United States v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 09 December 2021
• Docket Number: CRIMINAL ACTION 03-00194-BAJ-EWD
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ERIC WAYNE HAWKINS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ERIC WAYNE HAWKINS

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 03-00194-BAJ-EWD

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana

December 9, 2021

RULING AND ORDER

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before the Court is Defendant's pro se Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 165, the "Motion"). The Motion is unopposed. The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the limited purpose of representing Defendant regarding Defendant's Motion. (Doc. 173). The Court provided a briefing schedule. (Id.). Thereafter, the Assistant Federal Public Defender filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion. (Doc, 174). The United States did not file an opposition. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 12, 2003, the Grand Jury returned a three-count Indictment charging Defendant with the following: (1) Count One, distribution of five grams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base ("crack" cocaine); (2) Count Two, distribution of fifty grams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base and a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine; and (3) Count Three, distribution of fifty grams or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base. (Doc. 1).

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Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty on Counts Two and Three of the Indictment. (Doc. 67; Doc. 81). The Court dismissed Count One of the Indictment on the Government's Motion. (Doc. 81), The Court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment of "life without release" on Count Two and 360 months on Count Three, to be served concurrently. (Id. at p. 3). The Court imposed a term of supervised release of eight years upon Defendant's release from imprisonment. (Id. at p. 4).

The Government filed notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 that Defendant had two prior felony drug convictions. (See Doc. 122). Accordingly, Defendant was sentenced to the statutorily mandated sentence of life without release. (Id.).

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. (Doc. 79). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court, noting that Defendant had been sentenced pursuant to the statutory mandate of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(a). (Doc. 95, p. 4; see also Doc. 122).

Defendant then filed a Motion to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting that he received insufficient notice of the Government's intent to rely on prior state convictions to enhance his sentence. (Doc. 97). The Court dismissed Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence with prejudice as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1). (Doc. 115).

Petitioner then filed a "Motion Requesting Modification of Sentence of Imprisonment[ ] and [] Judicial Notice of Law in Accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) Motion [and] Federal Rule[ ] of Evidence 201." (Doc. 119).

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Therein, Defendant alleged that in imposing the sentence, the Court erroneously relied on a prior state conviction despite the Government's failure to provide timely notice of its intent to introduce the conviction to enhance his sentence. (Id.; see also Doc. 122).

The Court denied Defendant's Motion for a modification of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 2250. (Doc. 122). The Court found that the plain language of Section 3582 applied only to sentences that are "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." (Id. at p. 3). In denying Defendant's Motion, the Court reasoned that "because [D]efendant was sentenced pursuant to the statutory mandate of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(a) rather than the federal sentencing guidelines, a reduction in his term of imprisonment is not authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)." (Id. at p. 4).

Defendant appealed the Court's Ruling. (Doc. 125; Doc. 127). The Fifth Circuit remanded the matter to the Court to determine whether Defendant's notice of appeal was filed timely, and if not, whether Defendant's late filing was due to excusable neglect or good cause. (Doc. 131; see also Doc. 133). The Court concluded that Defendant failed to deliver his notice of appeal to prison officials timely but found good cause for the Defendant's delay in filing the notice of appeal. (Doc. 133, p. 1). Upon return to the Fifth Circuit, that court then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution as Defendant failed to timely file a brief. (Doc. 141, p. 2). Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit granted Defendant's motion to reinstate the appeal. (Doc. 142). Finally,

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on October 6, 2009, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as frivolous. (Doc. 143, p. 2).

On May 6, 2016, the Court entered an Administrative Order regarding "request for relief in light of Johnson v. United States, [576 U.S. 591 (2015)] which was made retroactive by the United States Supreme Court in Welch v. United States, [578 U.S. 120 (2016)]." (Doc. 148). Therein, the Court appointed the Office of the Federal Public Defender to represent any defendant who was previously determined to have been entitled to appointment of counsel or who is now indigent and who has been identified as possibly qualifying for federal habeas relief under either 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in light of Johnson and Welch. (Id. at p. 1). The Court formed a Johnson Review Committee, consisting of representatives of the Federal Public Defender, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Probation Office to continue the process of identifying and reviewing all criminal cases with filings in the Court requesting relief under Johnson, and to make recommendations to the Court regarding the proper resolution of the filings. (Doc. 149, p. 2). Following this process, the Government filed a Notice to the Court, representing that no Johnson motions were filed in this matter and that the Court's Administrative Orders were rendered moot. (Doc. 154, p. 2).

Defendant then filed a Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. (Doc. 159). The Court granted Defendant's Motion and reduced Defendant's term of imprisonment from a life sentence to 360 months. (Doc. 163).

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Defendant now moves for reconsideration of the Court's Ruling. (Doc. 165). Defendant simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal, appealing the Court's Order reducing his sentence. (Doc. 166). The Fifth Circuit remanded the matter to the Court for the limited purpose of ruling on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. (Doc. 171).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Although motions for reconsideration "are nowhere explicitly authorized in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, they are a recognized legitimate procedural device." United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Cook, 670 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 982 (1982)); see also United States v. Brewer, 60 F.3d 1142, 1143 (5th Cir. 1995) ("a motion for reconsideration ... is a judicial creation not derived from statutes or rules"). Courts have "continuing jurisdiction over criminal cases and are free to reconsider [their] earlier decisions." United States v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 1975). In the context of criminal proceedings, courts have applied the same legal standards as for motions for reconsideration in civil cases. United States v. Evans, No. 15-61, 2018 WL 6427854, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 2018); United States v. Cramer, No. 1:16-CR-26, 2018 WL 7821079, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2018); United States v. Fisch, No. H-11-722, 2014 WL 309068, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2014); see also United States v. Cook, 670 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 908 F.Supp.2d 812, 820 (S.D. Tex. 2012); United States v. Garay, No. 3:19-CR-122-S, 2021 WL 807254, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2021).

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In the civil context, a motion for reconsideration that challenges a final civil judgment is treated either as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), or as a motion seeking relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1076 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1994). Here, the Court construes Defendant's Motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. "Rule 59(e) offers a narrow, 28-day window to ask for relief; limits requests for reconsideration to matters properly raised in the challenged judgment; and consolidates proceedings by producing a single final judgment for appeal." Banister v. Davis, 140 S.Ct. 1698, 1700 (2020). Defendant's motion was timely filed within the limits imposed by Rule 59(e).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Court's Authority to Provide Relief Under First Step Act

Before considering whether to reduce Defendant's sentence in response to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order granting a Sentence Reduction Pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, the Court must determine whether it has the authority to do so.

The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for certain crack-cocaine offenses. United States v. Winters, 986 F.3d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010)). Among other changes, that enactment "increased the drug amounts triggering mandatory minimums for crack trafficking offenses." Winters,

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986 F.3d at 945 (citing Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 269 (2012)). The Fair Sentencing Act drastically reduced disparities in punishments between crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine offenses. Winters, 986 F, 3d at 945 (citing Dorsey, 567 U.S. at 269).

In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act. Winters, 986 F.3d at 945. Among other effects, it made the Fair Sentencing Act's modifications of the statutory penalties for...