United States v. Hubbard

Decision Date13 September 1979
Docket NumberCrim. No. 78-0401.
Citation493 F. Supp. 209
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Mary Sue HUBBARD et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Carl S. Rauh, U. S. Atty., Raymond Banoun, Judith Hetherton, Timothy J. Reardon, Steven C. Tabackman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., for the United States.

Leonard B. Boudin, Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard, Michael Lee Hertzberg, New York City, for defendant Hubbard.

Philip J. Hirschkop, John D. Grad, Leonard S. Rubenstein, Hirschkop & Grad, P. C., Alexandria, Va., for defendants Heldt and Snider.

Roger E. Zuckerman, Roger C. Spaeder, Lawrence A. Katz, Richard A. Stanley, Wendy K. Manz, Zuckerman, Spaeder & Taylor, Washington, D. C., for defendants Willardson and Weigand.

Michael Nussbaum, James Davenport, Ronald G. Precup, Nussbaum & Owen, Washington, D. C., for defendants Hermann and Raymond.

John Kenneth Zwerling, Jonathan Shapiro, Zwerling & Shapiro, Alexandria, Va., for defendant Wolfe.

Leonard Koenick, Washington, D. C., for defendant Thomas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge.

The fourth amendment of the U. S. Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S.Const. Am. 4. This amendment was intended to prevent searches under unchecked general authority, such as those that had resulted from the use of the general warrant in England and the writs of assistance in the Colonies, and to ensure the "privacies of life". Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877 (1959).

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created means of effectuating fourth amendment rights. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), the Supreme Court held that a defendant could petition prior to trial for the return of illegally seized evidence, and in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), the Court held that such evidence could not be introduced in a federal prosecution. Although the exclusion of probative reliable evidence denigrates the public interest in the determination of the truth at trial, the exclusionary rule has evolved as one deterrent to police misconduct. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487-88, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).1

Before the Court at this time are the motions of the defendants to suppress evidence. Finding no illegality in the actions of the government agents who executed the warrants at issue, the Court will deny the motions, and order the defendants to proceed to trial to be "acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175, 89 S.Ct. 961, 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 8, 1977, three search warrants were simultaneously executed on premises owned and operated by the Church2 of Scientology: 2125 S Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.; 5930 West Franklin Avenue, Hollywood, California the Fifield Manor; and 4833 Fountain Avenue, Hollywood, California the Cedars-Sinai Complex. Immediately following the execution of the warrants, the Church filed two separate actions in Los Angeles and the District of Columbia seeking the return and suppression of property pursuant to Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3

On July 27, 1977, Chief Judge Bryant of this Court ruled that the warrant executed in the District of Columbia was invalid on its face. In re: Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 436 F.Supp. 689 (D.D.C.1977). On December 1, 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Judge Bryant's decision and upheld the validity of the District of Columbia search warrant. In re: Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, 187 U.S.App. D.C. 297, 572 F.2d 321 (D.C.Cir. 1977), cert. denied, Founding Church of Scientology v. U. S., 435 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 1491, 55 L.Ed.2d 519 (1978).

In separate Memorandum Opinions of April 4, 1978, and July 5, 1978, Judge Lucas upheld the execution of the warrants in California on all grounds. Church of Scientology v. United States, No. CV-77-2565-MML (C.D.Cal. April 4, 1978); Church of Scientology v. United States, No. CV-77-2565-MML (C.D.Cal. July 5, 1978). On February 22, 1979, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the Church's appeal of Judge Lucas' decision on the ground that the judgment was interlocutory and unappealable. Church of Scientology v. United States, 591 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1979).

Meanwhile, on August 15, 1978, eleven individuals were indicted by a federal Grand Jury.4 It is these individuals,5 about to go on trial, who are before this Court seeking to suppress the evidence seized on July 8, 1977. The suppression hearing began on July 3, 1979, with this Judge taking testimony in Los Angeles, California,6 and ended, following a view of the premises and several weeks of proceedings in Washington, D. C., on August 29, 1979.

Five days prior to the completion of the hearing on the defendants' motions to suppress, Chief Judge Bryant issued an eleven-page Memorandum and Order holding that the search conducted in Washington, D. C. violated the fourth amendment. In re: Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, Misc. No. 77-0151 (D.D.C. August 24, 1979).7 It has been the government's position throughout the litigation before this Court, that none of the documents seized at the District of Columbia location were shown to the Grand Jury which indicted the defendants, and that none would be used at the trial in this case. Thus, the propriety of the District of Columbia search is not an issue before this Court.8 Accordingly, before this Court is the motion, filed by the nine individuals about to go on trial, to suppress the evidence seized on July 8, 1977, from the two Church of Scientology premises in Los Angeles, California.

The defendants have raised six broad grounds in support of their motion to suppress:

1. The warrant was unconstitutional on its face because it is not supported by probable cause, was based upon stale information, did not particularly describe the place to be searched and the items to be seized, and was a general warrant;

2. The search was illegal because the affidavit which was necessary to uphold the legality of the warrant was not attached to the warrant at the time it was executed;

3. The agents conducted a general, exploratory search, in violation of the terms of the warrant and of the first and fourth amendments;

4. The agents seized documents beyond the scope of the warrant;

5. The agents used excessive force in their searches in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109; and,

6. The warrant was obtained and executed by the government in a manner which violated defendants' right to process of law.

The government has convincingly undermined the persuasiveness of the defendants' arguments on three broad grounds. First, the government contends that the standing of the defendants to seek the suppression of evidence seized from the premises of the Church is severely limited. Second, the government points to the decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upholding the facial validity of the search warrant, In re: Search Warrant Dated July 4, 1977, supra, and the decisions of Judge Lucas upholding its execution in Los Angeles. Church of Scientology v. United States, supra. Finally, the government seeks to narrow the inquiry to the documents the government intends to introduce into evidence as part of its case-in-chief, which the defendants virtually concede were properly seized. The Court will begin its inquiry with an analysis of the defendants' right to challenge the search of the Church's premises.

II. THE DEFENDANTS' FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE LIMITED TO THEIR OWN OFFICES.

Traditionally, it was necessary for a defendant to demonstrate "standing" before he or she could challenge the validity of a search. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court subsumed the traditional standing inquiry under substantive fourth amendment doctrine. Id. 99 S.Ct. at 428. Thus, defendants can have illegally seized evidence suppressed if their fourth amendment rights have been infringed. Id.

In the prior proceedings at which the searches were challenged, the searches plainly involved the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights: the Church of Scientology was the owner and operator of the premises and the party challenging the searches. In the proceedings before the Court, the parties challenging the searches are individuals.

Each individual defendant in a criminal case must demonstrate that his or her fourth amendment rights are involved in order to suppress evidence. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969), the Supreme Court noted that:

The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Coconspirators and codefendants have been accorded no special standing.

Id. at 171-72, 89 S.Ct. at 965.

An individual's fourth amendment rights are involved if he or she has "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 99 S.Ct. at 430. It has been recognized that such a test does not provide a ...

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