United States v. Henry
| Decision Date | 13 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:13-cr-00409-DAD-BAM,1:13-cr-00409-DAD-BAM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ADAM ALAN HENRY, Defendant. |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
This matter is before the court on defendant Adam Henry's motion for a judgment of acquittal—or in the alternative, motion for a new trial—and motion for discovery. (Doc. No. 254, 260.)
Defendant Henry was charged by way of a superseding indictment with conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and receipt and distribution of a visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). (Doc. No. 110.) After lengthy pretrial proceedings, on November 7, 2017 the jury trial commenced. On November 17, 2017, after approximately five hours of deliberation over two days, the jury returned their verdict, finding defendant guilty on both counts. (Doc. No. 236.)
///// After seeking and receiving an extension of time in which to file post-trial motions (Doc. Nos. 243, 244), on January 8, 2018, defendant filed his motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and also moved in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a). (Doc. No. 254.) On January 10, 2018, defendant filed a motion for discovery related to his motion for a new trial. (Doc. No. 260.) The government filed its opposition on February 26, 2018. (Doc. No. 278.) Defendant filed his reply on April 2, 2018. (Doc. No. 285.) After several stipulated continuances, an initial hearing on defendant's motions was held on April 30, 2018. Assistant United States Attorneys David Gappa and Ross Pearson appeared for the government. Attorney Anthony Capozzi appeared on behalf of defendant Henry. At that hearing, the court determined that an evidentiary was necessary with respect to one aspect of defendant's motion. That evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 29, 2018, at which time the court also heard further argument from the parties.
Having considered the parties' briefing, and having heard the arguments of counsel, for the reasons set forth below defendants' motions will be denied.
"A defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must ask whether, viewing "the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Hursh, 217 F.3d 761, 767 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Hubbard, 96 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Garrison, 888 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court has established a two-step inquiry for considering a challenge to a conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). "First, a reviewing court must consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution." United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (enbanc) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). "Second, the reviewing court must determine whether this evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Katakis, 800 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2015) () (quoting Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164). "[E]vidence is insufficient to support a verdict where mere speculation, rather than reasonable inference, supports the government's case, or where there is a total failure of proof of a requisite element." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, "the government does not need to rebut all reasonable interpretations of the evidence that would establish the defendant's innocence, or 'rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326); see also United States v. Aubrey, 800 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2015).
In addition, "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). "A district court's power to grant a motion for new trial is much broader than its power to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal." United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000). In considering a motion for a new trial, "[t]he district court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; it may weigh the evidence and in so doing evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses." Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1095; see also United States v. Katakis, 252 F. Supp. 3d 988, 992 (E.D. Cal. 2017). "If the court concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determination by another jury." Kellington, 217 F.3d at 1097 (quoting United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980)). Nonetheless, such authority is to be exercised only where extraordinary circumstances are presented. United States v. Imran, 964 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir. 1992); Katakis, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 992.
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Here, defendant Henry has raised multiple arguments in support of his motion for entry of a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. The court addresses each in turn.
Defendant first contends that the evidence introduced at his trial, as a matter of law, was insufficient to support a guilty verdict on count one of the indictment, charging him with conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (c).
The court instructed the jury that to find defendant guilty of count one of the indictment, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit the crime of sexual exploitation of a minor; and (2) the defendant became a member of the conspiracy knowing of at least one of its objects and intending to accomplish it. (Doc. No. 241 at 34.) To satisfy their burden as to that charge, the government introduced evidence at trial that defendant and his wife, Angele Henry, acted in concert to place and arrange a hidden camera in the bathroom of their home, which captured images of the minor victim A.T. These images, which depicted A.T. in various stages of undress, were then sorted, saved, and stored on a password-protected hard drive in defendant's home.
Although defendant appears to concede (at least for the sake of argument) that there was evidence presented that he and his wife conspired, he argues the evidence at trial was insufficient to demonstrate that they conspired to sexually exploit a minor. In support of this argument, defendant emphasizes that the hidden camera in their bathroom was installed high above the ground, and "was not situated as to focus on the lower extremities of the body." (Doc. No. 254 at 3.) Defendant takes the position that while his and his wife's actions may have amounted to voyeurism, they did not constitute sexual exploitation. Defendant also argues that under the so-called Dost factors, the images he secretly captured of A.T. did not amount to a lascivious exhibition, and therefore did not depict sexually explicit conduct. See United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987), and aff'd, 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987).
///// As noted above, defendant was charged in count one of the superseding indictment with conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor; he was not charged with the substantive offense of sexually exploiting a minor. When an individual is charged with a conspiracy offense, "[t]he agreement is the essence of the crime." United States v. Iriarte-Ortega, 113 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Loveland, 825 F.3d 555, 561 (9th Cir. 2016) (). Moreover, conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2251 does not require that an overt act be committed for the crime of conspiracy to be fully accomplished. See United States v. Grovo, 653 Fed. App'x 512, 514 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Unlike the general conspiracy statute, which expressly requires proof of an overt act, § 2251(e) makes no mention of such a requirement.") (citing United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990)).1 Thus, defendant's conviction on count one does not stand or fall depending upon whether the images of A.T. he was successful in capturing portrayed sexually explicit conduct.
Nonetheless, whether the images constituted a lascivious exhibition—and therefore amounted to sexually explicit conduct—is relevant to the jury's determination of whether a conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor existed. See United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 924 (9th Cir. 2004) (). If the defendant recorded and compiled sexually exploitative images of the victim, and then stored them in a place that was readily accessible only to he and his co-conspirator, that is some evidence that sexual exploitation was one of the aims of the conspiracy. In evaluating whether the images captured by the hidden camera...
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