United States v. Horton
| Decision Date | 10 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:11CR393 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF, v. BRIAN P. HORTON, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the motion of defendant Brian Horton to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense. (Doc. No. 93.) The government opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 95.)
On August 18, 2011, defendant was charged on a criminal complaint with one count of transmitting a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). (Doc. No. 1, Complaint.) In an affidavit sworn by FBI Special Agent Charles P. Johnson and attached to the complaint, it was alleged that on June 7, 2011, defendant contacted the chambers of a Florida state judge, and requested a "record" of the probate proceedings involving his late mother's estate. When he was advised that no such record would be transmitted, defendant became upset and threatened that if anything were to happen to his sister and an attorney (Vicky Buckwalter and Ron Figler)—who were a party and counsel, respectively, in the probate matter—it would be the state court's fault.On June 14, 2011, the state court judge's chamber's received a letter, sent through the U.S. Mails, from defendant wherein he allegedly wrote:
I should have said I want to kill Both [sic] of them in cold blood . . . [and] I have exhausted all avenues in FL [sic]. Your office knows that what I am saying is true. Vigilante I will be. If I have a jury of my peers I want them to spare my life because I tried the Legal [sic] system in Florida and it failed to up hold [sic] the laws of the land of Fl. Maybe this will get a criminal hearing if I take the law into my own hands.
(Doc. No. 1-1, Affidavit, at 3; Doc. No. 111, letter filed under seal, at 430.)
On August 31, 2011, an indictment was returned charging defendant with the same offense. (Doc. No. 12, Indictment.) The indictment, which is the subject of defendant's motion to dismiss, contains less detail than the original complaint and supporting affidavit, and provides, in its entirety:
On or about June 7, 2011, through June 14, 2011, in the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, and elsewhere, the defendant, BRIAN P. HORTON, knowingly did deposit in an authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent and delivered by the Postal Service, and caused to be delivered by the Postal Service according to the directions thereon, a communication addressed to the Florida Fifth Judicial Circuit, Middle District of Florida, and containing a threat to injure another person, in violation of Title 18, Section 876(c), United States Code.
In his motion to dismiss, filed July 10, 2013, defendant argues that the indictment is constitutionally deficient in that it has violated his Sixth Amendment right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." (Doc. No. 93 at 329 ].) He further claims that the indictment's deficiencies have deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to prepare and present a defense, impinging his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. (Id.)
Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that an indictment contain a "plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged[.]" FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1); see United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 704 (6th Cir. 1994) () (quoting United States v. Piccolo, 723 F.2d 1234, 1238 (6th Cir. 1983) (en banc)). "An indictment will usually be sufficient if it states the offense using the words of the statute itself, as long as the statute fully and unambiguously states all the elements of the offense." United States v. Superior Growers Supply, Inc., 982 F.2d 173, 176 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 696 (6th Cir. 2008) () (quoting United States v. Douglas, 398 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir. 2005)). "However, the recitation of statutory language 'must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description with which he is charged.'" United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 531(6th Cir. 2007) ().
"The indictment must be read as a whole, accepting the factual allegations as true, and construing those allegations in a practical sense with all the necessary implications." McAuliffe, 490 F.3d at 531 (citing United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 140 n.1 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). "An indictment is to be construed liberally in favor of its sufficiency." Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 411 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Defendant claims that the indictment fails to charge a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). Section 876(c) provides:
Whoever knowingly so deposits or causes to be delivered as aforesaid, any communication with or without a name or designating mark subscribed thereto, addressed to any other person and containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If such a communication is addressed to a United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, or an official who is covered by section 114 [18 U.S.C. § 1114], the individual shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
The government does not contend that defendant directed a threatening communication to a United States judge, a federal law enforcement officer, or any official who is covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1114, such that § 876(c)'s enhancement would apply. Consequently, in order to establish a violation of § 876(c) in this case, the government must prove: (1) defendant caused a communication to be delivered, addressed to any other person ("mailing element"); (2) the communication contained a threat to injure the addressee or another person ("threat element"); and (3) defendant knowingly mailed the threatening communication ("mens rea element"). United States v. Rendelman, 641 F.3d 36, 44 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1712, 182 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 876(c); see also United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 768 (6th Cir. 2011) ().
Defendant does not seriously challenge the existence of the "mens rea element," as the indictment clearly charges that defendant knowingly sent the communication. Instead, he focuses on the first two elements, insisting that the indictment is fatally defective because it fails to: (1) state an address to which thecommunication was mailed and to identify the person to whom the alleged communication was directed; and (2) set forth the contents of the alleged threat. (Doc. No. 93 at 332.) The Court will address each contention in turn.
Defendant complains that the indictment omits the address where the letter was sent and the identity of the subject of the alleged threat. However, neither fact goes to an essential element of § 876(c). See 18 U.S.C. § 876(c); Rendelman, 641 F.3d at 46 (); United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 266 (6th Cir. 1992) ().
Nonetheless, defendant's objection does indirectly raise the question of whether the addressee of the communication must be a natural person. Defendant would answer the question in the affirmative, and request a ruling that the government's case fails because the address on the envelope of the letter was a court and not a natural person.
Courts are far from uniform in their treatment of § 876(c)'s use of the term "person", and the Sixth Circuit has yet to weigh in on the issue. In United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 2006), the indictment provided that the envelope containing the threatening communication was addressed to the "Connecticut State's Attorney's Office in Bridgeport," Connecticut. Id. at 307. In affirming the conviction under § 876(c), the court rejected the defendant's contention that the address on theenvelope was not a reference to a specific person. The court reasoned that, "[w]hile 'Connecticut State's Attorney's Office' may be used to refer to an institution, at the same time, the Connecticut State's Attorney is a person, and the words 'Connecticut State's Attorney's Office' are reasonably understood to indicate that person's office." Id. at 308.
Likewise, in United States v. Williams, 376 F.3d 1048, 1051-53 (10th Cir. 2004), the court held that threatening communications addressed to "U.S. Dist. Attorney Office's" was directed to the "natural person" holding that office. In reaching this conclusion, the court found that it was appropriate to consider, "at a minimum, the envelope and the salutation of a letter" to determine the subject to whom the letter was addressed. Id. at 1053. The Ninth Circuit took the analysis one step further and ruled that it was appropriate to consider the envelope, salutation, and body of the communication to determine the identity of the addressee. See United States v. Havelock, 664 F.3d 1284, 1296 (9th Cir. 2012) (...
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