United States v. Huslage
| Decision Date | 05 December 1979 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 79-127. |
| Citation | 480 F. Supp. 870 |
| Parties | The UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. John Niles HUSLAGE, Thomas Albert Stewart, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
James Y. Garrett, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.
George E. Schumacher, Federal Public Defender, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Huslage.
Vincent A. Colianni, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Stewart.
A federal grand jury returned a five-count indictment against John Niles Huslage and Thomas Albert Stewart on July 25, 1979. A synopsis of the five counts follows:
(1) Count One charges both defendants with kidnapping a fifteen-year old minor, (who will be referred to as "C.T."), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976), and transporting her from Albuquerque, New Mexico to Philipsburg, Pennsylvania.
(2) Count Two charges that both defendants knowingly transported a female — C.T. — in interstate commerce for an immoral purpose in violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1976).
(3) Count Three charges Huslage alone with knowingly shipping and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce, having been previously convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1976).
(4) Count Four charges Huslage alone with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(i) (1976) by knowingly shipping and transporting a stolen firearm in interstate commerce, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm was stolen.
(5) Count Five charges that both defendants unlawfully carried a firearm during their commission of the offense of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Mr. Huslage is thus charged under all five counts of the indictment, while Mr. Stewart is charged as a codefendant in Counts One, Two and Five.
On October 22, 1979, this Court heard testimony and arguments on four pretrial motions presented by the defense. The defendants joined in making all four motions. Although this Court orally ruled on these motions in order to enable counsel to proceed with their preparations for trial, we now provide a fuller explanation of those rulings.
Count Two of the indictment charges both John Niles Huslage and Thomas Albert Stewart with a violation of section 2421 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which is commonly known as the Mann Act. The defendants argue that the United States Attorneys' Manual directs the district offices only to prosecute cases under section 2421 when those cases involve commercial prostitution activities. Noting that the present case does not have any commercial element, the defendants move this Court to dismiss Count Two, or in the alternative, to order the government to request a determination by the Justice Department of the propriety of the instant prosecution.
Section 2421 does not require, on its face, that the government prove an element of commercialism in order to obtain a conviction. Rather, the statute authorizes the prosecution of anyone who knowingly transports across state lines a female for any immoral purpose. If the government proves the facts alleged in this case, a jury lawfully could convict the defendants under the Mann Act. The procedures set forth in the United States Attorneys' Manual are not binding on district offices, the Manual creates no rights in any party, and the United States District Courts have no jurisdiction to enforce the Manual's directives. See United States v. Shulman, 466 F.Supp. 293, 297-301 (S.D.N.Y.1979). Even if this Court did have the authority to enforce the Manual, however, we still would not dismiss Count Two. We interpret the relevant section of the Manual as seeking to avoid the prosecution of cases in which there was no commercial element and the female had consented to the interstate travel. We do not believe that the Manual seeks to prevent the prosecution of cases in which a defendant allegedly transports an underage female against her will.
The joint motion to dismiss Count Two will be denied.
The defendants jointly move this Court to suppress evidence seized by Pennsylvania state troopers during a search of the defendants' persons incident to their arrest and during two searches of an automobile that was in the possession of Defendant Huslage. They also move to suppress statements given by the defendants to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation following their arrest.
Pennsylvania state troopers made a warrantless arrest of both the defendants on the evening of July 8, 1979 outside the Mainliner Motel in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. The troopers had ample probable cause to support the arrests. Earlier in the evening, C.T., the alleged victim, had told an officer of the state police that the defendants had transported her from New Mexico against her will, that they had sexually abused her, and that they were armed. Troopers also had spoken to an employee of the motel where the defendants and C.T. had been staying. This employee stated that C.T., naked, bruised and scared, had come to her seeking help. Moreover, one of the troopers had observed C.T. in a shaken condition. "Probable cause can rest upon the collective knowledge of the police, rather than solely on that of the officer who actually makes the arrest." United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047, 98 S.Ct. 894, 54 L.Ed.2d 798 (1978).
Where probable cause exists, police do not need a warrant to arrest a suspected felon in a public place. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-24, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). The troopers did not violate any right of the defendants when they searched the defendants' persons incident to valid, custodial arrests. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343, 348 (1979); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973).
Following the arrest of the defendants, the state police had Defendant Huslage's Volvo towed to the police barracks. At approximately 1:30 A.M. on July 9, 1979, troopers obtained a warrant from a state magistrate authorizing them to make a nighttime search of the automobile and the defendants' motel room. The application for the warrant adequately described the premises to be searched and the items to be seized. Trooper Schaffer was the affiant on the search warrant application. The facts presented by Trooper Schaffer to establish probable cause came from an interview that he had had with C.T. She had told him that the defendants had transported her against her will from New Mexico to Pennsylvania, that they possessed illicit drugs, that they were armed with a pistol and that she had seen the pistol in the vehicle. An affidavit accompanying a search warrant application may contain hearsay if that hearsay comes from a reliable source. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). A victim of a crime is considered to be reliable unless evidence in the affiant's possession indicates the contrary. See United States v. Mahler, 442 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993, 92 S.Ct. 541, 30 L.Ed.2d 545 (1971); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal.3d 263, 269, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 632, 545 P.2d 1333, 1336, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929, 97 S.Ct. 335, 50 L.Ed.2d 299 (1976); State v. Paszek, 50 Wis.2d 619, 630-31, 184 N.W.2d 836, 842-43 (1971). The facts contained in Trooper Schaffer's affidavit constituted probable cause to search the motel room and the automobile.
The defendants, besides alleging a lack of probable cause, assert other challenges to the legality of the seizure made on July 9. These challenges arise from the fact that the police searched the Volvo twice on July 9. Using flashlights, troopers conducted their initial search at approximately 4:10 A.M.; they did not seize any evidence. The warrant, by its terms, had to be served by 5:00 A.M. At approximately 10:00 A.M., upon questioning by Trooper Schaffer, C.T. reaffirmed her earlier statement that she had seen a pistol in the automobile during the cross-country trip. Trooper Schaffer immediately conducted a second search. Aided by natural light, he found a Beretta pistol tucked behind a loose piece of upholstery. Later on July 9 Trooper Schaffer filed a return on the warrant, listing the weapon and its leather case.
The defendants argue that the seizure of the pistol violated the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, because the police conducted the search pursuant to a stale warrant that had already been used once. This Court finds on three independent grounds that the police activity that resulted in the seizure of the pistol did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. We address the merits of Defendant Stewart's challenges rather than deciding the difficult question of standing that could be raised in the wake of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).
First, although the state police did search the Volvo after the warrant, according to its terms, had expired, this action under the circumstances does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and should not prevent federal authorities from using the evidence in a federal prosecution. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 2005 requires that a search warrant "direct that the search be executed within a specified period of time, not to exceed two (2) days from the time of issuance." This rule seeks to prevent police searches where the probable cause supporting the search has grown stale. See Commonwealth v. McCants, 450 Pa. 245, 299 A.2d 283 (1973). In the present case, Trooper Schaffer searched the vehicle within nine hours after the magistrate had issued the warrant and within twelve hours after...
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