People v. Ramey

• Decision Date: 25 February 1976
• Docket Number: Cr. 18795
• Citation: 16 Cal.3d 263,127 Cal.Rptr. 629
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 545 P.2d 1333 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Kenneth RAMEY, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 629

127 Cal.Rptr. 629

16 Cal.3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael Kenneth RAMEY, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 18795.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Feb. 25, 1976.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1976.

Harold D. Winingar, Sacramento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Robert L. Layton, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Joel E. Carey and J. Robert Jibson, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

John E. Howard, Acting Dist. Atty., Harry B. Sondheim and Arnold T. Guminski, Deputy Dist. Attys., Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant was charged by information with possession of marijuana for sale, possession of amphetamines, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun. He pleaded not guilty and moved to suppress the evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The motion was granted in part and denied in part. Thereafter defendant negotiated a plea whereby he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of possession of marijuana (Health & Saf Code, § 11357), and the prosecution dropped the remaining counts. Defendant now appeals, asserting as error the partial denial of his motion to suppress. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m).)

On July 30, 1973, the residence of one James Turner of Sacramento was burglarized. Among the items taken were several firearms, one of which was a distinctive weapon, a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson Airweight. Turner immediately reported the burglary to the Sacramento police.

Turner, who was a licensed private investigator and former security guard, also decided to investigate his own case. His inquiries led him to two individuals, Reed and Weaver. Reed informed Turner that defendant Ramey had purchased the stolen weapon from Weaver. Turner was slightly acquainted with defendant, and decided to confront him about the stolen weapon.

On the afternoon of August 17, 1973, Turner went to defendant's home. Defendant first told Turner he had been offered the stolen weapon but had not purchased it. Turner insisted he had heard that defendant had bought the Airweight. Defendant responded, 'oh, that one,' and said he had not known it was Turner's. ¹ Defendant then admitted he had owned it briefly but said he had sold it to 'some white guy.' When pressed for details, defendant could not supply any further information concerning the purchaser. Turner considered defendant's manner and responses evasive and believed he was still in possession of the stolen weapon.

Turner again contacted the Sacramento police and spoke to Detective Joel Garcia. He related to Garcia that chain of events leading him to defendant's residence and his suspicion aroused by his conversation with defendant. Garcia concluded from Turner's information that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for the offense of receiving stolen property. ²

After a delay of some three hours, Garcia and six other officers proceeded to defendant's residence to effect the arrest of defendant and his roommate. As is the standard departmental practice, Garcia did not secure an arrest warrant prior to the prospective arrest. ³

Upon arriving at the apartment the officers drew their service revolvers and knocked. Defendant opened the door, and the officers identified themselves and displayed their badges. Defendant backed away towards a portable bar in the living room. The police followed him in, and when defendant was seen to reach behind the bar one of the officers grasped his arm and placed him under arrest. Detective Garcia looked behind the bar and found a .45 caliber pistol, three 'lids' of marijuana in cellophane baggies, and a baggie containing tablets appearing to be benzedrine. The officers then seized other marijuana in plain view.

After placing defendant and his roommate under arrest the police searched the entire premises, discovering additional contraband. None of the items found, however, related to the Turner burglary. At the section 1538.5 hearing only those items of evidence seized in the living room were ruled admissible; the remainder was ordered suppressed under the rule of Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.

Defendant attacks the validity of the seizure on the ground that the arrest itself was unlawful, thereby vitiating any claim that the search was conducted incident to a valid arrest. He charges illegality on two alternate theories. First, it is urged that Turner was an untested informant whose credibility had not been established and whose information thus could not furnish probable cause to arrest. Secondly, it is contended that even if there was probable cause the arrest was nevertheless invalid because article I, section 13, of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution require that in the absence of exigent circumstances a warrant must be obtained prior to an intrusion into the home for the purpose of effecting an arrest.

I

The issue of probable cause turns on the facts known to Detective Garcia prior to the arrest. Here the sole source of that knowledge was the information related to Garcia by Turner. The question is whether it was reasonable for Garcia to rely on that information.

The courts have recognized a distinction between informers who are virtual agents of the police and 'citizen informants' who are chance witnesses to or victims of crime. The former are often criminally disposed or implicated, and supply their 'tips' to the authorities on a recurring basis, in secret, and for pecuniary or other personal gain. The latter are innocent of criminal involvement, and volunteer their information fortuitously, openly, and through motives of good citizenship. (See generally People v. Schulle (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 809, 814--815, 124 Cal.Rptr. 585 and cases cited.) Because of these characteristics, the requisite showing of reliability in the case of a citizen informant is significantly less than that demanded of a police informer. (People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218, 240, 107 Cal.Rptr. 157, 507 P.2d 1365; Krauss v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 418, 421--422, 96 Cal.Rptr. 455, 487 P.2d 1023, and cases cited.)

It may therefore be stated as a general proposition that private citizens who are witnesses to or victims of a criminal act, absent some circumstance that would cast doubt upon their information, should be considered reliable. This does not, of course, dispense with the requirement that the informant--whether citizen or otherwise--furnish underlying facts sufficiently detailed to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed and the named suspect that the perpetrator; and the rule also presupposes that the police be aware of the identity of the person providing the information and of his status as a true citizen informant. (People v. Abbott (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 966, 970--971, 84 Cal.Rptr. 40.) In short, probable cause will not be provided by conclusionary information or anonymous informants, but neither a previous demonstration of reliability nor subsequent corroboration is ordinarily necessary when witnesses to or victims of criminal activities report their observations in detail to the authorities. ⁴

In the present case Detective Garcia could reasonably believe that Turner was a citizen informant as herein defined. Moreover, an additional demonstration of reliability was presented in Turner's ongoing relationship with the Sacramento police: while his occupation would not of itself cloak him with any presumption of credence, there was evidence that he had dealt with the Sacramento police on other occasions without raising doubts as to his trustworthiness. For all these reasons, Detective Garcia could accept as true Turner's representations as to the circumstances which led him to defendant's residence, and the statements which defendant there made.

Having established that Turner was a reliable informant, we consider the remaining question whether the information he supplied was sufficient to constitute probable cause to believe defendant guilty of the crime of receiving stolen property.

Defendant contends the information given to Garcia consisted mainly of Turner's mere speculation that defendant was still in possession of the stolen Airweight. However, Garcia testified that he believed there was probable cause to arrest defendant for the offense of Receiving stolen property, a crime which does not necessitate continuing possession of the goods. (Pen.Code, § 496, subd. 1.)

With regard to this offense there was ample showing to support a conclusion of probable cause. The key evidence, of course, was defendant's own admission to Turner that he had purchased the weapon and had actually 'received' it. After this admission the only element of the offense still open to question was defendant's subjective knowledge that the weapon was stolen. This is an element which must be inferred from the circumstances. As we recently stated in People v. Martin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 687, 696, 108 Cal.Rptr. 809, 814, 511 P.2d 1161, 1166, 'Possession of a stolen item in and of itself is a factor which could assist a reasonable person in formulating a strong suspicion that the recipient knew the item was stolen.' In addition, defendant apparently came into possession of the gun shortly after the burglary; he did not disclose to Turner the identity of the person from whom he had purchased it; and he conceded that he quickly 'got rid of' the gun by selling it to an apparent stranger. Taken together, these circumstances supported an inference of guilty knowledge. Detective Garcia therefore had probable cause to arrest defendant for the crime of receiving stolen property.

II

But this determination does not end our inquiry. Defendant further contends that even if there was probable cause, the arrest was...