United States v. Hoyt

Decision Date08 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. 1:01CR283.,1:01CR283.
Citation200 F.Supp.2d 790
PartiesUNITED STATES of America Plaintiff, v. Richard HOYT, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Gary D. Arbeznik, Sr., Office of U.S. Atty., Cleveland, OH, for plaintiff.

Dennis G. Terez, Office of Fed. Public Defender, Cleveland, OH, Richard W. Hoyt, Cameron Mills, NY, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ECONOMUS, District Judge.

On August 16, 2001, this Court held a competency hearing to determine whether Defendant is competent to stand trial under the standard set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4241. After hearing expert testimony, the Court granted the parties leave to brief the issue of Defendant's competency. On September 28, 2001, Defendant submitted his brief (Dkt.# 10); the government filed a response on October 17, 2001 (Dkt.# 11); and on March 26, 2002, Defendant filed a Supplemental Brief (Dkt.# 12). For the reasons stated below, the Court finds Defendant competent to stand trial.

BACKGROUND

On June 27, 2000, Defendant was charged in a criminal complaint with six counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) in the North District of Ohio. On June 29, 2000, Magistrate Judge Nancy A. Vecchiarelli granted Defendant's oral motion for a competency exam and hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241. Defendant arrived at the Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MCC") in Chicago, Illinois, on August 9, 2000. Dr. Daniel S. Greenstein ("Dr.Greenstein"), a licensed clinical psychologist, examined and observed Defendant from that date until September 28, 2000. Dr. Greenstein filed his report on October 4, 2000. Dr. Greenstein diagnosed Defendant as suffering from major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, polysubstance abuse, borderline personality disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. Post-Hearing Brief of Richard Hoyt at Exhibit A, p. 5. In addition, Dr. Greenstein reported that it was his medical opinion that Defendant was "not competent to proceed to criminal adjudication" and that Defendant was "in need of mental health services without which the legal proceeding will lack the requisite fairness in terms of having the interests of both the government and the defendant represented." Post-Hearing Brief of Richard Hoyt at Exhibit A, p. 7.

On October 24, 2000, Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli presided over Defendant's second competency hearing, and neither the government nor the Defendant objected to Dr. Greenstein's determination that Defendant was not competent to stand trial. Consequently, Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli ordered Defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment for restoration to competency at MCC.

On November 30, 2000, Defendant was transferred to the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri ("Springfield"), to undergo a comprehensive evaluation and treatment.1 Dr. James K. Wolfson ("Dr.Wolfson"), a staff psychiatrist, first examined Defendant on December 1, 2000. Dr. Wolfson filed the first status report on February 28, 2001, a second status report on May 1, 2001, and a final report on May 25, 2001. Dr. Wolfson agreed with Dr. Greenstein's evaluation of Defendant as suffering from borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and polysubstance abuse. Post-Hearing Brief of Richard Hoyt at Exhibit D, p. 19. Dr. Wolfson also reported that Defendant suffered from "[p]robable major depression, largely resolved." Id. Dr. Wolfson concluded that Defendant had been restored to competency, while expressing "some degree of uncertainty as to whether or not the defendant was ever truly incompetent." Post-Hearing Brief of Richard Hoyt at Exhibit D, p. 26.

On June 18, 2001, Bill Hedrick "Mr. Hedrick", Warden at Springfield, issued the requisite certificate of competency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e). Court Exhibit D. Mr. Hedrick informed the Court that it was the opinion of the clinical staff that Defendant had been restored to competency and that Defendant "possessed the mental capacity to understand the legal proceedings against him and to assist an attorney in preparing his defense." Id.

On August 16, 2001, this Court held a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e), to determine whether Defendant was competent to stand trial. At the hearing, Lonnie Archuleta, the Defendant's mother, and Dr. Wolfson testified. The Court granted the parties leave to submit post-hearing briefs as defense counsel had not received the final report regarding Defendant's competence from Dr. Wolfson at the time of the hearing.

LAW

Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e), after the director of the facility at which a defendant is hospitalized issues a certificate of competence, the court must hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to § 4241(d). If the court finds that a defendant "has recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense, the court shall order his immediate discharge from the facility in which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for trial." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e).

In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), the Supreme Court stated that to be competent for trial, a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and must have "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." See United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 580 (6th Cir.1999); United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1203 (6th Cir.1997). The government bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant is competent to stand trial. United States v. Chapple, 47 F.3d 1170, 1995 WL 6147, *2(6th Cir.(6th Cir. 1995)) (unpublished). "A preponderance of the evidence is such evidence that persuades the fact finder to conclude `the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.'" Id. quoting Disner v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 726 F.2d 1106, 1109 (6th Cir.1984). Furthermore, "[i]n determining whether a defendant is competent, the court may consider a number of factors, `including medical opinion and the court's observation of the defendant's comportment,' representations by defense counsel, and the defendant's psychiatric history." United States v. Reinhold, 1998 WL 88764, *2 (S.D.N.Y.)(internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Although Dr. Wolfson found Defendant competent to stand trial, Defendant maintains that he is not. Defendant's claim of incompetence relies for the most part on the diagnosis and evaluation performed by Dr. Greenstein at MCC. Defendant asserts four points in support of his contention that he is not competent to stand trial: (1) Dr. Wolfson has neither discredited Dr. Greenstein's conclusions, nor found fault with the manner in which Dr. Greenstein conducted his forensic evaluation of Defendant; (2) Defendant has a long history of troubled behavior, upon which Dr. Greenstein based his conclusion; (3) Dr. Wolfson failed to provide treatment or mental services consistent with Dr. Greenstein's recommendation in his written report; and (4) Defendant's cognitive awareness of court procedure is not definitive in determining Defendant's competence to stand trial.

Defendant's first point is based upon the fact that Dr. Wolfson and Dr. Greenstein —two qualified, court-appointed experts —reached opposite conclusions concerning Defendant's competence to stand trial. Defendant relies upon Dr. Greenstein's determination that Defendant is not competent to stand trial. In United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir.1991), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not err in assigning greater weight to an expert's finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial despite another expert's finding that the defendant suffered from major depression and was not competent. Dr. Wolfson, a board certified specialist in psychiatry and forensic psychiatry, was responsible for restoring Defendant to competence subsequent to Dr. Greenstein's diagnosis and evaluation of Defendant. Although Dr. Greenstein diagnosed Defendant as suffering from depression, it was Dr. Wolfson's professional assessment that over the course of the six months during which he subsequently treated and observed Defendant, that Defendant displayed the requisite competence to stand trial.

Defendant takes issue with the fact that although Dr. Wolfson disagreed with Dr. Greenstein, Dr. Wolfson did not discredit Dr. Greenstein's conclusions or find fault with his methodology. However, it was not necessary for Dr. Wolfson to do either in presenting to this Court his professional opinion that Defendant is competent to stand trial. Furthermore, rather than discredit the findings of Dr. Greenstein, Dr. Wolfson offered several reasonable explanations for their different conclusions.

First, Dr. Greenstein conducted his observations for less than two months, from August 9, 2000 to September 28, 2000, whereas Dr. Wolfson observed and examined Defendant for about six months, from December 1, 2000 until May 25, 2001. Second, Dr. Wolfson noted that he regards Dr. Greenstein "as a perfectly qualified colleague," but acknowledged that he disagreed with his reasoning. Def. Ex. D at 10. Dr. Wolfson explained that Dr. Greenstein interpreted Defendant's disinterest in his defense strategy and Defendant's seeming desire to remain incarcerated to Defendant's having a lack of capacity to have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him as a result of major depression. Tr. at 37. However, Dr. Wolfson did not believe that Defendant's disinterest was the result of depression or that Defendant was incapacitated. Although he testified that Defendant displayed symptoms of dysphoria,2 Dr. Wolfson's assessment was that it was not pervasive. Tr. at 38-39. Dr. Wolfson observed that Defendant did not display the symptoms...

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