sponsor[ship]" and "exhibit[ion]" of cockfighting matches in Puerto Rico. Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 12616, 132 Stat. 4490, 5015-16 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2156 ). Plaintiffs argue that the law exceeds Congress's Commerce and Territorial Clause powers and violates their First Amendment and Due Process rights. We affirm the district court's decision and hold that Section 12616 is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power and does not violate plaintiffs' individual rights.1

I. Background

On appeal from the grant of the government's motion for summary judgment, we read the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Stamps v. Town of Framingham, 813 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2016).

Cockfighting is "the sport of pitting gamecocks to fight and the breeding and training of them for that purpose." Cockfighting, Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/sports/cockfighting (last visited Dec. 17, 2020). The birds are bred to fight, are typically armed with steel spurs, and fight until one of the birds dies or is so injured that it can no longer fight. The Cockfight: A Casebook, at vii (Alan Dundes ed., 1994). The fights may end in a few minutes or go on as long as half an hour. Id. Cockfighting was banned in Puerto Rico from 1898 to 1933, and has since been heavily regulated under local Puerto Rico law. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15 §§ 301 et seq.

In 1976, Congress amended the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA") to ban "animal fighting venture[s]," now defined as "any event, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, that involves a fight conducted ... between at least 2 animals for purposes of sport, wagering, or entertainment." 7 U.S.C. § 2156(f)(1) ; Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-279, 90 Stat. 417, 421-22 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2156 ). Those 1976 amendments contained an exception allowing fights between "live birds" which took place in any state where such fights were allowed under state law. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976 § 17. Puerto Rico is treated as a state under the AWA. 7 U.S.C. § 2156(f)(3).

Congress has amended the animal fighting venture prohibition several more times. As of 2018, before the passage of the law at issue in this case, Congress had banned attendance at all animal fighting ventures -- including those in Puerto Rico and other jurisdictions which still allowed cockfighting -- and the "[b]uying, selling, delivering, possessing, training, or transporting" of animals for the purpose of having the animal participate in an animal fighting venture. 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(2), (b) (2018).

In 2018, Congress passed Section 12616, which removed the remaining exception that allowed individuals to "[s]ponsor[ ] or exhibit[ ]" cocks in fights if allowed under local law and if they lacked knowledge that the cocks were moved in interstate commerce for purposes of cockfighting. See Section 12616(a); 7 U.S.C. § 2156. It also closed an exception which had allowed the use of interstate mail or services to advertise or promote cockfights taking place in states which permitted cockfighting. See Section 12616(b); 7 U.S.C. § 2156(c) ; Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171 § 10302, 116 Stat. 134, 492.

The sponsors of Section 12616 explained that prohibiting cockfighting would "move to end the cruelty of animal fighting," "protect ... communities from associated crimes such as illegal drug dealing and human violence," and "safeguard against the spread of diseases in poultry such as avian flu, since birds used in cockfighting are particularly vulnerable." Further, "[a]fter a 2002 outbreak of exotic Newcastle disease

in the U.S., which cost taxpayers nearly $200 million and the poultry industry many millions more, the USDA implicated cockfighting as a culprit in spreading the disease."

II. Procedural History

On May 22 and August 1, 2019, plaintiffs filed two suits to enjoin the enforcement of Section 12616.2 The cases were consolidated by the district court on August 5, 2019.

Plaintiffs asserted a number of claims, including that Section 12616 violated their First Amendment and Due Process rights, and that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce and Territorial Clauses. Club Gallístico de P.R. Inc. v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 3d 191, 201 (D.P.R. 2019). The plaintiffs lodged both facial and as-applied pre-enforcement challenges to the statute. Id. at 200.3

The government asserted that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the portions of the animal fighting venture ban that were unchanged by Section 12616.4 Id. at 203.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Id. at 201. The district court granted the government's motion and denied plaintiffs' motion. Id. at 202.

The district court first held that the plaintiffs had "standing to challenge the constitutionality of Congress' extension of the animal fighting prohibition to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and those provisions that have existed prior to Section 12616's approval." Id. at 204.

The district court then concluded that Section 12616 was a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause and Territorial Clause powers. Id. at 204-08. It next held that cockfighting is not expressive conduct and so is unprotected by the First Amendment, and that Section 12616 did not violate plaintiffs' right of free association because it does not actually restrict association. Id. at 209-10. The district court rejected the substantive Due Process claim because there is no fundamental right to cockfighting and there was a rational basis for passing Section 12616. Id. at 211. It also rejected plaintiffs' procedural Due Process claim, stating that "the legislative process itself provides citizens with all of the process they are due." Id. (quoting Correa-Ruiz v. Fortuño, 573 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) ).

This appeal followed.5

III. Analysis

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Irish v. Fowler, 979 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2020).

We first address the issue of standing, followed by the Commerce Clause, First Amendment, and Due Process arguments.

A. Standing

Federal courts have "an independent obligation to assure that standing exists, regardless of whether it is challenged by any of the parties." Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 499, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009).

To have standing, a plaintiff must " ‘allege[ ] such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction." Id. at 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). "To satisfy Article III's ‘personal stake’ requirement vis-à-vis a statutory challenge, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that (i) she has suffered an actual or threatened injury in fact, which is (ii) fairly traceable to the statute, and (iii) can be redressed by a favorable decision." Ramírez v. Sánchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2006) (first citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ; and then citing Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) ). "[A] plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.’ " Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159, ...

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